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Foreword 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry commissions regularly an independent 
evaluation on the institutions under its administrative branch. This evaluation 
aims to objectively assess the importance, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (FII).  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry invited Dr. Markku Maula from the Helsinki 
University of Technology and Professor Gordon Murray from the London 
Business School to carry out the evaluation of the FII. 
The objective of the evaluation was to find answers to the following questions: 
What kinds of conclusions could be made on the relevance of FII’s 
activities in respect of the market needs?  
Has FII reached its objectives set by the law, the Government and the 
Ministry?  
Has the direct supply of State capital been the right way to achieve the 
objectives set, compared to other alternative instruments? 
The quality of management − has it been efficient and effective?  
Has the company utilised well external resources both in Finland and 
internationally? 
Are the practices of the company equal to those used in the private sector 
with regard to possible market distortions? 
Has the corporate governance been arranged in a proper way and have the 
objectives set by the Ministry been relevant? 
To support the evaluation, the Ministry set up a steering group representing the 
Venture Capital markets, investors and industries. The group was chaired by Mr. 
Matti Pietarinen from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and composed of Mr. 
Raine Vairimaa, Ministry of Finance, Mr. Ari Tolppanen, Capman Ltd., Mr. 
Martti Porkka, Sampo Ltd., Mr. Elmar Paananen, Eimo Ltd. and Mr. Jouni 
Keronen, Fortum Corporation. The group was supported by Mr. Pertti Valtonen 
and Mrs. Ritva Hainari from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Mr. Juha 
  
Marjosola from the FII. However, the evaluation report represents the opinions of 
the evaluators only. 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry wishes to thank the evaluators for their 
report. As a result of the evaluation, the Ministry of Trade and Industry believes 
that the FII receives valuable information and feedback for further development 
of its activities and the Ministry obtains an outside expert’s view of the 
institution’s utility, outcomes and relevance. Also, the evaluation most certainly 
adds value to the annual result-oriented supervisory process between the Ministry 
and the FII. 
 
Helsinki, 17 January 2003 
 
Erkki Virtanen 
Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
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Executive Summary 
Although the Finnish venture capital market grew rapidly over the last half of the 
1990s, it is still very small by international comparisons. The immaturity of the 
Finnish venture capital market is particularly marked if the high level of 
knowledge intensity, which characterizes the Finnish industry structure, is taken 
into consideration. 
In terms of market failures, the limited availability of seed and startup stage 
venture capital is the most persistent and urgent market failure in the Finnish 
venture capital market. Finnish industry observers almost universally share this 
opinion. The lack of early stage venture capital has also been the most common 
and permanent area of market failure in most of the other countries. In some 
more advanced venture capital markets, the market failure in early-stage venture 
capital has been recognized already for decades. The severely constrained supply 
of seed funding in Finland is particularly worrying given that its absence will 
over time likely limit the supply of high-quality deal flow to later stage investors. 
Accordingly, market failure in this one critical area can have the potential to 
hamper the long-term development of a substantial part of the Finnish venture 
capital and private equity markets. Accordingly, there is an argument for 
government intervention specifically in the areas of seed and startup stage 
venture capital. 
The primary focus of FII, given in the current legislation and in the decision of 
the Government, is to stimulate the Finnish venture capital market by addressing 
market failures particularly in early stage venture capital. However, FII has been 
burdened with a range of additional and frequently incompatible objectives. As a 
result, the management of FII has not been able to tackle successfully the 
worsening market failure in early stage investments. The recent emphasis of FII 
on direct investments and late stage fund investments does not suggest that the 
goal of resolving the early stage market failure is currently its key priority. 
Further, the present operating mode of FII by which it invests in venture capital 
funds on equal terms (pari passu) with private investors does not appear to be 
effective in resolving this market failure in seed and start-up stage venture 
capital. Consequently, FII has been losing its focus and effectiveness as a policy 
tool over the last two years. Given that the raison d’être of FII is to help resolve 
market failures in the Finnish venture capital market system, helping to resolve 
the market failure in early stage venture capital should remain the highest priority 
for FII. 
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FII’s operations in developing regional venture capital have been valuable. In 
comparing the various alternatives for reducing overlap between State agencies 
supplying regional venture capital, the evaluation of FII suggests that it is in a 
good position to operate as a regional fund of funds investor transferring best 
practices from other areas to regional venture capital management companies. FII 
has also good working relationships with EIF and institutional investors. There is 
a natural role for FII in continuing operating as a fund of funds investor focusing 
on market failure areas including regional venture capital funds. However, 
because of the lack of geographical presence outside Helsinki, the role of FII is 
better focused on providing centralized, effective financial management via fund 
of funds operation rather than operating locally in regions. In aspects requiring 
local presence, FII should collaborate closely with Finnvera’s regional network. 
Research and international experiences suggest that the government’s 
intervention in the venture capital market on the supply side has the most 
effective and least distorting impact if it is based on indirect rather than direct 
investing. The best practice is based on incentivizing experienced and capable 
investment professionals to manage State-assisted venture capital funds, which 
should be financed primarily by private investors. Incentives can best be 
engineered through asymmetric profit sharing. The incentives should focus on 
upside leverage (i.e. rewarding for success) rather than downside protection (i.e. 
underwriting losses in the case of failure). Such an indirect, upside incentive-
based approach helps to leverage both private money and provide critical value-
added services for the young portfolio firms in the fund. 
FII should not get involved in direct investing in client companies. There may be 
exceptional circumstances when this prohibition should be reappraised. These 
rare occasions should only be decided by MTI in the light of FII’s primary remit. 
FII’s core role should remain as a fund of funds investor. The management of FII 
should continue to build expertise in this area. If circumstances arise where 
national importance can be demonstrated, FII should contain its role to that of 
temporarily coordinating the management of the external skills and expertise 
needed to complete the necessary transactions. FII should not build a new direct 
investment organization for one-off contingencies. Indeed, there is a danger that 
given the scarce resources of the organization, contingent, one-off operations will 
serve to weaken the more important and longer-term objectives of the 
organization. 
Supporting the development of new technologies of national strategic importance 
is a key responsibility for a government. FII may well have a role here directing 
State resources into focused venture capital funds, which invest in these novel 
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and desired areas. However, the determination of the technologies of strategic 
importance to Finland should not be the responsibility of FII. Rather, decision-
making on such technology strategies should be made at the highest policy level. 
Such decisions must necessarily leverage available knowledge from other key 
actors in the innovation system including Tekes and Sitra. Once an agreement on 
areas of future strategic technology interest is determined, government can 
decide whether or not FII has an appropriate investment role via a fund of funds 
model. 
One valuable role of FII has been its support in helping channel EU funding to 
Finnish venture capital funds. Given the limited supply of domestic risk capital, 
immature venture capital market, and the challenges of young Finnish firms in 
internationalizing, an important part of the development of the venture capital 
market for FII in the future could be supporting the Finnish venture capital funds 
in attracting capital from foreign investors. 
The performance measurement of FII should be improved to enable a better 
assessment of the organization’s ability to address and resolve policy goals 
consistent with its purpose. Such an evaluation system cannot be put in place 
until the objectives and priorities of FII are both clear and agreed among its 
stakeholders. Once these goals are clear, the performance of FII investments in 
industry policy terms can be measured more accurately. This should include 
monitoring the investments by FII-backed venture capital funds in the identified 
market failure areas. An improved performance measurement of the policy 
effects would be of benefit to both FII management and MTI as the responsible 
ministry. 
If meeting a specific financial return target continues to be a key requirement 
placed on FII, it should be measured over a sufficiently long period of time in 
order to reflect more fully the cyclical changes in an economy. Longer-term 
perspective would enable FII to focus on its remit of resolving market failures 
particularly when the economic conditions are poor and FII’s intervention is most 
needed. It should be noted that, at the present time, the annually monitored, 
financial performance criterion placed on FII is inimical with the organization 
pursuing its early stage investment remit. The imposition of this single 
performance criterion has in large part contributed to the confusion of objectives, 
which appears endemic in this organization. 
At present the governance system overseeing FII appears somewhat weak and 
often of questionable effectiveness. This, in turn, has the consequence that senior 
management of FII are offered little guidance in the pursuit of their 
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responsibilities. This lacunae has enabled management to prioritize goals which 
have increasingly diverged from the primary objectives placed on FII by the 
decision of the Government in February 2000. In extremis, this agency of 
government has started to develop policies, which arguably reflect individual 
personalities and interests rather than the highest priorities of the stated 
government policy. 
The coordination between the key players of the Finnish innovation system 
should be improved. At the margin, there is real confusion expressed by industry 
observers as to the proper authority, roles and relationships of the main actors 
including FII, Sitra, and Finnvera. Top-level coordination between the players is 
needed to improve the effectiveness of the innovation system and to help resolve 
emerging problems at the boundary areas of the State agencies. This coordination 
needs to be monitored at the highest level of government given the different 
reporting structures (MTI and Parliament) of these organizations. The recently 
instituted meetings between the key executives of Sitra, Tekes, Finnvera, FII, 
T&E Centres, Finpro and the Finnish Foundation of Innovations have started this 
process, but it is as yet too early to judge the outcomes of this sensible (although 
overly delayed) initiative. 
Further, effective enterprise policy requires coordinated actions not only between 
several government special financing agencies but also in more fundamental 
functions such as taxation, regulation, and education given their importance as 
preconditions for entrepreneurial activity. Without sufficient measures taken to 
improve the incentives and other enabling infrastructure for high-growth 
entrepreneurship, government supply of venture capital can have only a limited 
impact on growth-oriented entrepreneurship. Effective enterprise policy requires 
a clearly identifiable and responsible champion at the highest level of the 
government capable of influencing and driving the development of the 
environment for entrepreneurship in all key areas. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. (FII) 
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (FII) was established in 1995 to invest the 
proceeds from the privatization of the state-owned companies in order to 
accelerate the availability of risk capital for small and medium-sized companies 
(SMEs). Finnish Industry Investment Ltd is a wholly government-owned 
investment company. It is engaged in equity investments and invests in venture 
capital funds, private equity funds and directly in selected target companies. FII’s 
central role is to assist in the formation and growth of innovative young firms in 
Finland via support measures directed towards stimulating at greater supply of 
equity finance. The organization is administered by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. 
1.2 Logic and Objectives of the Evaluation 
This report documents the analyses and findings of an international institutional 
evaluation of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd carried out by Dr. Markku Maula, 
Helsinki University of Technology (HUT) and Professor Gordon Murray, 
London Business School (LBS). This evaluation was carried out over the last six 
months of 2002. 
The purpose of this evaluation is to objectively assess the importance and 
effectiveness of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd as an agent of Finnish public 
innovation policy given its evolving mandate by government over the period 
1995−2002. In so doing, the evaluation has two overall objectives: i) to provide 
the senior management of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd and its sponsors in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) with independent analysis, information and 
feedback for the future direction and development of its present activities; and ii) 
to give the sponsoring Ministry an outside, expert view on the institution’s 
operational goals, effectiveness and relevance. The evaluation has therefore 
aimed to complement and provide the additional rigor of an external, 
independent assessment to the annual supervisory process of the Finnish Industry 
Investment Ltd.  
The focus of the evaluation addresses one central task, namely, a rigorous and 
objective assessment of the degree to which the company has fulfilled its 
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economic and societal functions as presently envisaged by the FII’s sponsors, the 
Finnish Government. In addition, it is expected by the evaluation’s government 
sponsors in MTI that the external evaluators will suggest possible changes to the 
objectives and operation of FII in the event of finding any major problematic 
issues with the current systems. 
1.3 A Comment on the Nature of External 
Evaluations  
The task of any evaluation fundamentally depends on the quality and accuracy of 
the information available to the evaluators. Responses are elicited from a range 
of actors involved directly or indirectly with the organization under examination. 
Remits of organizations evolve over time often as a response to circumstances 
outside the knowledge or comprehension of those involved at the time of initially 
setting up the organization. Often, as additional tasks are added or existing 
objectives changed and amended, the organization develops a set of working 
practices sometimes quite distinct from that originally envisaged. An appropriate 
and objective evaluation has to fully understand both the reasoning and the 
consequences of the myriad pressures and environmental changes to which any 
organization is subjected. Further, in any evaluation exercise, it is very likely that 
inconsistencies between the organization’s declared remit and its actual operation 
are found. The nature and implications of such discontinuities can only be 
properly understood with the direct assistance and candid participation of those 
senior personnel in the organization(s) who have executive responsibility. It 
would be very easy, and often more comfortable, for such persons if certain 
issues were not revealed. Evaluations have to address both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the organization under scrutiny. Therefore, it is critically 
important to state very clearly that the external evaluators have no intention or 
interest in negative criticisms of individual organizations or persons. The 
purpose of the assessment is to rigorously and fairly describe and analyze the 
circumstances of the Finnish Industry Investment Ltd., as it presently exists. 
From this analysis, a series of recommendations will be provided on which FII 
and its governmental sponsors may choose to act. The value of the analysis and 
the recommendations can only be fully effective if the exercise is conducted 
solely with the legitimate and pragmatic purpose of improving existing policy 
actions. 
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1.4 Methods 
The evaluation is based on a number of information sources. We started by 
collecting and reviewing the internal documentation of FII and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance as well as Finnish and 
international literature and other documentation on government venture capital 
and innovation and enterprise policy. In our evaluation, we interviewed 42 
experts with the average interview lasting approximately one hour. Some of the 
experts as well as FII management were interviewed on several occasions. The 
respondents included major stakeholders of FII as well as a number of 
internationally renowned experts in the area of designing effective government 
special financing programs to resolve market failures in venture capital 
provision. In addition to interviews, we conducted a survey, which was sent to 
134 Finnish stakeholders of FII including all Finnish venture capital firms, a 
large number of consultants and institutional investors, government agencies 
such as Sitra, Tekes, Finnvera, all regional T&E Centres, all Finnish science 
parks, and a large number of Finnish academic experts in entrepreneurship and 
corporate finance. The response rate of the survey was exceptionally high, at 
57%. The FII stakeholder survey respondents are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   FII stakeholder survey respondents 
 
Number of survey questionnaire recipients 134
Returned survey questionnaires 
 FVCA members (typically managing partners of Finnish VCs, excluding Sitra and FII)  22
 Industry experts (institutional investors, consultants, FII direct investees etc.)  12
 Government agencies (top management of Sitra, Tekes, Finnvera, T&E Centres, etc., 
excluding FII) 20
 Academic experts (Entrepreneurship & corporate finance professors etc.) 14
 Science parks (CEOs)  8
Total number of returned survey questionnaires 76
Share of survey questionnaires returned 57%
 
The survey questionnaire is enclosed in as an appendix 4. In addition to our own 
survey data, we were able to benefit from several other earlier survey studies 
carried out in Finland by both academics and practitioners. 
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1.5 Key Definitions 
Table 2 defines the key terms used in the report. Other definitions are introduced 
in a glossary of terms in the appendix 1. 
Table 2.   Key definitions 
 
Term Definition 
SME − Small and 
Medium Sized 
Enterprises1 
The category of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made 
up of enterprises which have fewer than 250 occupied persons and
which have either an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, or
an annual balance total not exceeding 43 million euro.  
Venture capital Professionally managed monies co-invested with the entrepreneur to 
fund an early stage (seed start-up) or expansion venture. Offsetting 
the high risk the investor takes, is the promise of high return on the
investment. (EVCA) 
Early-stage 
(seed and start-up) 
Seed and start-up stages of a business. (EVCA definitions) 
• Seed: Financing provided to research, assess and develop an
initial concept before a business has reached the start-up phase. 
(EVCA) 
• Start-up: Financing provided to companies for product 
development and initial marketing. Companies may be in the
process of being set up or may have been in business for a short
time, but have not sold their product commercially. 
Private equity Private equity provides equity capital to enterprises not quoted on a 
stock market. Private equity can be used to develop new products and
technologies, to expand working capital, to make acquisitions, or to
strengthen a company’s balance sheet. It can also resolve ownership
and management issues. A succession in family-owned companies, or 
the buy-out and buy-in of a business by experienced managers may 
be achieved using private equity funding. Venture capital is, strictly 
speaking, a subset of private equity and refers to equity investments
made for the launch, early development, or expansion of a business. 
(EVCA) 
In this report, we use ‘private equity’ to refer to later stage investments
meaning other than seed-stage, start-up-stage, and expansion-stage 
investments. 
Regional investment Investments undertaken in regions outside the main metropolitan and
capital centers with commonly both an economic and a social objective
Risk capital The European Commission defined (in SEC (1998) 552 final of 31
March 1998)) risk capital as equity financing provided to companies in 
their start-up and development phases. 
                                              
1  European Commission, 2002d, Definition of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), The 
Commission of the European Communities, Accessed: 1.12.2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
enterprise/consultations/sme_definition/consultation2/index_en.htm>. 
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2 Finnish Venture Capital Market 
According to the statistics of the Finnish Venture Capital Association, the 
venture capital market developed rapidly in the second half of the 1990s (Figure 
1). In the four-year period between 1996 and 2000, the industry’s value and 
number of investment grew annually by 47% and 32%, respectively. Even the 
drop in investment recorded between 2000−2001 has been small in comparison 
to most other developed economies. In fact, the number of companies receiving 
investments actually increased between 2000−2001, which is quite remarkable 
given international comparisons. Looking at these figures gives a largely 
encouraging picture of the recent development and the current strength of the 
Finnish venture capital market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Annual venture capital and private equity investments in Finland 
1991−2001 
 
However, despite the Finnish venture capital market experiencing strong growth 
to the end of 1990s, the size of the venture capital market in relation to GDP was 
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still very small even at the peak year of 2000.2 3 This low (i.e. below European 
average) GDP share of venture capital financing is worrying particularly because 
Finland is considered a high-technology country. This status would suggest that 
the venture capital share of GDP in Finland should be above, rather than below, 
the European average. (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   Venture capital and private equity investments as a percentage of 
GDP in Europe and United States in 20014 
 
 
                                              
2  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2001, Financial Systems and Venture Capital in Nordic Countries: 
A comparative Study, Etla Discussion Papers No. 774, The Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy, Helsinki. 
3  Arenius P., Autio E., Kovalainen A., and Reynolds P. D., 2001, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2001 Finnish Executive Report, Center for Technology Management Research Reports 1-2001, 
Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
4  Source: EVCA statistics 2002 
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In a deeper analysis of the Finnish venture capital market, it appears that the 
availability of expansion-stage venture capital is relatively sufficient for the 
amount of good quality deals coming to expansion-stage venture capital 
investors. The problem, however, is that the amount of high-quality expansion-
stage deals is relatively low. The scarcity of early stage (seed stage and start-up-
stage) financing might be one reason for the lack of high quality expansion stage 
deals. Because there is very little competitive early-stage financing available, 
many potential entrepreneurs will not start a new company, which they might do 
if the availability of seed and start-up funding were better. There was nearly 
unanimous agreement among the respondents of our survey and interviews that 
there is an important market failure in seed-stage venture capital in Finland. 83% 
of the survey respondents considered that government should increase its 
involvement in seed stage financing. The market failures in the Finnish venture 
capital market will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
2.1 Finnish Innovation System and Financial 
System 
Figure 3 gives a graphic presentation of the Finnish innovation system. While it 
is certainly difficult to position various organizations accurately, this mapping by 
Tekes gives an illustration of the range and relative size of actors in the Finnish 
innovation system and the multiple public/private linkages that exist. The graph 
also incidentally emphasizes the need for communication and co-ordination if 
effort is not to be wasted. 
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Figure 3.   Positioning, resources, and funding of key players in the Finnish 
innovation system, 20005 6 
2.1.1 Government Institutions 
The State agencies with their enterprise support roles closest to FII are Sitra, 
Finnvera, and Tekes. Each of these organizations are involved in the financing of 
SMEs.7 8 It is interesting to note the overlapping roles of Sitra and FII in the 
mapping in Figure 3, which also reflects the views of our interviewees. Both 
organizations have played a dual role as funders of VC funds and as direct 
investors in young companies.  
                                              
5  The figures describe the total resources of the mentioned organizations in 2000. The figures in 
parentheses describe the funding from State budget. The funding of Tekes, the Academy of 
Finland and the Foundation for Finnish Inventions is provided nearly totally from the State budget. 
6  Tekes, 2002, Tekes Annual Review 2001, Tekes, National Technology Agency. 
7  Hyytinen A. and Väänänen L., 2002, Government Funding of SMEs in Finland, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
8  Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2001, Seed Capital in the Nordic Countries: Best 
Practice, Nordic Industrial Fund, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
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As a government agency in the venture capital sector, FII has acted 
predominantly as a fund of funds investor since 1995. However, it has recently 
increased its involvement and interest in direct investments. The decision to 
invest and the related valuation and negotiation issues have been undertaken by 
FII’s small management team. Sitra has been involved in both fund of funds 
investments and direct investments, with the emphasis being increasingly in 
direct investments. Sitra has developed specialist investment teams in both the 
information technology sector and the life sciences sector.9 10 Both Sitra and FII 
include early stage investments as one focus of their activities. However, both of 
them also share a similar imperative to remain profitable. In Sitra’s case, its 
investment activity is constrained by the present reduction in financial returns on 
its endowment resources. The recent severe declines in stock market valuations 
have had significant and adverse consequences on the ability of Sitra to continue 
or expand its active involvement in venture capital operations. In FII’s case, its 
governmental mandate requires that it conducts its investment activities 
profitably. The current interpretation of this requirement means yielding annual 
returns above the inflation rate. However, the short-term evaluation of financial 
performance throughout a period of decreasing firm valuations has also obliged 
FII to move to later stage investments in order to satisfy the profitability goal. 
Consequently, the two most important Finnish public investment organizations 
that share an objective of resolving market failures in venture capital have each 
been forced to move away from early-stage investments. Their actions have 
come at the time when environmental conditions have made access to early stage 
finance extremely difficult for young technology-based firms. In consequence, 
the incidence of market failure has accelerated for young firms. 
The roles of several State agencies, particularly FII and Sitra, and 
their relationship in the innovation financing process are not very 
clear. The recent change with FII focusing more on direct investments 
has made its role increasingly unclear. Neither FII nor Sitra have 
managed to effectively act as a counterbalance to the near 
disappearance of private funds specializing in seed, start-up and other 
early stage investments. The consequence is a major reduction in 
                                              
9 Sitra, 2002, Annual Report 2001, Sitra, Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, 
Helsinki. 
10  Vihko R., Castells M., Georghiou L., Jalkanen S., Meyer-Krahmer F., Vuokko P., and Gröhn M., 
2002, Evaluation of Sitra 2002, Sitra, Helsinki. 
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sources of finance available to early-stage Finnish high-tech 
companies. 
2.1.2 Venture Capital Investors 
In Finland, there are currently around 40 active venture capital management 
companies. The oldest of these fund managers have migrated to a clear focus on 
later stage deals. A number of new fund managers entered the market in 
1999−2000 with a specialist focus on the rapidly growing earlier stage market. 
Recently, as a result of universal and downward market corrections, particularly 
in technology-related stocks, most of these players have dramatically reduced 
their early stage investments. Some of these early stage investors have shut down 
their investment activities completely. Some others have tried to move their 
focus to later stage deals. The reason for new entrants to move to later stage 
investments is that they need to be able to make profitable exits in order to build 
a track record. Without an attractive track record, they cannot raise a subsequent 
new fund from demanding institutional investors. These trends are not unique to 
Finland. The rapid commitment to early stage technology investments was 
followed almost universally in the period 1995−2002 as young and often 
inexperienced fund managers in Europe, America and beyond entered and then 
exited the venture capital market. Also the tendency of successful venture capital 
management companies to grow substantially as they accumulate larger and 
larger funds is common to most national venture capital industries. 
Thus, for early-stage investments, the exit horizon is perceived as being too 
distant under current market conditions. For all practicable purposes, the initial 
public offerings (IPO) market is virtually closed to young technology companies 
for the foreseeable future. But time has a direct and severe cost to a fund whose 
performance is measured by an annualized internal rate of return (IRR). Later 
stage, private equity managers have already been able to raise new and larger 
funds in part as a result of the problems evident in the early stage technology 
sectors. Large funds have found the execution of small early-stage investments 
less attractive for both cost and return reasons. Overall, as is nearly universally 
shown, early-stage investments are difficult and less profitable when compared to 
 
25 
 
later stage deals11. The greater time spent in completing and monitoring early 
stage deals, the small amounts of money able to be employed, and very high risk 
of project failure have each contributed to a general disillusionment with this 
investment activity. This has lead to an acute contraction in the supply of early 
stage finance and particularly seed capital. This response can be seen as a 
‘market failure’ given that private investors do not and cannot value the 
important societal implications of their actions. Specific peculiarities of the early 
stage market for technology investments have exacerbated the supply problem, 
particularly difficulties of information asymmetries. Accordingly, both 
incumbent venture capital investors and new market entrants have each moved 
towards later stage investments preferring to ignore the early stage market 
completely. Given the present and future reliance of the Finnish economy on 
entrepreneurial young companies in key areas of new technology, the correction 
of this situation is an urgent priority, as it is for several other European nations. 
Many private early stage funds entered the market in 1999−2000, but 
since then private investors’ activity in the early stage area has nearly 
disappeared in Finland.  
Concerning the Finnish financial system and challenges for the venture capital, 
several challenges have been documented. One important problem is the illiquid 
domestic exit market.12 Liquid exit markets are a requirement for the sustained 
development of the venture capital market.13 14Another problem is the small 
home market for companies. Both of these challenges increase the need for rapid 
internationalization. The limits of domestic markets and domestic supply of 
capital increase the importance of foreign venture capitalists and global capital 
markets. Foreign venture capital investors and cross-border flows of capital have 
                                              
11  Reference to the annual performance surveys of the European Venture Capital Association or any 
of its European country members will give ample evidence of this assertion. Also see Burgel O., 
2000, UK Venture Capital and Private Equity as an Asset Class for Institutional Investors, London 
Business School and British Venture Capital Association, London. 
12  Ali-Yrkkö J., Hyytinen A., and Liukkonen J., 2001, Exiting Venture Capital Investments in 
Finland: Lessons from Finland, Etla Discussion Papers No. 781, The Research Institute of the 
Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
13  Black B. S. and Gilson R. J., 1999, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 36−48.  
14  Jeng L. A. and Wells P. C., 2000, The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence across 
countries, Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, 241−289. 
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been seen to ease many of the constraints of small economies.15 16 17 A recent 
OECD report notes that: “While such cross-border flows can improve the 
efficiency of the global venture capital market, they can also reduce the relative 
importance of domestic supply factors in favor of domestic demand factors, such 
as creativity, innovation, risk-taking and entrepreneurship.18 Although Finnish 
information and communication technology ventures have been able to attract 
some foreign venture capital investors to invest in them, Finland has not been 
very welcoming towards foreign venture capital.19 In many other countries, fiscal 
and legislative barriers such as double taxation of international institutional 
investors in domestic venture capital funds have been recognized and removed. 
2.2 Finnish Venture Capital Market in 
International Comparison 
Despite the growth of the Finnish venture capital market at the end of the 1990s, 
the share of domestic venture capital as a percentage of gross domestic product 
remains very low. According to the latest statistics by the European Venture 
Capital Association, the relative size of the Finnish venture capital and private 
equity industry was 0.19% of GDP in 2001, which is less than the European 
average of 0.25% of GDP. 
                                              
15  Baygan G. and Freudenberg M., 2000, The internationalization of venture capital activity in 
OECD countries: implications for measurement and policy, STI Working Papers − 2000/7, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
16  Hursti J. and Maula M. V. J., 2002, Acquiring Financial Resources from Foreign Equity Capital 
Markets: Examination of the Factors Influencing Foreign Initial Public Offerings, Paper presented 
at the 22nd Annual International Conference of the Strategic Management Society, Paris, 
22−25.9.2002. 
17  Maula M. and Mäkelä M. Forthcoming. Cross-Border Venture Capital. In A. Hyytinen, M. 
Pajarinen (Eds.), Financial Systems and Firm Performance: Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives. The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
18  Baygan G. and Freudenberg M., 2000, The internationalization of venture capital activity in 
OECD countries: implications for measurement and policy, STI Working Papers − 2000/7, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
19  Timgren M., 2001, Ulkomainen pääomasijoittaja suomalaisessa pääomarahastossa - utopiaako?, 
Venture-tiedote, 1/2001, 10−11. 
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In the recent 2002 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor20, a cross-country 
comparison of venture capital availability in the 39 participating countries placed 
Finland 13th, when ranking countries according to the volume of classic (seed, 
start-up, and expansion stage) venture capital investments (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.   Domestic classic venture capital investments as percentage of GDP in 
1999−200121 
 
In the same Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002 study, Finland was placed 
last, when ranking the countries according to the share of combined informal and 
classic venture capital investments as a percentage of GDP in 2001 (Figure 5). 
                                              
20   Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is a longitudinal academic study of the drivers of 
entrepreneurial activity currently undertaken annually in 39 countries. Venture capital provision is 
one of several subjects of interest in the overall program of study. 
21  Reynolds P. D., Bygrave W. D., Autio E., and Hay M., 2002b, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2002 Summary Report, Babson College, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation & London Business 
School. 
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Figure 5.   Domestic classic venture capital investments and informal 
investments as a percentage of GDP in 200122 
 
In the 2001 GEM Finnish Executive Summary, the authors recommended, on the 
basis of expert interviews, that a target level of classic venture capital of GDP in 
Finland should be 0.5% of GDP.23 This means that the size of the present venture 
capital industry should be more than doubled. The recommended 0.5% target 
percentage of venture capital of GDP would not even be very high in comparison 
to some other leading high-technology countries. The share of venture capital as 
a percentage of GDP is an important benchmark concerning the access to early-
stage growth capital by high-technology companies. It has been identified as a 
useful benchmark figure in the entrepreneurship policy of the European 
Commission. Using this benchmark, Ireland, which can reasonably be compared 
                                              
22  Reynolds P. D., Bygrave W. D., Autio E., and Hay M., 2002b, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2002 Summary Report, Babson College, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation & London Business 
School. 
23  Arenius P., Autio E., Kovalainen A., and Reynolds P. D., 2001, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2001 Finnish Executive Report, Center for Technology Management Research Reports 1−2001, 
Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
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to Finland, has set the target for the size of its venture capital market as 0.8% of 
GDP by 2006.24 
The share of venture capital as a percentage of GDP in Finland is 
comparatively low and should be increased. 
2.3 Market Failures in the Finnish Venture Capital 
Market 
For most Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the availability of 
external finance is not a major problem.25 This is not a surprise, because most of 
the Finnish SMEs are small businesses with no expectation of growing rapidly.26 
External financing, particularly venture capital, is mainly relevant for a minority 
of companies with exceptionally high growth intentions. However, it is just these 
high-growth ventures that have the highest impact on the growth of the economy 
and employment. Therefore, the fact that SMEs in general do not have major 
problems with financing should not lead to a false feeling of comfort that there 
are no problems in the availability of finance. There are some universal, well 
known areas of finance for SMEs where market failures are likely to occur. In 
this chapter we explore some of these segments in more detail. 
Since 1995, only a small fraction of Finnish SMEs have reported the lack of 
financing as the most serious obstacle to the growth of the company according to 
the bi-annual survey of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises. The 
overall picture for SMEs has not changed significantly during the last couple of 
years.27 Interestingly, the results of the above research were initially presented to 
the evaluators as evidence that there is not a financing concern in the Finnish 
                                              
24  European Commission, 2002g, Quantitative Targets in Enterprise Policy: Steps towards the 
Lisbon Objectives, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2002) 1214, The Commission of 
European Communities, Brussels. 
25  Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2002, PK-yritysbarometri, 2/2002, Finnvera 
and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, Helsinki. 
26  According to the recent survey of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, the share of 
highly growth-oriented firms of the SME population had decreased during the last six months from 
the normal very low range of 7−9% to an alarmingly low percentage of 5%. 
27  Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2002, PK-yritysbarometri, 2/2002, Finnvera 
and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, Helsinki. 
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economy. It is worth remembering Storey’s28 UK finding that in a sample of any 
100 new firms over half the total value created by year ten will be produced by 
approximately four firms. Thus, the status of innovation financing should not be 
judged by circumstances pertaining to the average firm but by what resources are 
forthcoming to a nation’s most interesting and highest potential young firms. 
A closer look at the data is revealing. The situation for SMEs on aggregate level 
was still relatively positive in August 2002. However, it was noted for the first 
time in the Fall 2002 survey that growth-oriented SMEs have a strong and 
significant overrepresentation among SMEs reporting the availability of 
financing as their most serious obstacle to growth.29 Whereas only 8% of all 
SMEs reported the lack of financing being the worst obstacle to developing the 
companies, 21% of highly growth-oriented companies reported the availability of 
finance as their worst problem (Figure 6). While these figures reflect the single 
worst obstacle to growth, Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises 
found in their analysis that almost half (47%) of the strongly growth-oriented 
SMEs experienced problems in accessing external finance.30 Also other recent 
survey research suggests market failures in the financing of technology-based 
new firms.31 32 In short, it is those companies with the highest propensity and 
potential to grow rapidly that are being most constrained by the present limited 
availability of finance in Finland. 
                                              
28  Storey D., Watson R., and Wynarczyk P., 1987, Fast Growth Small Businesses. Case Studies Of 
40 Small Firms In North East England, Research Paper 67, DTI, London. 
29  Finnvera, 2002, Riskirahoitukselle ja uusille rahoitusmuodoille kysyntää - Kasvuhakuisilla pk-
yrityksillä ongelmia kasvun rahoittamisessa, Press release 3.10.2002, Finnvera and the Federation 
of Finnish Entreprises, Accessed: 1.12.2002, <http://www.finnvera.fi/index2.cfm?dynamic= 
uutinen.cfm&lang=1&id=1545>. 
30  Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2002, PK-yritysbarometri, 2/2002, Finnvera 
and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, Helsinki. 
31  Hyytinen A. and Toivanen O., 2002, Do Financial Constraints Hold Back Innovation and 
Growth? Evidence on the Role of Public Policy, The Research Institute of Finnish Economy 
(ETLA), Helsinki. 
32  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2002a, Financing of Technology-Intensive Small Businesses: Some 
Evidence on the Uniqueness of the ICT Industry, Etla Discussion Papers No. 813, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
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Figure 6.   The share of SMEs reporting the lack of finance as the most serious 
obstacle to developing their company33 
 
The key point regarding the disproportional problems faced by growth-oriented 
ventures in getting finance is that these firms do have significantly greater needs 
for external finance in comparison to SMEs in general. Most small firms do not 
have strong growth ambitions and can normally finance their operations from 
cash flow. In contrast, the small percentage of SMEs with strong growth 
ambitions cannot achieve these goals without access to significant amounts of 
external risk capital. 
In our evaluation, we conducted a survey of stakeholders of FII to get a better 
view of the market needs. The results concerning the adequacy of access to 
external finance are presented in Figure 7. According to the survey, the financing 
situation in any sector is not particularly good. Regional SMEs have a slightly 
lower rating as regards the adequacy of available finance compared to SMEs in 
general. However, the measure for growth-oriented technology-based new firms 
                                              
33  Based on information collected in the bi-annual barometer of Finnvera and the Federation of 
Finnish Enterprises, August 2002. Information kindly provided by Finnvera and the Federation of 
Finnish Enterprises. 
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is lower than for any other groups. These results are in line with the results of 
other surveys in Finland.34  
In a closer examination of the availability of venture capital finance for 
technology-based new firms, it is interesting to note the dramatic differences in 
the availability of different stages of venture capital. According to the results, 
and in line with the interviews, the unmet demand is worst for seed stage venture 
capital. There seems to be market failure also in start-up stage venture capital. 
However, as expected, the responses indicate a relatively sufficient availability of 
expansion stage venture capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the adequacy of the availability of 
external finance 
                                              
34  Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2002, PK-yritysbarometri, 2/2002, Finnvera 
and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, Helsinki. 
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2.3.1 Early-stage Venture Capital 
Of the various segments in venture capital, the supply of early-stage venture 
capital has universally been found to be particularly prone to market failure.35 36 
37The difficulty of early-stage venture capital was also recognized in the mandate 
of FII.38 39 Although private investors tend to move to later stages even during 
good times, the market downturn accelerates this development creating clearly a 
market failure in early-stage (seed and start-up) venture capital. The importance 
of public policy to secure the supply of early stage venture capital to technology 
companies in declining market conditions.40 41 
In regard to early-stage venture capital in Finland, the amount of funds invested 
in seed stage dropped in 2001 compared to 2000. The share of private investors 
in all seed investments also dropped from 45% in 2000 to 10% in 2001. Most of 
the public seed-stage investments have been arguably been made by Sitra (Figure 
8). 
                                              
35  Macmillan H. P., 1931, Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, HMSO, London. 
36  Storey D. J. and Tether B., 1996, New technology-based firms in the European Union: an 
Introduction, Research Policy, 26, 933-946. 
37  Bannock Consulting Ltd, 2001, Innovative instruments for raising equity for SMEs in Europe, 
Final report prepared for DG Enterprise of the European Commission by Bannock Consulting. 
38  Government Proposal to Parliament for an Action Finnish Industry Investment Ltd, (132/1999) 
(Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy -nimisestä valtionyhtiöstä, 
HE 132/1999). 
39  Government Decision on the General Outlines for Finnish Industry Investment Ltd’s Investment 
Activities (184/2000) (Valtioneuvoston päätös Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy:n sijoitustoiminnan 
yleisistä suuntaviivoista, N:o 184/2000). 
40  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2002a, Financing of Technology-Intensive Small Businesses: Some 
Evidence on the Uniqueness of the ICT Industry, Etla Discussion Papers No. 813, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
41  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2002b, Small Business Finance in Finland: A Descriptive Study, 
Etla Discussion Papers No. 812, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
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Figure 8.   Seed-stage venture capital investments by private and public 
investors42 
 
There is a lot of very recent anecdotal evidence that the situation in early-stage 
venture capital has become increasingly difficult in Finland in 2002.43 44 
Although the latest FVCA statistics cover only the year 2001, our interviews and 
some other studies suggest significant and continued decline in early-stage 
investments in Finland in 2002.45 46 For instance, a recent study of Source Code 
Finland concluded that the lack of seed finance is seriously hampering the 
emergence and growth of new companies in the software product industry.47 
In addition to investment stages, another measure of start-up financing activity is 
the share of initial investments as a proportion of all investments. The share of 
                                              
42  FVCA and Sitra statistics and estimates  
43  Helsingin Sanomat, 2002, Aloitteleville it-yrityksille ei liikene yksityistä riskirahaa, Helsingin 
Sanomat, D1. 
44  Talouselämä, 2002, Rohkene kasvaa, riskisijoittaja!, Talouselämä, 38 (8.11.2002), 28−35. 
45  Ernst & Young and VentureOne, 2002, Riskisijoitukset Euroopassa vähentyivät merkittävästi, 
Press release 26.8.2002, Accessed: 20.11.2002, <http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/Finland/ 
Tiedote_260802_VentureOne>. 
46  Nikulainen K., 2002, Riskisijoittajien määrä Suomessa romahti, digitoday.fi, Accessed: 7.11.2002, 
<http://www.digitoday.fi/digi98fi.nsf/pub/finanssi20021107111929_kni_56772259>. 
47  Viitasaari J., 2002, Siemenraha kortilla - Lupaava ohjelmistoyritys joka kuukausi Suomessa, 
digitoday.fi, Accessed: 4.12.2002, <http://www.digitoday.fi/digi98fi.nsf/pub/dd20021204145557_ 
jvi_67247882>. 
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initial investments compared to follow-on investments decreased significantly in 
2001.48 According to interviews and anecdotal evidence, it is currently very 
difficult for young companies to attract initial venture capital investment. This is 
because venture capitalists have been limiting their scarce investment resources 
to the most promising of their existing portfolio companies since 2001. With 
little immediate prospect of new fund raisings, venture capital firms that are 
managing mature and fully invested funds have become severely cash 
constrained. What finances are available are being retained to nurture existing 
investments until the eventual re-emergence of a healthy exit market. Figure 9 
illustrates the development of initial and follow-on venture capital investments. 
As can be observed from the graph, initial investments dropped both in number 
and in value in 2001. Based on estimates, the development in 2002 has been 
towards a still smaller share for initial investments. This trend has also been 
commonly observed in other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.   Initial and follow-on investments in Finland 1996−200149 
 
                                              
48  Finnish Venture Capital Association, 2002, Pääomasijoittaminen Suomessa 2001, Finnish Venture 
Capital Association. 
49  Finnish Venture Capital Association, 2002, Pääomasijoittaminen Suomessa 2001, Finnish Venture 
Capital Association. 
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Data from a 2002 survey of the Finnish software product companies indicate that 
small software product companies with revenues less than three million euros 
find the availability of financing services more difficult than larger software 
companies.50 Also the data from the SME barometer of Finnvera and the 
Federation of the Finnish Entrepreneurs suggest that the financing challenges are 
worse the smaller the company.51  
In our survey of the stakeholders of FII, the lack of financing was clearly 
identified to be worst for the earliest stage investments (Figure 7). Concerning 
seed capital, the opinions of the stakeholders of FII were very clear and 
unanimous regarding the lack of seed capital. 70% of the respondents gave a 
rating 1 or 2 (i.e. poor or very poor) in a scale of 1−5 for the adequacy of the 
availability of seed capital (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the adequacy of the availability of seed 
capital in Finland 
 
                                              
50  Hietala J., Maula M. V. J., Autere J., Lassenius C., and Autio E., 2002, Finnish Software Product 
Business: Results from the National Software Industry Survey 2002, Centre of Expertise for 
Software Product Business and Helsinki University of Technology. 
51  Data from the bi-annual SME barometer of Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Entreprises, 
August 2002 
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There was also a nearly universal agreement that the government should increase 
its involvement in the supply of seed stage venture capital. This is in line with the 
general perception that seed capital, in normal conditions, is not as commercially 
attractive an activity as later stage investments. Government intervention is 
needed to resolve the market failure, preferably by incentivizing private 
investors. As illustrated in Figure 11, 83% of the stakeholders of FII saw a need 
for the government to increase its involvement in the supply of seed capital. 
Early-stage venture capital is seen as the highest priority activity of FII (Figure 
25, page 67). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the need for the government to change 
its involvement in the supply of seed stage venture capital 
 
The lack of early-stage (seed and start-up) venture capital is a serious problem 
for the whole venture capital industry. According to our interviews, this situation 
is seen as hampering the consequent development of high-quality deal flow to 
expansion stage deals. This leads to a problem where expansion stage venture 
capitalists cannot find good enough deals for the funds available. The very low 
level of Finnish venture capital as a percentage of GDP and the problems of 
venture capitalists in finding good enough deals suggest that this problem is 
serious and needs to be addressed. It is presently hampering the development of 
the venture capital market. This situation, in turn, has direct and negative 
implications for the Finnish economy at large. 
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There is a significant equity gap in Finland in early-stage (seed and 
start-up) venture capital for technology-based new firms. This dearth 
of supply not only affects the young firms denied capital for growth. 
Similarly it is hampering the development of significant elements of 
the venture capital market because of the negative impact of a lack of 
early-stage venture capital on the subsequent generation of high-
quality deal flow for expansion and later stage finance. 
2.3.2 Regional Investments 
In addition to early-stage venture capital, market failures have often been argued 
to reside in venture capital markets located outside the main concentrations of 
existing venture capital activity.52 The limited and insufficient provision of 
finance to SMEs (and indeed larger firms) in less developed or more peripheral 
regions of an economy represents a specific development problem that is faced 
by many countries. Essentially, the underlying conditions in more remote regions 
from the major urban and metropolitan centers represent a series of major hurdles 
to the effective development of a robust economic environment. Remote regions 
are often burdened by their distance from both major supplier and customer 
markets, the limitations of local labor markets especially for knowledge and 
other skilled workers, and the lack of appropriate technical and commercial 
infrastructures including the absence of major research-based universities, 
research laboratories and other key nodes of a dynamic information network. For 
understandable reasons of social equity, local and central governments (and 
several major EC programs) feel obliged to offer a range of support measures for 
firms in such disadvantaged regions. While the burden is usually assumed by 
central government ministries having a regional and social remit, State 
organizations supporting technology and innovation are frequently involved 
when the regional firms in question are technology focused. The problem centers 
on whether or not State-originated funds and support are being provided for 
purely commercial reasons. All too often firms that would not be supported if an 
analysis was made solely on their technical or commercial merits receive 
assistance because of their location in a remote city or town, or because they are 
the largest employer in an area, or because they represent the only example of 
technology X in Region Y. Officials running technology programs often will 
have their ‘arms bent’ by their political masters to ensure that they provide 
                                              
52  Centre for Strategy & Evaluation  Services, 2002, Guide to Risk Capital Financing in Regional 
Policy, European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy, Brussels. 
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support alongside regional agencies to address these development issues. The 
problem is compounded if government program managers are obliged to provide 
a regional firm with a socially valuable service, but the said program is 
subsequently assessed on purely technical or commercial evaluation criteria. This 
is a very common dilemma for many governments and their agencies. 
In an analysis of the access to finance in the Helsinki metropolitan area and in 
other areas, some small differences can be found. In the bi-annual survey of 
Finnish SMEs by Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, on average 
8% of all SMEs stated the access to finance being the worst obstacle to 
developing the company. Figure 12 compares this obstacle in various regions in 
Finland. It can be noted that the problem is slightly lower in Uusimaa (6%), 
whereas there are regions where the percentage reaches 11%. However, based on 
these figures, it seems that the geographic location is a less important 
determinant of the financing difficulties when compared to the growth intentions 
of the firms. The comparable figure for highly growth-oriented SMEs was 21% 
(Figure 6, page 31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.   Lack of financing as the worst problem for the development of the 
company classified by region53 
                                              
53  Source: August 2002 SME monitor by Finnvera and the Federation of Finnish Enterprises 
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In our own survey of the stakeholders of FII, the adequacy of financing was 
perceived being somewhat poorer in regional areas compared to SMEs in general 
(3.0 compared to 3.2 in scale from 1 (not at all adequate) to 5 (very good), Figure 
7). Figure 13 gives the views of different stakeholder groups of FII concerning 
the adequacy of availability of external finance for SMEs located outside the 
Helsinki area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.   FII’s stakeholder’s views on the adequacy of the availability of 
external finance for SMEs located outside the Helsinki region classified by 
respondent type 
 
Taken together, the availability of regional venture capital in Finland does not 
appear to be particularly good. However, in the regions, as in the economy at 
large, the difficulties are more related to a lack of early-stage venture capital 
rather than a lack of venture capital in general.  
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2.3.3 Specific Technology Sectors 
In our evaluation, the biotechnology and life sciences cluster emerged as a sector 
with distinct problems. In Finland, there were approximately 120 biotechnology 
and life sciences companies at the time of the evaluation in Fall 2002.54 55 The 
Finnish government has invested heavily in biotechnology. The biotechnology 
sector is estimated to represent investments of 110 million euros. This is 
equivalent to 9% of all public R&D in 2002.56 
Presently, the Finnish biotech industry is very immature. Accordingly, Finnish 
biotechnology companies, although small, still require substantial future 
investments. The availability of additional capital from domestic investors is 
limited. These new enterprises will often take several years to develop attractive 
new products and services. Profitability is an even more distant and uncertain 
prospect. Several observers view the present situation as critical. They argue that, 
because of the lack of capital, the results from intensive R&D will be lost as a 
result of unnecessary bankruptcies.57 Even if these fledgling firms survive, some 
of our interviewees feared that many will have their intellectual capital purchased 
by foreign investors at a fraction of its true worth. This is because of the 
dangerous combination of poor negotiation power against large foreign investors 
and a desperate immediate need for cash. 
A strong point made by several informants is that Finnish life sciences/ 
biotechnology companies are too small to be viable as independent firms. In 
order to create viable businesses out of State-financed R&D projects, stronger 
multi-project companies need to be created in order to gain the strength 
necessary to act and survive as independent players. One potential idea stated by 
informants would be to consolidate several R&D-focused, small biotechnology/ 
life sciences companies together − possibly in combination with relevant 
corporate spin-offs. Collectively, these firms would have the resources and 
experience to create the necessary economies of scale. This would allow them to 
                                              
54  Hermans R. and Luukkonen T., 2002, Findings of the ETLA Survey on Finnish Biotechnology 
Firms, Discussion Papers No. 819, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
55  Lähteenmäki R., 2002, Finnish Biotech - Built on Solid Foundations, Nature Biotechnology, 20. 
56  Puustinen T., 2002, Jyvät kuivuvat biolaaksoissa, Talouselämä, 28.10.2002. 
57  Tekniikka & Talous, 2002, Saarnivaara povaa bioyrityksille konkurssiaaltoa, Tekniikka & Talous, 
4. 
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exploit, for example, the international marketing and sales channels required for 
their operation as viable independent companies.58 
The emergent view is that the Finnish biotechnology/life sciences sector is at a 
critical stage at the time of compiling this report (November 2002). As confirmed 
by the players and respondents from all areas of the Finnish innovation system, 
this sector is at a stage where an immediate, direct government intervention could 
help gain significant results from the substantial investments already made in the 
sector. 
The evaluators were aware that some of these comments were made by 
respondents with significant personal interest in the commercial success of 
portfolio firms. In practice, it is important that the proposed interventions should 
not be seen as merely an additional one-off source of funding with little purpose 
beyond delaying the demise of vulnerable or non-viable firms. Instead, FII 
should help consolidate uneconomically small companies with the purpose of 
building players that are strong enough to attract international private capital in 
subsequent rounds, for instance, when funds are needed in order to fully 
internationalize the business. 
Therefore, the implications and opportunity costs of this proposed role for FII 
should be properly reviewed by FII management in conjunction with MTI. The 
logic, means and likely effect of FII intervention in these immature markets need 
to be objectively and rigorously appraised. Any intervention by the State should 
be rigorously justified. If such an intervention can be objectively justified, FII 
should only be involved in such an industry restructuring in collaboration with 
other key agencies in the appropriate technology sectors. Specialist technical 
evaluations should generally be contracted out in order to implement these 
transactions. FII’s acknowledged skills are financial and commercial – and 
should remain so. 
                                              
58  The need to consolidate the unviable small biotechnology firms has also been expressed in a recent 
evaluation of the sector. Academy of Finland, 2002, Biotechnology in Finland - Impact of Public 
Research Funding and Strategies for the Future - Evaluation Report, Publications of the Academy 
of Finland 11/02, Academy of Finland, Helsinki. 
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2.3.4 Government intervention 
In line with the general recognition of the dearth of seed and start-up stage 
venture capital, there was a strong respondent consensus for the government to 
become more involved in the supply of seed and start-up stage venture capital. 
Particularly, seed capital was seen as requiring a major increase of government 
intervention. In contrast to early-stage investments, the aggregate view regarding 
the expansion stage was for less government involvement in this area (Figure 
14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.   Finnish respondents’ views on the needs for changes in government 
involvement in the supply of venture capital classified by stage 
 
Figure 15 describes the views of each of the FII’s stakeholder groups concerning 
the need to change the government supply of seed, start-up, and expansion stage 
venture capital. There is a clear consensus among these groups concerning the 
need to increase the supply of seed capital. The need to increase start-up capital 
was perceived by other groups except for academic experts. Concerning the need 
to increase or decrease the supply of expansion stage capital, there was more 
disagreement between the groups. 
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Figure 15.   Finnish respondents’ views on the needs for changes in government 
involvement in the supply of venture capital classified by stage and respondent 
type 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
As a conclusion, it can be noted that there is evidence of a severe market failure 
particularly in early stage (seed and start-up) venture capital. Partly because of 
the lack of early-stage venture capital, there is also a poor deal flow of expansion 
and later stage deals. Consequently, Finnish venture capitalists have difficulties 
in finding attractive expansion and later stage deals despite the small size of the 
Finnish venture capital market by international standard. Given the high level of 
public and private R&D investments, this situation can be seen as alarming in its 
potential consequences for the effective future commercialization of Finnish 
intellectual property. A strong and urgent need for the State’s increased 
intervention in the supply of early-stage venture capital was expressed by the 
majority of respondents in both our survey and interviews. 
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3 Finnish Industry Investment Ltd 
FII is a state-owned equity investment company, administered by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. The Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. (1352/1999) 
sets the objective for FII:59 
“The purpose of the state-owned company Finnish Industry 
Investment Ltd. is to improve the conditions particularly for small and 
medium-sized firms by making equity investments in venture capital 
organizations. 
The company may make equity investments directly into target 
companies particularly when long-term risk taking is required.” 
The Act also states: 
“The operations of the company must be profitable. 
In individual investment decisions, a lower return expectation and 
higher risk can be accepted in exceptional cases.” 
The Government decision (184/2000) sets the general guidelines for FII’s 
investment activities. Section 1 of the decision specifies that FII should focus on 
resolving market failures:60 
“Investments are directed to targets, where the market does not 
channel sufficient funds” 
Furthermore, this section also sets out the focus areas of FII’s activities: 
“The primary focus of the company is the improvement of equity 
funding to starting companies. Particularly important in this regard is 
                                              
59  Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (1352/1999) of 30 December 1999 (Laki Suomen 
Teollisuussisjoitus Oy -nimisestä valtionyhtiöstä N:o 1352/1999, 30.12.1999). 
60  Government Decision on the General Outlines for Finnish Industry Investment Ltd’s Investment 
Activities (184/2000) (Valtioneuvoston päätös Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy:n sijoitustoiminnan 
yleisistä suuntaviivoista, N:o 184/2000). 
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the setting up, development, and financing of venture capital funds 
investing in seed and start-up stage firms, the development and 
financing of a regional network of funds, and the channeling of EU 
finance.” 
“Another area of focus is equity investments into large business 
ventures requiring long-term risk-taking.” 
“In addition to the industry, the investment activities of the company 
cover also the service sector, particularly knowledge-intensive service 
companies.” 
In the next chapter, we examine in more detail the development of the objectives 
of FII over the seven years of its existence. 
3.1 The Development of FII’s Objectives 
The objectives of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd are defined on three 
hierarchical levels − firstly in the legislation, secondly in the Government 
decisions, and thirdly in the guidelines given by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. The purpose of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. is defined in the Act 
on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. The original 1994 Act was repealed in 1999. 
The starting point for the amendment of the Act in 1999 was the recognition of 
the rapid development of the Finnish venture capital market between 1994 and 
1999. Because the venture capital market had developed significantly, it was seen 
that the government intervention should be refocused more directly towards the 
remaining market failures particularly in early-stage venture capital. Regarding 
the new primary focus of the operations, the proposal of the new Act stated the 
following: 61 
“Because the markets for growth and expansion stage venture capital 
are efficient, the primary focus of the company should be the 
improvement of the supply of early stage venture capital. Areas of 
particular emphasis should be development and capitalization of seed 
                                              
61  Translated from: Government Proposal to Parliament for an Act on Finnish Industry Investment 
Ltd (132/1999) (Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy -nimisestä 
valtionyhtiöstä, HE 132/1999). 
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and start-up stage venture capital funds, capitalization of a regional 
venture capital fund network, and channelling of EU funding.” 
Table 3 details the development of the definition of the purpose of Finnish 
Industry Investment Ltd. in the Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. in 
December 199462 and December 1999.63 
 
Table 3.   The objectives of FII as defined in the Act on Finnish Industry 
Investment Ltd. 
 
Objectives set in the Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. 
1531/1994 (December 1994) 1352/1999 (December 1999) 
The objective of Finnish Industry 
Investment Ltd is to enhance the 
conditions of industry and the related 
entrepreneurship by… 
The purpose of the state-owned company 
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. is to improve 
the conditions particularly for small and 
medium-sized firms by.… 
… financing investments primarily in small 
and medium-sized firms 
FII makes primarily equity investments in 
venture capital organizations. 
The company may also make direct 
investments to the above-mentioned 
firms. 
... making equity investments in venture capital 
organizations. 
The company may make equity investments 
directly into target companies particularly when 
long-term risk taking is required. 
 
The company makes investments on an 
economic basis. 
The company has to set return 
expectations for its investments. 
The operations of the company must be 
profitable.  
In individual investment decisions, a lower 
return expectation and higher risk can be 
accepted in exceptional cases. 
 
Although the amendments to the Act do not appear dramatic, the underlying 
intent of the revision of the Act was to focus the operations of FII more 
accurately to the remaining market failures following the rapid development of 
the Finnish venture capital market in 1994−1999. In the motivation for the new 
                                              
62  Act on a State-owned Company Pursuing Capital Investment Activities (1531/1994) of 29 
December 1994 (Laki pääomasijoitustoimintaa harjoittavasta valtionyhtiöstä, N:o 1531/1994, 
29.12.1994). 
63  Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (1352/1999) of 30 December 1999 (Laki Suomen 
Teollisuussijoitus Oy -nimisestä valtionyhtiöstä, N:o 1352/1999, 30.12.1999). 
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Act, the lack of the supply of early-stage venture capital was emphasized as a 
remaining key market failure. Recognizing the higher risk and lower return 
expectations in this area, the profitability goal was revised so that FII can accept 
lower than usual return expectations and higher risks on individual investments. 
In justifying a case for such an intervention, particular reference was made to 
investments in technology-focused early-stage venture capital funds.64 
As stated at the end of the Act on FII, more precise operating guidelines for the 
enforcement of the laws are given as Government decisions. One of the major 
amendments in the new Government decision in February 2000 replacing the 
previous one from September 1996 was the amendment to the definition of the 
purpose and focus areas of FII. Whereas the prior focus was in general on 
support of the financing of SME companies, the new primary focus areas were 
defined to target the remaining market failure areas. As discussed above, the new 
primary focus area of the company was defined to be in the improvement of the 
supply of seed and start-up stage venture capital. The objectives of FII are 
presented in Table 4. 
                                              
64  Government Proposal to Parliament for an Act on Finnish Industry Investment Ltd (132/1999) 
(Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy -nimisestä valtionyhtiöstä, 
HE 132/1999). 
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Table 4.   The objectives of FII as defined in the Government decisions65 
 
Objectives set in the Government decisions  
September 1996 February 2000 
• to promote the functioning of the venture 
capital market 
• to promote equity investments in 
innovative companies at the seed or 
start-up stage by promoting the founding 
of new funds focused on seed and start-
up 
• to enhance the possibilities for companies 
to grow, internationalize, and go public by 
improving their financing 
• to promote the channeling of private 
funds to venture capital funds focusing 
on start-ups 
• to promote the channeling of private funds 
into venture capital market and to advance 
entrepreneurship in the industry 
• to accelerate the commercialization and 
internationalization of the results of R&D 
investments  
• to promote the structural change of 
industries and commercialization of R&D 
investments 
• to promote the structural change of 
industries by direct investments targeted 
along the lines of the industry policy 
• to develop the secondary markets and to 
promote the cooperation of venture 
capitalists 
• to promote the functioning of the venture 
capital market to the level of the most 
developed venture capital markets 
• to promote the equity financing of 
innovative start-ups, and with this aim, the 
development of technology-focused 
venture capital funds as well as a 
regionally located venture capital network 
• to enhance the possibilities for 
companies to grow, internationalize, and 
go public by leveraging the opportunities 
stemming from international fund 
collaboration 
• to develop the organizational structure of 
funds and to increase entrepreneurship 
and know-how within the venture capital 
industry 
• to promote the channeling of equity 
financing from EU sources to Finland 
 
The responsibilities placed on FII have evolved and changed in line 
with the development of the Finnish and international venture capital 
markets. When FII was established, the local market was 
underdeveloped and the key emphasis was to stimulate the creation of 
a private venture capital market. By 1999, the venture capital market 
had developed rapidly over the intervening five years, and the 
                                              
65  Translated from: Valtioneuvoston päätös Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy:n sijoitustoiminnan 
yleisistä suuntaviivoista, N:o 184/2000, and Valtioneuvoston päätös Suomen Teollisuussijoitus 
Oy:n pääomasijoitustoiminnan yleisistä periaatteista, N:o 702/ 1996, 19.9.1996. 
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objectives set for FII were then targeted more towards resolving the 
remaining market failures. Particular emphasis was placed on 
promoting early stage (seed and start-up) venture capital and 
regional venture capital through the fund of funds structure. The 
development of these priority areas has been a rational and informed 
set of decisions. 
3.2 Financial Resources 
FII is 100% owned by the government. At the end of 2001, the State investments 
in FII totaled 227.9 million euros. Table 5 presents the government investments 
in FII, the profits of FII, the dividends of FII, and the cumulated profit in the 
balance sheet. 
 
Table 5.   Government investment in FII 1995−200166  
 
Year Government 
investment in FII 
(MEUR) 
FII Profit
(MEUR)
FII Dividends
(MEUR)
FII Cumulated profit in the 
balance sheet
(MEUR)
1995 53.8 1.9 0.0 1.9
1996 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.9
1997 13.5 0.7 0.0 3.6
1998 34.5 2.9 1.0 5.5
1999 0.0 4.4 1.3 8.6
2000 84.1 26.9 7.3 28.2
2001 42.0 -0.9 1.4 25.9
Total 227.9 36.9 11.0 25.9
 
Figure 16 describes FII’s own equity, investments, investment commitments, and 
its own equity available to be invested at the end of June 2002. 
                                              
66  FII annual reports 1996−2001 
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Figure 16.   FII’s own equity, investments, investment commitments, and own 
equity available to be invested at the end of June 200267 
 
Figure 17 details the group profit of FII group in 1995−2001. FII was able to 
remain profitable from its inception to 2000. However, in 2001, the global 
market downturn, which produced severe decreases in valuations in both stock 
market and venture capital investments, had a significant and inevitable impact 
on the profitability of FII. For the first time in its history, FII made net losses in 
2001. The management has predicted a worsening financial situation by the end 
of 2002. 
                                              
67  Information from FII 
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Figure 17.   FII Group profit and loss in 1995−200168 
3.3 Organization 
The current organization of FII consists of a CEO, three investment directors, 
and three other employees. The impression from the respondent interviews is that 
the team is considered commercially very competent. It is seen as well suited for 
a fund of funds mode of operations. Particularly the financial skills of the team 
have been described as excellent. However, the size, experience, and 
geographical coverage of FII are not sufficient for the effective management of 
direct investments. In regard to early-stage investments, there is an impression 
given by the survey respondents and interviewees that FII is not particularly 
enthusiastic or proactive in growing this activity. 
The better fit of the organization for fund of funds investments rather than direct 
investments gets further support from the market research of Taloustutkimus Oy 
concerning the Finnish venture capital industry.69 In the annual research study, 
Taloustutkimus Oy surveys the management of venture capital backed private 
enterprises as well as listed companies. In the 2002 study, FII was placed 17th in 
the ranking of 50 venture capital organizations on the question of how well the 
                                              
68  Annual reports of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. 1996−2001 
69  Taloustutkimus Oy, 2002, Suomalaiset pääomasijoittajat ja corporate finance -yritykset. 
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organization was known among the survey’s respondents. In comparison, Sitra 
was the best-known investor. Regarding the major strengths or weaknesses of 
FII, there were four key areas where the pluses given by the respondents 
outweighed the minuses by more than 10%. Unfortunately, all of these were 
weaknesses. According to the study, the perceived key weaknesses of FII were 
the designing of complete financing solutions, risk-taking capability and appetite 
for risk, contact networks, and support for internationalization. The results 
certainly reflect the fact that FII has not been very visible in direct investments. 
However, they also do not give any strong reason to expand FII’s direct 
investment activities. 
3.4 Investments 
Figure 18 describes the allocation of the actual investments and investment 
commitments of FII at the level used in its reporting. The portfolio allocation as 
of June 2002 included 13% investments in funds with regional focus and 38% in 
venture capital funds. The share of direct investments (10%) and investments in 
private equity funds (32%) have increased slightly. The target allocation set by 
the Board of FII for the year 2002 is to increase the proportional weight of 
private equity investments (40% of new investments in 2002) and direct 
investments (30% of new investments in 2002). This development cannot be seen 
as supporting the policy goals of FII.70 The Ministry of Trade and Industry has in 
the supervisory process emphasized the role of FII acting in contrary fashion to 
the public market for venture capital by focusing on early-stage investments. FII 
has been requested on two separate occasions to reconsider its intention to 
continue to increase allocations toward private equity and direct investment 
classes by the Ministry of Trade and Industry during the years 2001−2002. 
                                              
70  “The primary focus area of the company is enhancing the equity financing of start-up companies. 
In this respect, particularly important are founding, development and capitalization of seed and 
start-up venture capital funds, development and capitalization of a regional fund network, and 
channeling of EU funding.” Government Decision of 17 February 2000. 
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Figure 18.   Portfolio allocations 12/1999−6/2002 and the planned allocation of 
investments in 2002 
3.4.1 Fund Investments 
The primary mode of operation of FII is to invest in individual venture capital 
funds as a limited partner. Both in this evaluation and in prior research, this fund 
of funds operating mode has been found to be a good mode of government 
intervention. This activity creates little distortion to the capital markets, has the 
benefit of stimulating other investors, and in consequence, creates a positive 
leverage effect by the attraction of additional private money to the funds so 
supported by FII.71 
By the end of year 2001 FII had committed 178 million euros to 39 Finnish 
venture capital funds. These funds were managed by 21 management firms. 
Annual commitments have been on average 30 million euros. These investments 
have been directed to 4−8 new funds annually (Figure 19).  
                                              
71  Bouix J., Dodge C., Huttunen J., Pirinen P., Suominen R., and Viertola K., 2000, Comparison of 
public special financing programs for SMEs: Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Norway, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
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 Figure 19.   Annual new fund commitments by FII 
 
FII has had an important role as a fund investor in the Finnish venture capital 
market. Its funds and their management firms are a representative part of the 
market. At the end of 2001, FII had an investment relationship with 21 firms, 
which represents half of the venture capital firms based in Finland. Figure 20 
presents the number of management firms FII is involved in, and their share as a 
percentage of the total value of all Finnish venture capital firms on an annual 
basis. 
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Figure 20.   Extent of FII’s involvement in Finnish VC firms 
 
Venture capital funds 
Investments in early-stage venture capital are the key focus area of FII as stated 
in the 2000 Government decision. FII reports the fund investments classified as 
venture capital, regional and private equity funds. The venture capital funds are 
supposed to represent investments made to fulfill the key policy goal of starting 
early-stage (seed and start-up) venture capital funds. Table 6 details the 
investments by FII in funds labeled as ‘venture capital’ funds. There were in total 
14 funds falling in this category by the end of 2001 where FII has been an 
investor. FII’s commitments in this category have been on average 6.7 million 
euros representing 18% of an average fund of 46.8 million euros. No new 
investments had been made in this category in 2002 at the time of the report 
(November 2002). 
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Table 6.   FII investments in venture capital funds 
 
Fund Year Fund size 
(MEUR)
FII 
commitment 
(MEUR)
FII share Called as of 
31.12.2001
Forenvia Venture I Ky 1996 10.7 1.7 15.7% 88.0%
Profita Fund I Ky 1996 14.0 2.5 18.1% 92.0%
Telecomia Venture I Ky 1996 9.9 1.7 17.0% 82.0%
EQVITEC Teknologiarahasto I Ky 1997 68.2 12.4 18.3% 81.0%
Aura Capital Rahasto V Ky 1998 5.0 0.7 13.3% 86.0%
Bio Fund Ventures II Ky 1999 67.3 3.4 5.0% 74.0%
EQVITEC Technology Mezzanine Fund I A Ky 1999 40.2 17.0 42.3% 29.0%
Finnventure Rahasto V ET Ky 1999 34.0 16.8 49.5% 60.0%
SFK 99-Rahasto Ky 1999 59.8 3.0 5.0% 77.0%
Nexit Infocom 2000 Fund LP 2000 81.7 5.0 6.1% 32.0%
Slottsbacken Fund II L.P. 2000 27.4 5.0 18.2% 16.0%
Bio Fund Ventures III Ky 2001 81.6 10.0 12.3% 9.0%
CIM Venture Fund for Creative Industries Ky 2001 22.2 5.0 22.6% 6.0%
EQVITEC Technology Fund II Ky 2001 133.8 10.0 7.5% 7.0%
 
Investments in early-stage (seed and start-up) venture capital funds were given as 
the primary focus of operations in the 2000 Government decision. The 
categorization of funds in venture capital, regional, and private equity classes 
does not allow accurate measurement of FII’s fulfillment of this goal, because the 
category ‘venture capital’ does not necessarily mean that the fund would make 
early-stage investments (seed and start-up). Many of the funds FII has invested in 
are not presently active in making early stage investments. Most of the funds in 
this venture capital category now focus on expansion/ development stage 
investments. A closer analysis of the investments by FII-backed funds is 
provided in chapter 3.4. 
Regional funds 
The development and financing of a regional network of funds is among the top 
priorities given for FII in the Government decision. FII has been actively 
involved in setting up a network of ‘Ky type’ limited partnership structured 
regional venture capital funds.  
Table 7 details the investments by FII in funds labeled as venture capital funds. 
There were in total 15 funds falling in this category at the end of 2001 in which 
FII is an investor. FII’s commitments in this category have been on average 1.8 
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million euros representing 24% of the average size of funds of 8 million euros. 
Table 7 details the investments by FII in funds labeled as venture capital funds. 
Only one new fund investment has been made in this category in 2002 at the time 
of the report (November 2002). 
 
Table 7.   FII investments in regional funds 
 
Fund Mgmt Co  
City 
Year Fund size 
(MEUR)
FII 
commitment 
(MEUR)
FII share Called
as of 
31.12.2001
Tampereen Seudun Kasvurahasto 
Tasku Ky 
Tampere 1996 10.4 3.4 32.2% 68.0%
Karhu Pääomarahasto Ky Pori 1997 3.1 0.7 21.5% 86.0%
Lahden Alueen Pääomarahasto Ky Lahti 1997 2.4 0.7 28.4% 57.0%
Etelä-Pohjanmaan Rahasto Ky Seinäjoki 1998 5.0 1.7 33.3% 35.0%
Etelä-Savon Pääomarahasto Ky Mikkeli 1998 5.1 0.8 14.9% 100.0%
Kareliaventure Rahasto Ky Joensuu 1998 3.3 1.1 33.3% 55.0%
Metal Fund Ky Vaasa 1998 5.0 1.7 33.3% 35.0%
Savon Kasvurahasto I Ky Kuopio 1998 7.8 1.0 12.9% 70.0%
Aboa Venture II Ky Turku 1999 9.6 1.3 14.0% 77.0%
Jokilaaksojen Rahasto I Ky Oulu/Raahe 2000 5.4 1.9 34.2% 21.0%
Lapin Rahasto I Ky Oulu 2000 3.2 0.8 26.0% 13.0%
Midinvest Fund I Ky Jyväskylä 2000 13.4 3.4 25.2% 12.0%
Seedcap Ky Lahti/Espoo 2000 13.5 3.4 25.0% 24.0%
Aboa Venture III Ky Turku 2001 11.1 2.0 18.0% 0.0%
GrowHow Rahasto I Ky Kuopio 2001 21.0 3.0 14.3% 3.0%
Teknoventure Rahasto II Ky  Oulu 2002 15.1 4.0 26.5% N/A
 
Support for the creation of a network of regional venture capital funds is well in 
line with the goals set for FII. The overall impression of the evaluators is that FII 
has played an important instrumental role in this area. 
Private equity funds 
The Government decision in 2000 allows FII to make investments also in later 
stage private equity funds in order to balance the overall returns of FII’s 
portfolio. FII has used this opportunity with 32% of the invested and committed 
capital allocated to this category. In the current market downturn, FII has seen a 
need to increase allocations to this category in order to remain profitable. FII has 
set a target allocation of 40% of investments in this category in 2002. 
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Table 8 details the investments by FII in funds labeled as venture capital funds. 
There were in total 10 funds falling in this category at the end of 2001 in which 
FII has been an investor. FII’s commitments in this category have been on 
average 5.7 million euros representing 8% of the average size of funds of 86.6 
million euros. Four new investments equaling to 40 million euros have been 
made in this sector in 2002 by the time of the report (November 2002). 
 
Table 8.   FII Investments in private equity funds 
 
Fund Year Fund 
size 
(MEUR)
FII
commitment 
(MEUR)
FII share Called
as of 
31.12.2001
MB Equity Fund Ky 1995 14.5 2.5 17.4% 100.0%
Finnventure Rahasto III Ky 1996 24.6 3.4 13.7% 100.0%
Fenno Rahasto Ky 1997 42.5 3.4 7.9% 100.0%
MB Equity Fund II Ky 1997 42.1 4.2 10.0% 71.0%
Sponsor Fund I Ky 1997 100.9 3.4 3.3% 68.0%
Finnventure Rahasto IV Ky 1998 59.5 3.4 5.7% 94.0%
MB Mezzanine Fund II Ky 1998 168.2 8.4 5.0% 29.0%
EQT Finland Fund C.V. 1999 138.3 8.4 6.1% 15.0%
Finnmezzanine Rahasto III A Ky 2000 101.4 10.0 9.9% 17.0%
Industri Kapital 2000 Fund LP VII 2000 174.0 10.0 5.7% 68.0%
MB Equity Fund III Ky 2002 96.1 10.0 10.4% N/A
Procuritas Capital Investors III L.P. 2002 184.9 10.0 5.4% N/A
Sponsor Fund II Ky 2002 107.1 10.0 9.3% N/A
Capman Equity VII A Ky 2002 166.0 10.0 6.0% N/A
 
Given the remit of remaining profitable, its structure as a limited company (Oy), 
the measurement of profitability based on annual net income, and the 
unpredictability of future capitalization of FII, it is quite natural for the 
management of FII to focus on profitability in a market downturn. However, it is 
precisely at such difficult economic times (since Spring 2000) when a public 
investor can have its most critical impact on a depressed market. When private 
investors are forced to retreat from difficult areas, a government agency should 
be able to balance this trend and help attenuate new and emerging market 
failures. In FII’s current mode, the stakeholders feel that it has not been able to 
focus on resolving market failures as much as it should in its role as a State 
agency. Investments in financially attractive, later stage private equity funds 
were given a low priority by all stakeholder groups in the survey in comparison 
to early-stage and regional fund investments. 78% of the experts surveyed stated 
that FII should choose to focus on policy goals if it were impossible to both 
resolve effectively market failures and simultaneously remain profitable. 
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3.4.2 Direct investments 
While the clear primary focus of FII in the current legislation is making fund of 
funds investments in early stage venture capital funds, the legislation also allows 
FII to make direct investments in ventures requiring large investments and long-
term risk taking. The starting point in the Government decision for FII making 
direct investments is the identification of a clear a market failure and the 
requirement for FII to co-invest with private investors. 
In the evaluation, the authors were surprised about the weight and the attention 
given to the direct investment activity by the FII management despite the clear 
secondary role of this activity in the mandate of FII: The management envisioned 
a significant growth in FII’s direct investment activity. This is already indicated 
in the target investment allocation for 2002. FII management also noted a 
pressing need to hire new personnel to support the growth of this activity. 
So far, FII has made ten direct investments, which it reports as belonging to this 
category of activity. Table 9 details the direct investments by FII up to November 
2002. 
 
Table 9.   FII direct investments in companies 
 
Investments Year Website Exit year 
Investment
(MEUR)
Okmetic Oyj 1996 www.okmetic.com   3.6
Elcoteq Network Oyj 1996 www.elcoteq.fi  2000 
High Speed Tech Oy Ltd 1996 www.highspeedtech.fi 2000 
Setec Oy 1998 www.setec.fi   3.4
Jutron Oy 2000 www.jutron.fi   1.7
Turun TV-tehdas Oy 2000 www.turkutv.com   5.4
Forchem Oy 2000 www.fchem.com  3.4
Finreila Oy 2001 www.finreila.fi   3.4
Finnish Furniture Holding Oy 2002 www.incapfurniture.fi   3.0
Konepaja Ceiko Oy 2002   2.4
 
In this increased allocation of direct investments, the return requirement has been 
one of the main arguments supporting the logic of this activity. This is surprising 
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given the mandate of FII to help resolve market failures.72 The evaluators feel 
that demonstrating a market failure logic in large direct investments is 
particularly challenging. Direct investments, particularly if made in order to 
increase FII’s financial returns, are clearly prone to cause a ‘crowding out effect’. 
73 It is remarkable that the international experts we interviewed categorically 
stated that government agencies should not participate in the venture level 
decision-making. The Finnish respondents similarly also gave a very low priority 
to direct investments (see Figure 27, page 70). 
3.5 Impact 
3.5.1 Development of the Finnish VC Market 
The size of the Finnish venture capital industry started to expand rapidly in 1996 
in line with other European countries and the US venture capital market. 
Previously growth had been steady but modest, but in 1996 the industry changed 
to a new growth track. Finnish Industry Investment Ltd was established in 1995 
to promote the development of Finnish venture capital industry. 
The capital commitments of Finnish Industry Investment Ltd have played an 
important role in the Finnish venture capital industry. During the recent years, 
FII has supplied each year 6%−8% of the total committed capital. The 
commitments of FII by the end of 2001 amount to 6% of the total of capital 
under management in the Finnish venture capital industry (Figure 21). 
                                              
72  Hyytinen A. and Väänänen L., 2002, Government Funding of SMEs in Finland, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
73  ‘crowding out effect’ occurs when the actions of the State work to frustrate the efficient working 
of the market. Funds provided by the State (which may be offered at cheaper rates of interest) 
reduce the opportunities of willing private investors to identify and invest in attractive projects or 
firms. State funds unnecessarily substitute for private sources of finance. 
 The ‘crowding out effect’ problem of direct investments is well documented in the academic 
literature as well as in the evaluations of various government programs. See e.g. 
 Bouix J., Dodge C., Huttunen J., Pirinen P., Suominen R., and Viertola K., 2000, Comparison of 
public special financing programs for SMEs: Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Norway, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
 Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
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Figure 21.   Capital commitments to the Finnish venture capital industry 
1995−2001 
 
Figure 22 compares the number and volume of investments by FII-backed 
investments compared to funds without FII-backing. It appears that FII-backed 
funds have taken a higher share in the total value of investments made compared 
to the total number of investments made. The statistics also indicate that FII-
backed funds have reacted more strongly to the declining market conditions after 
2000 compared to funds without FII-backing.  
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Figure 22.   Annual investments of FII-backed funds and other funds 
 
Comparison of Figure 21 and Figure 22 points out an important benefit of the 
original fund of funds operating model of FII. While FII has committed only 
about 6% of the total annual capital committed to venture capital funds, the funds 
in which it has invested have contributed about half of the total amount of annual 
investments. In comparison to a direct investment model where the committed 
capital and investments are the same, the fund of funds model of FII has 
significant advantages. The presence of the State as a co-investor through a fund 
of funds vehicle catalyzes institutional investors to invest in new venture capital 
funds. These enlarged and primarily private funds consequently syndicate with 
other venture capital funds thereby increasing the overall level of finance 
available. It was exactly this leverage effect of the fund of funds approach of FII 
which lead the authors of a prior comparison of public special finance programs 
for SMEs to conclude that FII was among the top performers in the sample.74  
 
                                              
74  Bouix J., Dodge C., Huttunen J., Pirinen P., Suominen R., and Viertola K., 2000, Comparison of 
public special financing programs for SMEs: Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Norway, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
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3.5.2 Early-Stage Investments 
At the end of 1990s, it could be noted that the Finnish venture capital market had 
developed rapidly. In the Government decision in 2000, the focus of FII was 
redirected from a general stimulation of the venture capital market towards 
resolving market failures. Early-stage venture capital investments were given as a 
key priority. 
Figure 23 compares the allocations of investments by FII-backed and other funds 
in early stage (seed and start-up) investments. On aggregate level, only 17% of 
the money invested by FII-backed funds went to seed and start-up stage ventures. 
In comparison, funds without FII-backing targeted 33% of the invested money in 
seed and start-up companies in 2001. These figures demonstrate that the 
allocation of FII-backed funds to seed and start-up stage investments has been 
lower than the allocation of seed and start-up stage investments by funds without 
FII-backing. Given the primary focus area of FII to help resolve market failure in 
early-stage venture capital, the lesser focus in this area compared to other funds 
is alarming. Given the share of roughly 9% of the FII portfolio allocated in direct 
investments (primarily later stage), in effect, only about 15% of the total 
investments by FII were invested in early-stage companies. 
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Figure 23.   The share of seed and start-up stage investments by FII-backed and 
other Finnish venture capital funds 
 
Another measure of importance in relation to the policy goal of FII to invest in 
starting companies is the relative share of initial investments versus ‘follow-on’75 
investments. In a comparison of initial investments versus follow-on investments 
by FII-backed and non-FII backed funds, it is surprising to find that the 
significant drop in the share of initial investments in 2001 is strongly explained 
by the change in investment behavior by FII-backed funds (Figure 24). The 
currently lower value-based share of new investments of all investments by FII-
backed investments compared to the ratio of other funds without FII-backing is 
puzzling given the remit of FII to focus its investments in funds investing in 
early-stage companies. This indicates the recently decreased effectiveness of FII 
to respond to this market need. 
                                              
75  A follow-on investment is an investment by the fund in a portfolio company or fund which has 
already received an initial round of finance. Follow-on funds necessarily reduce the amount of 
finance available to the invested in new companies in the short run. 
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Figure 24.   The share of initial investments of all investments (initial + follow-
on investments) by FII-backed and other Finnish venture capital funds 
3.5.3 Regional Investments 
FII has been actively involved in the creation of the regional network of venture 
capital funds. FII has been an investor in all ‘Ky-type’ limited partnership 
venture capital funds. Setting up a network of regional venture capital funds is an 
area in which FII has generally been considered as having done a good job. It is 
the area where FII has been most effective according to our survey respondents 
(see Figure 26 on page 68). 
Figure 25 compares the share of investments made in companies located outside 
southern Finland by FII-backed funds and other funds. The FII-backed funds 
have made roughly half of their investments in companies located outside 
southern Finland during recent years. This share is broadly similar to those 
venture capital funds not backed by FII. 
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Figure 25.   The share of investments outside Southern Finland by FII-backed 
and other Finnish venture capital funds 
 
FII’s stakeholders’ evaluation of FII’s activities 
In a survey of stakeholders of FII, the respondents were asked to rate separately 
the importance and the effectiveness of FII’s main activities on a scale of 1 (not 
at all important) to 5 (very important). This information allowed FII’s activities 
to be ‘mapped’ in relation to each other. The positioning of FII activities is 
presented in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the importance and effectiveness of the 
operations of FII 
 
The positioning of the importance of FII activities is well in line with the picture 
of the market needs coming from the other analyses. Indirect early-stage 
investments (seed and start-up) are observed as the highest priority market 
failure. FII is expected to help resolve that market failure by catalyzing new 
funds to invest in these stages. The second highest priority given to FII by the 
stakeholders is for regional investing through existing fund investments. These 
two areas are generally seen as having a significantly higher priority than FII’s 
other activities. 
Concerning these other activities, the next highest priority is given to direct 
investments in companies of strategic importance to Finland. A closer 
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examination of this issue reveals a split in the opinions concerning this activity. 
Many respondents do not consider this activity at all important, whereas others 
see it as a priority. Those considering this activity important commonly referred 
to the current problematic status of the biotechnology sector in Finland in their 
answers to the open-ended questions. 
Direct investments in turnaround/rescue operations are given a low priority. A 
low priority is also given to investing in financially attractive, later stage private 
equity funds for portfolio returns. The lowest priority is given to direct 
investments in financially attractive companies exclusively in order to increase 
FII’s portfolio returns. The open-ended questions suggested a relatively hostile 
attitude towards a public investor making direct investments. This was seen as 
crowding out private money. Further, FII was not believed to be good at this type 
of investment activity. FII was considered most effective in regional fund 
investments as well as in investing in attractive later stage investments. 
Regarding the organization’s effectiveness, it is somewhat worrying that FII was 
not seen as very effective at the moment in the highest priority activity of fund 
investments in early stage companies. This is also the highest priority objective 
given in the current government mandate for FII. 
Figure 27 illustrates the views of the stakeholders concerning the importance of 
the current activities of FII. It is noteworthy that there is a very strong consensus 
about the priorities of FII activities among all stakeholder groups. They gave a 
significantly higher priority for the fund of funds investments in early-stage and 
regional venture capital funds compared to the rest of FII’s activities. It is 
worrying that the importance given by stakeholders to these two activities is not 
fully reflected in FII’s own priorities. (See Figure 18 “Portfolio allocations 
12/1999−6/2002 and the planned allocation of investments in 2002” on page 54). 
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Figure 27.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the importance of FII’s activities 
 
Figure 28 presents the prioritization of the stakeholder groups of FII when asked 
to make a choice regarding “if it were impossible to effectively reduce market 
failures (e.g. in the supply of early stage venture capital) and be profitable at the 
same time”. 78% of the respondents prioritized focusing on “reducing market 
failures and increasing the allocation of investments in important but financially 
less attractive segments ignored by private investors even if it meant that FII 
could make net losses on its portfolio”. Only 22% of the respondents prioritized 
focusing on “keeping the FII’s investment portfolio profitable and increasing the 
allocation to financially attractive investments, even if it meant FII reducing 
commitment and effort to alleviating market failures.” 
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Figure 28.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the needed prioritization of FII goals  
 
Table 10 presents the cross tabulation of prioritization by stakeholder group. The 
prioritization of policy objective over profitability goal was shared among all 
stakeholder groups included in the survey. 
 
Table 10.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the needed prioritization of FII goals 
classified by stakeholder group 
 
 
Priority on resolving market 
failures over profitability
Priority on profitability over 
resolving market 
failure N
FVCA members 73% 27% 22
Science park 88% 13% 8
Industry expert 73% 27% 11
Government agency 90% 10% 20
Academic expert 71% 29% 14
Total 79% 21% 75
 
3.6 Collaboration 
In our survey, we also asked the respondents to rank the clarity and 
distinctiveness of the role of FII among the other development agencies of the 
Finnish Government (i.e. Sitra, Tekes, Finnvera etc.) that provide finance to 
high-growth young firms. 53% of the respondents considered FII’s role unclear 
and gave the grade 1 or 2 in a scale of 1−5 from not at all clear to very clear 
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(Figure 29). The result is in line with the picture given by interviewees that FII is 
seen as having several incompatible objectives and activities. FII was also 
perceived as being relatively ‘distant’ from other related State agencies’ such as 
Sitra, Tekes, and Finnvera. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29.   FII’s stakeholders’ views on the clarity and distinctiveness of the 
role of FII 
 
One of the areas of some confusion in collaboration is the responsibility of the 
regional venture capital operations of the government. To date, FII, Sitra, and 
Finnvera have all been active in this area. Finnvera has not been making new 
investments in regional funds, but has remained a co-owner in a large number of 
regional venture capital funds. As the main activity of Finnvera is debt provision, 
involvement in the supply of equity has been seen as potentially causing conflicts 
of interest. However, Finnvera has a comprehensive regional network with a 
large number of business analysts knowledgeable about local businesses. FII has 
been actively involved in setting up all new ‘Ky type’ limited partnership 
structured, regional venture capital funds. However, the small management team 
of FII is centralized in Helsinki and therefore has limited direct contact with 
regional businesses. Sitra has had an important role both as an investor and 
developer of the management companies. However, according to informants, the 
role of Sitra in regional investments is coming to an end. 
7 %
46 %
20 %
25 %
1 %
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
1 2 3 4 5
S
ha
re
 o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 (%
)
Not at all clear
and distinct role
Very clear
and distinct role
73 
 
The question of dividing roles between various government agencies cannot be 
answered by an evaluation of a single player in the system. According to the 
information collected in the present evaluation, each agency involved in the 
regional venture capital has made clear contributions in the field. It seems that 
the question regarding regional investment boils down to whether there is a need 
to centralize all regional venture capital investments within the ambit of a single 
fund of funds, or whether there is a need to separate the management of ‘Ky 
type’ venture capital partnerships from the ‘Oy type’ evergreen funds. The logic 
of this separation is that the former would focus on high-growth ventures being a 
part of normal venture capital market, whereas the latter evergreen funds would 
be more associated with regional (and social) policy. In the model where the 
roles are split, FII is seen as investing in the limited partnership type funds in a 
similar fashion to their role in investing in funds in other market failure areas. 
Finnvera is seen to have a continuing role in funding the evergreen funds.  
In this evaluation focusing on the role of FII, there can be seen to be strong 
synergies and economies of scale in FII taking care of investments in all limited 
partnership type funds where the market failure is based on the stage or the 
location. There are a lot of skills in monitoring, structuring of funds, 
orchestrating other limited partners, setting up effective monitoring systems, and 
many other activities where centralized operation is likely to be an effective 
operating mode. Contact networks to EIF and other institutional investors are a 
key asset in a fund of funds operation. FII is strong in these regards. However, 
the geographical reach of FII is limited. Therefore, a close collaboration with 
Finnvera’s regional network is considered essential to maximize the value of 
State resources. 
Overall, the coordination between the key players of the Finnish innovation 
system should be improved. At the margin, there is real confusion expressed by 
industry observers as to the proper authority, roles and relationships of the main 
industry players, including FII, Sitra, and Finnvera. Top-level coordination 
between the players is needed to improve the effectiveness of the innovation 
system and to help resolve emerging problems in the boundary areas of the State 
agencies. This coordination needs to be monitored at the highest level of 
government given the different reporting structures (MTI and Parliament) of 
these organizations. The recently instituted ‘six pack’ meetings between key 
executives of Sitra, Tekes, FII, T&E Centres, Finnish Foundation of Innovations, 
and Finpro have started this process, but it is as yet too early to judge the 
outcomes of this sensible (although overly delayed) initiative. 
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Further, effective enterprise policy requires coordinated actions not only between 
several government special financing agencies but also in more fundamental 
functions such as taxation, regulation, and education given their importance as 
preconditions for entrepreneurial activity.76 Without sufficient measures taken to 
improve the incentives and other preconditions for high-growth entrepreneurship, 
government supply of venture capital can have only a limited impact on growth-
oriented entrepreneurship.77 78 79 Effective enterprise policy requires a clearly 
identifiable and responsible champion at the highest level of the government 
capable of influencing and driving the development of the environment for 
entrepreneurship in all key areas. 
3.7 Conclusions 
From the beginning, FII has had many goals imposed on it, some of which are 
not fully compatible with each other. This conflict is particularly evident in a 
market downturn when the need for effective government intervention is greatest. 
Because of the history of FII, there has not been a very clear set of investment 
priorities. The problem has grown worse during the last year or two. 
FII is organized as a small, competent team of investment professionals and is 
particularly suitable for the management of fund of funds investments. However, 
the organization itself has a strong will to grow and increase its direct investment 
operations. The governance of FII appears not to be very strong. The guidance 
from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance, for 
example, regarding the increased need for FII and its management to focus on the 
market failure on early-stage venture capital has not led to a measurable change 
of operations towards that focus. Rather, the organization itself has increasingly 
                                              
76  Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2001, Business Environment Policy in the New Economy, Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
77  Arenius P. and Autio E., 1999, Kansakuntien yrittäjyyspotentiaali − kymmenen maan välinen 
vertaileva tutkimus − Suomen osaraportti, Teknillinen korkeakoulu, Yritysstrategian ja kansain-
välisen liiketoiminnan laboratorio, Espoo. 
78  Arenius P. and Autio E., 2000, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor − 2000 Finnish Executive 
Report, Research Reports / Center for Technology Management 1−2000, Helsinki University of 
Technology, Espoo. 
79  Arenius P., Autio E., Kovalainen A., and Reynolds P. D., 2001, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2001 Finnish Executive Report, Center for Technology Management Research Reports 1-2001, 
Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
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pursued growth intentions in later stage fund of funds investments and direct 
investments. 
One conclusion from our evaluation is that FII can be assessed having been 
successful during the early years of its operations between 1996−2000 in meeting 
governmental policy goals. FII initially helped stimulate the supply of venture 
capital in general and later successfully supported the development of regional 
venture capital funds. 
However, FII has not been able or prepared to follow effectively the new policy 
emphasis given in the February 2000 guidelines. Nor has the organization 
followed the instructions of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in regard to 
increasing its focus on early-stage investments and thereby reducing allocations 
to later stage private equity funds and direct investments. 
In the current market downturn, the profitability goal set for FII has become a 
major barrier to FII fulfilling its early-stage investment policy goals. According 
to the information gathered in the evaluation, the management of FII has not 
presented a particularly enthusiastic and active image in regard to finding ways 
to stimulate activity in the early stage market. Instead, the management has 
exhibited a stronger and determined interest in expanding its involvement in later 
stage operations and direct investments. 
The present situation regarding the remit and actions of FII appears strikingly as 
though “the tail is wagging the dog”. Namely, the secondary goal of being 
profitable has been used as a reason for not targeting the difficult area of early-
stage market failure (the primary purpose of FII). Rather than address this issue 
of contradictory evaluation criteria directly, FII has decided to pursue an 
alternative strategy of organizational growth in later stage investment activity. In 
consequence, other players in the Finnish innovation system have seriously 
questioned the purpose and the role of FII as a government-owned agency. Given 
the clearly indicated market failures in the early stage segment, the present lack 
of financial resources by other players, and the current lack of impact of FII in 
this key statutory area, informed questions of the usefulness of FII as a policy 
vehicle are not unjustified. The primary raison d’être of FII is in danger if its 
management is not able or willing to establish a clear role for FII in resolving 
market failures. FII has yet to show that it is fully committed to this goal and is 
prepared to work in close collaboration with other State and private players of the 
innovation system. 
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4 Government Intervention in 
Venture Capital 
4.1 Market Failure 
Technically, a ‘market failure’ exists when the price established in the market 
does not equal the marginal social benefit of a good and the marginal social cost 
of producing the good. Within the context of financing high-tech young firms, a 
market failure can occur when the market does not provide sufficient finance to 
meet the demands of young firms regardless of their willingness to pay the price 
(interest payment) required. Asymmetric information increases the uncertainty 
and risks for providers of capital who would rather leave the market than provide 
finance under these conditions. The absence of finance means that existing 
companies fail through lack of necessary resources and new companies are not 
formed. Both outcomes are a social and economic cost to society. 
It can be taken as a sine qua non that governments would prefer not to intervene 
in financial markets unless there is clear evidence of market failure leading to a 
serious misallocation of resources. Further, governments have to be convinced 
that their actions will effectively address the identified problem at an acceptable 
level of costs. Thus, governments (and, relevantly, the European Commission’s 
Competition Directorate. See chapter 4.4) need to be convinced that an 
addressable market failure exists. The fact that many financial institutions are 
loath to finance young firms is not per se evidence of a market failure. Indeed, if 
the young firms are highly risky and the expected value of any external 
investment does not provide an acceptable risk premium to investors, then their 
actions are economically rational. Those arguing the case for intervention have to 
show that there are specific circumstances that prevent capital markets from 
acting efficiently and finding an equilibrium price at which the market clears. 
Absence of information leading to the decision not to offer finance at any price 
would constitute a market failure, which could justify some form of government 
intervention. Perverse incentives that bias the normal matching of supply and 
demand would also constitute a market failure. Loan guarantees may on 
occasions have this effect on the actions of both capital providers and users. 
There is a substantial literature on the interests and actions of the key actors in 
the venture capital process and the effect of their behavior on the optimum 
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allocation of finance to potentially attractive young businesses80 81 82. The 
literature centers on a treatment of the genesis, effect and management of agency 
costs as faced by the providers of capital (limited partners), the users of capital 
(portfolio firms) and the allocating intermediary agents (the venture capitalists). 
The effect of moral hazard issues on the behavior of actors in this market is 
central to these arguments83. That agents can act in a manner which adversely 
affects the supply or demand of capital, is in large part based on the absence of 
full and equal information available to all the parties to the transactions, i.e. the 
information asymmetry problem. Thus the actions of government, in addition to 
providing more capital from public resources, also focus on correcting the causes 
of market failure in order that government interventions in private markets 
remain temporary.  
4.2 New Technology Based Firms 
The importance of new firm formation and growth, particularly in knowledge-
based sectors of the economy, has almost universal recognition by governments. 
Ever since the seminal studies of MIT academic David Birch (1979) in the US 
demonstrated the major impact of firms of under twenty employees on the net 
growth of the American labor force, a series of research programs have 
evidenced the critical role of SMEs within an advanced and prosperous 
economy.84 The value of these firms is not just restricted to quality employment 
growth. The literature brings out a number of other potentially key roles of new 
technology based firms (NTBFs): 
 
                                              
80  See for a well-known treatment of agency costs and the venture capitalists’ contractual responses 
to this threat. Sahlman W. A., 1988, Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital 
Investments, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 23−36. 
81  For a more recent treatment see Kaplan S. N. and Strömberg P., 2002, Characteristics, Contracts, 
and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, NBER Working Paper No.w8764, 
NBER. 
82  For an interest paper on the interests of the venture capitalists and the subsequent effect on their 
optimization objectives, see Gifford S., 1997, Limited attention and the role of the venture 
capitalist, Journal of Business Venturing, 12, 459−482. 
83  Amit R., Glosten L., and Muller E., 1990, Does Venture Capital Foster the Most Promising 
Entrepreneurial Firms, California Management Review, 32, 102−111. 
84  Birch D. L., 1979, The Job Generation Process, MIT Program on Neighborhood and Regional 
Change, Cambridge, MA. 
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• efficiency of innovation  
• export intensity  
• regional development  
• reciprocal relationship with large firms  
• increase industry competitiveness. 
The diversity of desirable potential benefits from a vigorous NTBF sector has 
made the encouragement of such firms a policy priority. However, while 
recognizing the potential importance of these types of young firm, there is also a 
substantial awareness that small firms, particularly in critical areas of high-tech 
and other knowledge-based industries, face peculiar problems that may well 
make them a ‘special case’ in policy terms.85 86 Storey and Tether87 have argued 
that this special case status of NTBFs can be justified for the following reasons: 
• difficulties of the assessment of demand in highly immature markets 
increase both costs and uncertainties for the NTBF 
• investors face added uncertainties as the initial NTBF financings have 
to cover both technology development and product marketing 
demands in the commercialization transition 
• persistent threat to the young firm of accelerated redundancy in 
choosing the wrong technology in rapidly changing technology-based 
sectors  
• lack of managerial skills among entrepreneurial scientists/ 
technologists increases both costs and uncertainties for the NTBF as it 
seeks to commercialize its technological advantages. 
These generic weaknesses particularly affect NTBFs at their earliest stages of 
development. The genesis of these difficulties hinge in large part on the 
consequences to small firms of an asymmetry of information in dynamic and 
volatile technology environments. Thus, investors have difficulties in 
determining the attraction or otherwise of a potential company. Similarly, the 
                                              
85  Bank of England, 2001, Financing of Technology-Based Small Firms, Bank of England, Domestic 
Finance Division, London. 
86  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2002a, Financing of Technology-Intensive Small Businesses: Some 
Evidence on the Uniqueness of the ICT Industry, Etla Discussion Papers No. 813, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
87  Storey D. J. and Tether B., 1996, New technology-based firms in the European Union: an 
Introduction, Research Policy, 26, 933−946. 
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NTBFs find it difficult to initially identify and then convince sources of finance 
as to the value and attractiveness of their entrepreneurial ideas. The outcome of 
these dislocations is that there usually exist imperfections both in the supply of 
finance to NTBFs (the ‘equity gap’) and in the quality of firms that wish to take 
up such sources of finance (the lack of ‘investment ready’ firms88). 
Given that these weaknesses reduce the rate of formation of high potential young 
firms and also reduce the interest of professional investors in financing the 
growth of such firms, the State has a very active interest in addressing and 
correcting these weaknesses in the capital markets. In consequence, a range of 
support measures have grown up to specifically target NTBFs as a particularly 
important cohort of high growth potential, young firms. These measures are 
largely focused on equity rather than debt based instruments given the limited 
potential of young firms to provide sufficient interest cover to satisfy banks and 
other potential creditors89. While in a number of countries (for example, Finland), 
the support programs do not formally differentiate between technology-based and 
other potentially high-growth young firms, the reality is that the schemes are 
largely conceived and executed as if they were specifically technology focused 
programs. 
4.3 Forms of Government Intervention 
The constraints facing the new and young firm are manifold. A government 
interested in supporting SMEs in general or NTBFs in particular can address a 
range of issues. NTBFs face financial rationing, but they also have problems in 
attracting competent managers with established careers in larger companies to 
take the substantial risk of joining a start-up or young company. Markets are 
rarely kind to new entrants, particularly if they are small, unknown and resource 
constrained. Very often firms are obliged to directly enter new markets where the 
use of distributors or joint ventures with more established firms would make 
more economic sense at put the young firm at less risk.90 Similarly, young 
                                              
88  Department of Industry Science and Tourism, 1997, Small Business Research Program: 
Investment Readiness Study, Commonwealth Government, Canberra. 
89  Berger A. N. and Udell G. F., 1998, The economics of small business finance: The roles of private 
equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle, Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, 
613−673. 
90  Burgel O. and Murray G. C., 2000, The International Market Entry of Start-up Companies in 
High-Technology Industries, Journal of International Marketing, 8, 33−62. 
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NTBFs are very often specialist in focus and this limits their familiarity with 
other important technologies or their access. This is part of a wider problem in 
that the nascent or young NTBF and its management are required to find and 
make sense of a huge array of different information in order to survive and 
flourish as an economic entity. Much of this information is not readily available 
to the inexperienced young firm or its management, which at least initially is 
likely to have more of a technological than a commercial history. Government in 
seeking to support these firms in their critical early stages post formation has to 
both understand the nature of the threats and the appropriate support measures to 
attenuate such problems. 
Table 11.   Typology of Government Support Measures for NTBFs 
 
State policies directed at new technology-based firms tend to be concentrated in addressing 
five areas of weakness: 
 
• Financial constraints 
• Management weaknesses 
• Market imperfections 
• Access to technology 
• Access to information 
In addition, policies may be classified by their mode of delivery, i.e. either direct to the 
applicant firm or via agents: 
 
• Direct policy instruments 
• Indirect policy instruments 
 
The majority of schemes to support NTBFs have traditionally been direct, i.e. involving some 
type of assistance to the entrepreneur/business. Indirect policies have more commonly aimed 
at infrastructure or market improvements. More recently, there has been increasing support 
for the State to act indirectly through its encouragement and development of existing market 
structures. 
 
In addition to a variety of ways in which the State can assist young firms, there 
are also a number of levels at which the State can intervene. They can choose to 
support NTBFs directly by grant or subsidy. Conversely, they can direct 
resources indirectly to the NTBFs by way of the professional investment firms, 
which seek to invest in such companies. In this review, we will concentrate 
primarily on those instruments which are linked to equity support by professional 
investors rather than loans or grants from the State. Further, we will not discuss 
those schemes which seek to improve the quality and supply of information to 
the entrepreneur or enhance his or her training. In this report, we will remain 
primarily concerned with the supply of finance to the young and resource-
constrained business.  
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Equity (often termed “risk capital”) has a particularly important role for the 
support of NTBFs given the lack of ‘collateralizable’ assets belonging to the 
young firm, and the often extended periods of negative cash flows before a new 
project or firm becomes profitable91 92.93 These two factors usually rule out 
traditional bank debt as a major source of funding94. Within the present report, 
the concentration on equity schemes is also appropriate given that FII programs 
are exclusively focused on equity rather than debt or grant provision. 
Government employees making decisions that impact directly on the workings of 
factor markets are increasingly treated with some reservations by policy makers 
and program designers. Civil servants are not trained private equity investors nor 
do they operate under remuneration packages that reward them on the basis of 
the success of their commercial decisions. Governments are increasingly of the 
opinion that public actions are a poor substitute for private, commercially driven 
activity in specialist markets that are characterized by high levels of complexity 
and volatility. Accordingly, there is an increasing interest in crafting public 
interventions, which enable commercial activity in early-stage VC markets to be 
more economically attractive to private agents. The State seeks to support rather 
than substitute for private action by changing the risk/reward profile of the target 
activity. 
4.3.1 Direct versus Indirect Policies Direct Intervention on the 
Supply of Venture Capital 
As noted, the State may seek to address problems in the supply of finance to high 
potential young firms by using its own resources directly to address the problem. 
A State investment agency may be set up to deal directly with target applicants. 
Such policies would be termed ‘direct’. Conversely, those policies which seek to 
address these market failures by incentivizing the supply of venture capital from 
                                              
91  Roberts E. B., 1991, Entrepreneurs in High Technology, Oxford University Press, New York. 
92  Bygrave W. D. and Timmons J. A., 1992, Venture Capital at the Crossroads, Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston, MA. 
93  Bank of England, 2001, Financing of Technology-Based Small Firms, Bank of England, Domestic 
Finance Division, London. 
94  Capital loans and other instruments where the greater risks of investing in young companies are 
compensated by an ownership (equity) position in the event of success are becoming increasingly 
common. However, Almi in Sweden argue that micro-loans with delayed repayment of principal 
and interest are as relevant as equity to NTBFs. 
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private agents in established capital markets and which specifically focus on the 
venture capital firm, are termed ‘indirect’ investment programs (‘fund of funds’). 
This is because they do not provide direct financial transfers to specific target 
SMEs but incentivize the intermediary agents in the capital markets and supply 
capital via these private intermediary venture capitalists.  
Direct Intervention by the State 
Pros: Lerner 95 96 highlights the importance of R&D spillovers as a key rationale 
for government investment in the venture capital industry. Social returns to 
investments in innovative firms are often higher than private returns. As private 
investors do not capture full benefits of the investment, it may be sub-optimal for 
them to invest. For the same reasoning, it may be desirable for the government to 
invest in such firms for reasons of net social benefit when private funding is not 
forthcoming. Lerner also shows the certification role of government by 
demonstrating that firms receiving investments by SBIR (Small Business 
Innovation Research) programs in the US between 1983 and 1997 grew faster 
than non-awardees and were able to attract more venture financing. If this finding 
of positive effects of government subsidies can be generalized, it might also 
apply to companies funded by VC finance provided by government funds.97 
Cons: Although there are some potential benefits in direct government 
involvement, the current research finds a significant number of reasons why 
government should not be involved in venture level decision-making.98 99 100 101 
                                              
95 Lerner J., 1999, The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program, 
Journal of Business, 72, 285−318. 
96  Lerner J., 2002, When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of effective 'public venture 
capital' programmes, Economic Journal, 112, F73−F84. 
97  Manigart S. and Beuselinck C., 2001, Supply of Venture Capital by European Governments, 
Working paper, Ghent University. 
98  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
99  Manigart S. and Beuselinck C., 2001, Supply of Venture Capital by European Governments, 
Working paper, Ghent University. 
100  Bouix J., Dodge C., Huttunen J., Pirinen P., Suominen R., and Viertola K., 2000, Comparison of 
public special financing programs for SMEs: Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Norway, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
101  Bannock Consulting Ltd, 2001, Innovative instruments for raising equity for SMEs in Europe, 
Final report prepared for DG Enterprise of the European Commission by Bannock Consulting. 
83 
 
For example, it has been argued that investments by government in the VC 
industry may lead to a slower development or even suppression of the private VC 
industry.102 103 This is the ‘crowding-out effect’, where private VC funding 
decreases and is substituted by government funds.104 105 106 Public VC may well 
fund the best projects by investing at below market rates and thereby leaving the 
second best projects to private VC investors.107 In these cases, the inappropriate 
intervention by governments can actually prevent the creation or subsequent 
working of an active and flourishing private VC market. Second, there is an 
argument that government investments and subsidies often grant a ‘license to 
steal’ to the entrepreneurs.108 For example, the SBIC (Small Business Investment 
Company) program seldom controls what happens with the money after a 
company receives a grant. Therefore, adequate control and follow-up of 
companies receiving government VC funds is needed in order to avoid abuse. 
Third, the appropriateness of using of public servants to assess VC investment 
opportunities is questionable. Their reward system is in most cases independent 
of the outcome of the investments.109 In this line of reasoning, public servants 
should either be rewarded and incentivized as their counterparts in the private 
sector, or conversely, the inappropriateness of using public servants in areas of 
direct commercial activity should be recognized. There is also an argument that 
direct investing activity by government is vulnerable to pressures from 
politicians and other interest groups to direct the investment activity to directions 
                                              
102  Surlemont B., Wacquier H., and Leleux B. F., 1998, State versus Private Venture Capital: Cross-
Spawning or Crowding Out? A Pan-European Empirical Examination, Paper presented at the 
Babson College-Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference. 
103  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
104  Khanna J. and Sandler T., 2000, Partners in giving: the crowding-in effects of UK government 
grants, European Economic Review, 44, 1543−1556. 
105  Hyytinen A. and Väänänen L., 2002, Government Funding of SMEs in Finland, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
106  Armour J., 2002, Law, Innovation and Finance: A Review, Working paper, Centre for Business 
Research, Cambridge University, Cambridge. 
107  Manigart S., De Waele K., Wright M., Robbie K., Desbrieres P., Sapienza H. J., and Beekman A., 
2002, Determinants of required return in venture capital investments: a five-country study, Journal 
of Business Venturing, 17, 291−312. 
108  Florida R. and Smith D. F., 1993, Keep the Government out of Venture Capital, Issues in Science 
and Technology, 9, 61−68. 
109  Surlemont B., Wacquier H., and Leleux B. F., 1998, State versus Private Venture Capital: Cross-
Spawning or Crowding Out? A Pan-European Empirical Examination, Paper presented at the 
Babson College-Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference. 
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that benefit themselves.110 Fifth, direct investments are also highly expensive for 
the government.111 112 
4.3.2 Indirect Intervention in the Supply of Venture Capital 
The State does not have to act directly if it can influence or adapt the commercial 
environment to a degree that will encourage private investors to undertake the 
desired actions.113 114 Governments have at their disposal a wide range of fiscal 
and regulatory instruments in addition to considerable freedom in the allocation 
of grants and other government transfers and subsidies. On some occasions, 
government can best influence the supply of venture capital by removing legal or 
regulatory stumbling blocks. For instance, the elimination of the ‘prudent man’ 
rule in the United States at the end of 1970s allowing trustees of pension funds to 
increase their allocations of finance to venture capital as an asset class without 
making themselves legally vulnerable.115 The 1981 Companies Act in the UK 
similarly removed a major barrier to venture capital activity by allowing venture 
capitalists to use the assets of a target management buy-out as the security for 
raising finance to purchase the buy-out. The removal of this barrier effectively 
launched the highly successful UK buy-out industry. 
The State is seeking a market-mediated response to the reality that without some 
kind of intervention there will be an insufficient supply of seed and early stage 
capital. In seeking to address this market failure, the State has to decide whether 
or not to tackle this problem via its own actions or by indirectly incentivizing 
                                              
110  Lerner J., 2002, When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of effective 'public venture 
capital' programmes, Economic Journal, 112, F73−F84. 
111  Bannock Consulting Ltd, 2001, Innovative instruments for raising equity for SMEs in Europe, 
Final report prepared for DG Enterprise of the European Commission by Bannock Consulting. 
112  Bouix J., Dodge C., Huttunen J., Pirinen P., Suominen R., and Viertola K., 2000, Comparison of 
public special financing programs for SMEs: Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Norway, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki. 
113  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
114  Martin S. and Scott J. T., 2000, The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public 
support for private innovation, Research Policy, 29, 437−447. 
115  Mayer C., 2002, Financing the New Economy: financial institutions and corporate governance, 
Information Economics and Policy, 14, 311−326. 
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third parties. As part of the overall appraisal, the evaluators decided to seek the 
views of a number of specialist policy-makers who had responsibility for 
designing their government’s prescription to the equity gap issue. One of the 
most uniform of the responses gained from interviews with a representative 
group of internationally senior policy-makers (see References for a list of 
interviewees) was their response to the question: “Do you believe that the State 
should be directly involved in selecting attractive seed/early-stage portfolio firms 
in which to invest?” Not one respondent strongly agreed with that statement 
while the single largest response was to very strongly disagree. Clearly, policy-
makers have come to accept that the skills set required to successful generate, 
identify and execute seed/early stage investments in new technology based firms 
cannot be easily replicated by the State. Accordingly, in most cases, the State 
sought to attract professional private sector investors to act as agents on behalf of 
government. Private investors seeking to maximize their wealth by making 
attractive investments were seen as more effective instruments of government 
policy than non-specialist civil servants operating in a bureaucratically structured 
and highly constrained reward system. The State can, if it wishes, recruit over 
time investors and management to run its own investment company. However, 
evidence suggests that it is very difficult for governments to retain specialists in 
the area of venture capital and private equity with private firms repeatedly 
‘cherry picking’ attractive government staff. 
To Protect or to Reward Private Investors: Managing Success and Failure 
Based on the premise that, in the absence of government intervention, private 
investors will either not invest in seed and early stage investments or that their 
activities in this area will be sub-optimal, the State has to make the decision how 
best to encourage a greater interest from commercial investors. The intervention 
of the State has to skew the reward /risk profile from that pertaining in the market 
without their involvement. This may be achieved by reducing the costs of failure 
(down-side protection) or magnifying the economic returns from success (up-side 
leverage). These outcomes are not necessarily alternatives and some programs 
will incorporate elements of both actions. The State may also seek to alter the 
economics of seed and early stage funds not by influencing the consequences of 
adverse or positive outcomes but by altering the operating costs of an early stage 
venture capital firm via direct subsidy. Table 12 describes some features used in 
government-sponsored venture capital programs to incentivize private investors 
to resolve market failures. 
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Table 12.   Features used in government-sponsored venture capital funds 
to incentivize private investors to invest in market failure areas
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Managing Success − Upside Incentives 
The purpose of upside incentives is to increase the rate of returns to private 
investors by a preferential reallocation of the net rewards from a portfolio of 
investments making the expected returns from investments in market failure area 
comparable to other investment opportunities. Thus, in practice, the investment 
sums of the State in a leveraged fund will subsequently take a smaller share of 
any net gains than their private co-investors. This is done by restricting or 
capping the returns to the invested monies of the State when it is involved as a 
limited partner in the fund. Additionally, the State may be required to make its 
investments before the finances of the private investors are ‘drawn down’ into 
the fund. Similarly, the private investors may be distributed the principle and any 
returns from individual investments plus any final residual surplus from the fund 
before the public investor. This has the effect of returning a larger proportion of 
the net capital gain of the fund to the private investors than their investment in 
the fund would warrant if all investors were treated equally. These actions are the 
opposite of when the State invests pari passu with private investors, i.e. the State 
and the private investors are treated equally in any commitments to or returns 
from the fund. FII normally invests on pari passu terms. Thus, while FII 
investments increase the size of any fund into which it invests and its 
contribution may assist in realizing any scale effects on the operation of the fund, 
its actions have no leverage effect on the returns to private investors. Given the 
profit requirements on FII, this arrangement is rational but it does mean that the 
State forgoes any leverage incentivization of private investors. It is highly likely 
that leverage effects will be much more valuable to private investors than any 
scale effects from FII merely being involved on the same terms as any private 
investors in the fund. 
Importantly, upside leverage instruments do not protect the venture capital firm 
or the limited partners against the costs of ‘adverse selection’ and project failure 
but rather multiply the financial benefits of success to the disproportionate 
advantage of the venture capital firms and their private equity investors (limited 
partners). Given that a relatively small number of successful investments will 
typically provide the majority of capital gain for a venture capital fund, this 
leverage again can have critically important performance benefits particularly for 
the smaller fund.  
State-sponsored leverage schemes usually allow each euro or dollar of a venture 
capitalist’s fund to be matched with one or more euros or dollars of the 
government’s money. The German BTU scheme (co-financing variant) will 
match the venture capitalist on a deal by deal basis at parity (i.e. 1:1 ratio) to a 
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ceiling of DM 3 million investment from the federal government. In the 
American SBIC Scheme, the leverage is 2:1 for most licensed US venture 
capitalists outside special development areas up to a ceiling of a State 
contribution of US $90 million per fund. Thus, a US $45 million fund of private 
investors can attract the maximum leverage of US $90 million publicly 
guaranteed monies to become a $135 million US fund. In 1997, the Australian 
government formally adopted a local equivalent of the revised SBIC Scheme by 
creating the Industrial Investment Fund with A$130 million available for 
leveraged investment on a 2:1 State/Private ratio. In a later variant of this 
program, the Australian government’s Competitive Pre-Seed Fund, which was 
established in 2001, is based on a 3:1 public to private leverage ratio. In 
providing such a generous State contribution, the latter scheme recognizes the 
economic challenge of the initial commercialization of R&D activities for a 
commercial investor. 
In addition, these schemes materially assist the fund in being able to provide 
portfolio companies with successive rounds of finance. This dearth of ‘follow-
on’ finance is a major problem for a small venture fund supporting an exciting, 
and invariably cash demanding, investee company.125 In the absence of sufficient 
follow-on finance, the original investor is likely to face severe dilution and a 
diminishing share in any eventual capital gain from the investment. In effect, the 
first investor takes the highest level of risk and by not being able to continue to 
invest is denied an appropriate reward. The addition of State money not only 
provides leverage benefits but the larger size of the fund gives the fund managers 
much more liquidity to continue investing in their most promising portfolio 
companies. 
The State may insist on a share of any capital gain of the fund. The higher the 
returns to the State’s investment, the less the effect of a leverage of the private 
investors returns. While any increase in the share of investment returns to the 
State increasing the cost to the venture capitalist of the State’s participation, the 
benefits of leverage are likely to outweigh the incremental costs – provided that 
attractive investments are made and successfully exited by the fund and the share 
demanded by the State is not too onerous. Again, the prevailing logic of the 
program remains solely in rewarding successful investment by private agents. In 
practice, the State is usually less interested in a risk-adjusted return on its funds 
and more attracted by the supply side stimulation to the venture capital market 
                                              
125  Murray G. C., 1994b, The Second ’Equity Gap’: Exit Problems for Seed and Early Stage Venture 
Capitalists and Their Investee Companies, International Small Business Journal, 12, 59−76. 
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resulting from its involvement. For the State to demand a large share of net 
returns becomes counter-productive to its more valuable policy focused role of 
incentivizing private investors. For example, the UK Regional Venture Capital 
Funds set up in 2001 ‘cap’ the returns to the State’s investment in each fund to a 
‘cash to cash’ net Internal Rate of Return of 5%. Any additional capital gain from 
the fund’s investments goes exclusively to the private limited partners. (See 
appendix 6 for a description of the 2001 UK Regional Venture Capital Fund 
scheme).  
Thus, the State’s financial contribution allows the managing partners of the fund 
to ‘gear up or leverage’ the returns from the investment to the exclusive benefit 
of the private equity investors. Zero Stage Capital, a Boston-based, early-stage 
venture capital firm, and one of the first US managing partnerships to be awarded 
a license under the revised SBIC leverage scheme, has estimated that the benefit 
of this instrument can translate into a one third improvement on the terminal IRR 
of an average performing fund126. The 1:3 leverage component (i.e. 25% of the 
funds’ capital is provided by the State) of the cited British scheme has the effect 
that with an overall fund return of 20% IRR, the private partners will receive a 
net annualized return on their investments of 27% IRR. Regardless of the limited 
partners’ return, the State’s return is capped at 5% IRR after the limited partners 
have earned a threshold IRR of 10%. Many recent government venture capital 
programs targeted at resolving market failures have recently adopted either a 
‘capped return’ for the government or a ‘buy-out option’ for the private investors 
in order to incentivize private investors to invest in early stage areas where a 
market failure exists. Such schemes have been launched by the government e.g. 
in the UK, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Korea. 
State leverage may be either directed at the fund itself or, less commonly, at a 
specific portfolio company. Underwriting schemes are commonly authorized on 
a specific deal by deal basis. Thus, each portfolio company has individually to be 
accepted into the scheme by the underwriter. In the case of the upside leverage, 
this is addressed at the level of the fund in the case of the US’ SBIC scheme, the 
British Regional VC Fund program and one of the variants (KfW ‘refinancing’) 
of the German BTU Scheme. The other BTU scheme (tbg ‘co-investment’) 
participates directly in a portfolio company in parallel with the venture capitalist 
with a separate decision being made on each investment. 
                                              
126  Correspondence with Paul Kelley, President of Zero Stage Capital, Cambridge, MA. 
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Managing Failure – Downside Protection 
Early-stage investments in NTBFs carry a range of firm and industry specific 
risks. Thus, it is not uncommon for a very significant proportion of the investee 
firms in an early-stage portfolio to result in full or partial loss of the venture 
capitalist’s investment.127 128 129 This malign outcome skews the risk/reward 
distribution strongly towards poor fund returns in both theory and practice.130 
Recognizing this peculiar reality, a number of governments have instituted 
publicly supported, insurance or underwriting schemes to encourage investors to 
remain in this activity. The SOFARIS program in France, the “Udviklings 
selskaber” program in Denmark or the now terminated PPM scheme in the 
Netherlands are all examples of State guarantees. Thus, the professional investor 
does not bear the full cost of a failed investment but is partially compensated or 
‘bailed out’ by the State acting as an underwriter.  
This safety net, it is assumed, will change the venture capitalist’s risk preference 
and behavior towards greater investment activity in younger and more 
speculative enterprises. Evidence from the German BTU scheme would suggest 
that this assumption is correct. However, one major problem with downside 
protection is that it does not discriminate between unlucky and merely 
incompetent investors. Guarantees protect the venture firm recipients from 
excessive losses. Underwriting does little to improve investment returns 
compared to leverage/equity enhancement schemes or programs (e.g. Israel’s 
Yozma) that have allowed fund managers to buy the State’s interest in successful 
funds. In effect, guarantee schemes allow less successful investors to be 
protected from the consequences of their own actions.  
Regardless of the moral hazard problem, down-side protection can be viewed as 
important by smaller funds in particular.131 Being already constrained by limited 
                                              
127  Huntsman B. and Hoban J. P., 1980, Investment in New Enterprise: Some Empirical Observations 
on Risk, Return and Market Structure, Financial Management, 44−51. 
128  Murray G. C. and Marriott R., 1998, Why has the investment performance of technology-
specialist, European venture capital funds been so poor?, Research Policy, 27, 947−976. 
129  Sahlman W. A., 1990, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27, 473−521. 
130  Burgel O., 2000, UK Venture Capital and Private Equity as an Asset Class for Institutional 
Investors, London Business School and British Venture Capital Association, London. 
131   One expert respondent also argued that institutional investors also saw some value in limiting the 
downside of their investment in venture capital as it gave them some comfort in explaining their 
investment decisions to the trustees of their funds in the event of a poor fund performance. 
94 
 
funds under management, the write-off of a significant number of investments 
can reduce the level of residual operating funds available for investment to below 
a viable limit. Also, the very nature of early-stage investment requires that 
significant risks are taken and a high level of uncertainty is accepted. A fund that 
is not losing a proportion of investments is probably acting in too conservative a 
manner in emerging and immature technology markets. Thus, accepting a 
material level of losses is virtually inevitable in early-stage investments. Yet, it is 
exactly this type of investor that is least likely to have the resources to accept 
such losses. Hence, the logic of underwriting a percentage of early-stage fund 
losses can appear attractive to early-stage fund managers. 
It is common for these schemes to assume a substantial proportion of the costs of 
project failure particularly at the vulnerable early period of a new business. Both 
Udviklingsselskaber and SOFARIS provide a 50% cover as did the PPM scheme 
(which ended in the Netherlands in 1995). The BTU scheme assumes a 
maximum cover of 75% of total project investment cost (although calculated in 
different ways for the two variants of the scheme). Both the BTU and the PPM 
schemes extended this guarantee for five years from the time of the first venture 
capital investment in a portfolio company. After five years, cover under the PPM 
scheme declined by 10% a year to disappear at year 10. The critically vulnerable 
first year of the investment was also removed from the cover in the post 1988 
variant of the PPM scheme. All schemes instituted a ceiling level of cover (i.e. 
liability) per portfolio firm. 
The adverse consequences of a guarantee scheme may actually be greater than 
just protecting unsuccessful investors. Any scheme that builds a safety net into 
the operation of a commercial fund alters the risk/reward profile of the investor. 
As already noted, the intended logic is to purposively alter the investor’s 
behavior. A guarantee may well encourage investors to act in a manner which 
reduces their willingness to undertake rigorous ‘due diligence’ on a firm before 
investing. Indeed, depending on the risk preference of the investor, he or she may 
be happy to invest in projects with a significantly negative net present value 
given that a considerable element of the loss is covered and any gain, however 
unlikely, is still fully or largely owned by the investor. This moral hazard 
problem is endemic to incentives of this nature. In short, fund guarantee schemes 
can allow private investors to gamble with government’s money at little personal 
cost. There is certainly a contemporary view held by a number of German 
academic and industry observers that the generosity of the BTU scheme did 
encourage a number of inappropriate organizations to enter the venture capital 
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industry in the technology bull market of 1997−2000.132. The validity of this 
comment was corroborated by a senior German policy maker in discussion with 
one of the evaluators who noted that the BTU scheme had decided in 2002 to 
dispense altogether with the guarantee element of this program. This decision 
was made in the light of the excessive losses incurred in underwriting the 
investment guarantee. 
The WFG case is an earlier German example of the incentive problems that are 
created by government programs that include downside protection.133 Whereas 
upside leverage increases the economic returns to the skills and value added 
efforts of the venture capital partners, downside protection provides no such 
incentives to the better or more experienced investors. State-provided incentives 
should spur recipients to make the extraordinary commitments necessary to 
create globally successful businesses.  
Thus, the greatest problem of down side protection is the most difficult one to 
observe. Down side protection removes the investors’ interests from an exclusive 
focus on maximizing the rewards of success. Rather, it increases the benefits of a 
comfortable mediocrity. With losses partly underwritten, investors do not lose a 
great deal but neither do they create much – either in terms of internationally 
successful businesses or greater levels of employment growth for the State. 
Guarantee schemes are insidious. They are more likely to help the survival of 
venture capital firms rather than accelerate the success of their investments. The 
result is that while several new investments may have been sponsored, such 
assistance is not designed to unreservedly incentivize the creation of world-class 
new enterprises. Guarantees do not encourage exceptional effort or ‘winner take 
all’ strategies. The passion of creating the next generation of global enterprises is 
replaced by the comfort of “if it goes wrong, it will not hurt much”. Accordingly, 
these schemes are commonly of negligible interest to main stream and 
professional venture capital firms that wish for positive incentives to scale up the 
rewards of taking risky decisions backed by adequate capital resources, 
demanding investors and the exceptional effort of skilled management teams. 
                                              
132 At the LMU Private Equity Conference 2002 held in Munich on the 9th November 2002, industry 
and academic delegates from Germany were almost unanimous in the view that unwise 
investments had been encouraged by the generosity of the underwriting of venture capitalists in the 
scheme to the extent that investors had terminated portfolio companies that were worth more on 
liquidation (50% guarantee) than if restructured (<50% or original investment realized). 
133  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
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It is interesting to observe that the more developed (and successful) the venture 
capital community, the less likely is downside protection to feature as a main 
element of supply-side programs to encourage venture capital. In the relatively 
few US and UK government supported venture capital schemes, the emphasis is 
primarily on the leveraging of the rewards to private investors. No formal 
guarantee schemes for equity are in place in either country (although in the UK 
Regional VC Fund scheme the returns of the State are subordinate to those of the 
private investors). Conversely, the major countries of mainland Europe (France, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark) have all had state-sponsored 
schemes with a direct guarantee component. 
Support for the Fund’s Operating Costs 
Specialist early-stage, technology funds are commonly characterized by their 
small size. The great majority of specialist, seed capital funds in Europe have 
historically been capitalized at under 20 million euros. Some regional seed funds 
in Europe have had as little as 2 million euros under management.134 135 The 
UK’s University Challenge Fund provides universities with seed funding for the 
financing of interesting intellectual property of approximately £4 million. Given 
their structure and resources, these small funds are able to exploit few of the 
scale and scope economies available to larger development capital funds of 500 
million euros upwards.136 However, industry norms for the level of fee income 
available to the managing partners (i.e. the venture capital firm) are based on the 
precedents set by these larger and more influential funds. In addition, in most 
venture capital communities, the managing partners have seen significant 
downwards pressure on the percentage of fee incomes negotiable and an increase 
in the stringency of the conditions under which these fees are provided. These 
pressures are in no small part a consequence of early abuses of inexperienced 
institutional investors by aggressive venture capital firms.137 138 The bargaining 
power of the institutional investors is either applied directly (in the case of larger 
                                              
134  Murray G. C., 1998, A policy response to regional disparities in the supply of risk capital to new 
technology based firms in the European Union: The European Seed Capital Fund Scheme, 
Regional Studies, 32, 405−419. 
135  Murray G. C. and Marriott R., 1998, Why has the investment performance of technology-
specialist, European venture capital funds been so poor?, Research Policy, 27, 947−976. 
136  Apax Partners’ last fund was over $4 billion in size. 
137  Zider B., 1998, How venture capital works, Harvard Business Review, 76, 131−+. 
138  These circumstances lead one industry commentator memorably to observe that the UK venture 
capital industry had “mugged” the institutional investors - Initiative Europe, 1994. 
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investors) and/or via the agency of a ‘gatekeeper’, i.e. a specialist private equity 
consultant advising several institutions on an optimal asset allocation program. 
Fund of funds managers can similarly exert downward pressures on the fee-based 
incomes of individual managing partnerships given their influence on the 
allocation of institutional funds under their control. 
The ‘going rate’ management fee for development or merchant capital funds is 
around 2–2,5% of the total value of the funds raised, although this rate may taper 
in the closing years of a ten year, fixed term fund. The appropriate figure for 
specialist, early-stage technology funds in order to cover the operating costs of 
the venture capital management activity is probably about 4–5% of finance 
raised139 depending on the scale of the funds managed. This latter percentage 
figure has appeared totally unacceptable to the vast majority of institutional 
investors or their advisers. In 1989, the British Venture Capital Association 
suggested to government that they might consider providing a subsidy towards 
the costs of professional management in seed funds. This was a recommendation 
of the newly constituted Seed Committee. The UK government declined to 
become involved in the proposed scheme, which was quietly dropped. The Seed 
Committee subsequently was wound up. In a survey140 of the twenty leading 
venture capitalists in the UK in 1990, there was universally acknowledgement 
that the industry’s inability to find a way that seed and start-up investments could 
be profitably supported was seen as one of the most important failures of the UK 
industry in the decade of the 1980s. 
The European Seed Capital Fund pilot program of the European Union (1988–
95) was a pan-European attempt to address this issue of the relatively (high) 
fixed costs of managerial governance in small funds.141 Half of the eligible 
operating costs of the twenty-three early-stage funds in the program were paid 
for by the European Commission through the provision of a non-interest bearing, 
term loan to the funds. This subsidy on operating costs was paid to cover start-up 
costs and the first five year’s running costs of the fund. This term loan was only 
repayable if the fund subsequently made a net profit on its investments over the 
ten years of the fund’s life. The focus of this scheme proved very popular and 
                                              
139 Robert Hook is a founder partner of the Cambridge early-stage technology fund, Prelude 
Technology Investments Ltd. His estimate of an appropriate fee income was made at a seminar of 
the European Seed Capital Fund network.  
140 Murray G. C., 1991, Change and Maturity in the UK Venture Capital Industry 1991−95, British 
Venture Capital Association, London. 
141 Murray G. C., 1994a, An Assessment of the First Three Years of the European Seed Capital Fund 
Scheme, European Planning Studies, 2, 435−461. 
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twenty-one funds were set up or re-organized to take part in this pilot activity. 
Research showed that the European Commission’s intervention was appreciated 
by early-stage fund managers and private investors alike. They argued that the 
imprimatur of the European Commission’s support allowed them to increase 
substantially the level of private finance raised – a ‘certification effect’. Further, 
the scheme allayed institutional investors’ (i.e. the limited partners) fears that 
their contributions were excessively diverted to paying management incomes 
rather than purchasing equity in exciting young businesses. 
The initial review of the European Seed Capital Fund Scheme carried out by 
Murray in 1991 for the European Commission placed considerable emphasis on 
the economic vulnerability of small, grant-dependent funds. The observation was 
made that both under-funded regional and commercial funds would run out of 
finances within their ten year horizons even without making any investment in 
portfolio companies. Essentially, the administrative costs of the funds were 
strongly out of kilter with the level of finances available. The average size of the 
21 funds surveyed was only 1.7 million euros (range 0.5–7 million euros).  
Demand-side Issues 
Table 13 creates a typology that segments direct and indirect policies further into 
demand and supply-side responses to the venture capital market. The more recent 
concentration on demand side issues reflects the very common observation of the 
venture capital community that there is generally no shortage in the supply of 
expansion stage venture capital finance but, rather, a shortage in the quality of 
applicants for their money. Given that the project level returns required by 
venture capitalists are exceptional and are measured in IRRs of 50% per annum 
and above142 for early stage companies, most companies will not meet these 
exacting standards. Demand side issues recognize that a system which ultimately 
rejects more than 95% of all the firms that seek to obtain venture capital 
financing is enormously wasteful in both applicant firm and investor resources. 
Accordingly, a number of countries have created ‘investment ready programs’. 
These are also replicated an European Community level by such training 
initiatives as I-tec and Gate2Gate initiatives143. Indeed the renaissance in 
entrepreneurship as a legitimate career and a valuable field of study at school and 
                                              
142 Murray G. C. and Lott J., 1995, Have UK Venture Capitalists a Bias against Investment in New 
Technology-Based Firms, Research Policy, 24, 283−299. 
143  Gate2growth replaced I-Tec in 2001 as a source of advice to young firms and venture capitalists 
alike provided by DG Enterprise of the European Commission. See www.Gate2growth.com 
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university is in part the result of a government-fuelled concern that the level of 
entrepreneurial activity in society needs to be stimulated144. Technology or 
science parks and business incubators are more specialist means by which the 
divide between research and its commercial exploitation is being bridged. 
 
Table 13.   Typology of Government Support Measures classified by Demand or 
Supply-side Focus145 
 
 Demand-side Measures Supply-side Measures 
Direct 
Investment 
• Public incubators • Public sponsored VC funds 
Indirect 
Investment 
• Promotion of enterprise 
• Management and skilled 
workforce 
• Business incubators, e.g. 
science and technology parks, 
commercial clusters. 
• Downside protection 
• Upside-leverage 
• Subsidizing fund costs 
• Exit schemes  
• Tax incentives 
• Business Angel networks 
 
While these demand side schemes are undoubtedly important, this present 
evaluation is largely addressing supply side issues of the provision of early-stage 
finance within the context of the Finnish economy. 
Logic and Modes of Government Intervention: Conclusions 
The findings on which this section of the report is based come from academic, 
government and industry perspectives. It is important to note that in practice 
there seems to be very few sources of disagreement between theorists, policy 
makers and practitioners. It should also be noted that the interviews held with 
policy makers or industry representatives certainly could not be conceived as 
random. The evaluators specifically sought out persons with significant 
knowledge and experience of the venture capital programs of interest. Findings 
and opinions of the expert respondents may usefully be summarized into a series 
of related statements on which there was near uniform consensus: 
                                              
144  Two recent UK government’s initiatives to promote entrepreneurial action at university level in the 
science and engineering fields, i.e. the University Challenge Fund and the Science Enterprise 
Challenge, have been successful in encouraging the training of science graduates in basic business 
skills. Some of these graduates have gone on to form companies in which the University Challenge 
Funds have invested. 
145  Christofidis C. and Debande O., 2001, Financing Innovative Firms through Venture Capital, EIB 
Sector Papers, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg. 
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• The State’s involvement in seed/early stage should properly be viewed 
as a temporary rather than a permanent intervention into the venture 
capital market. 
• In the event that the State becomes a permanent investor in a market 
that would collapse or fail without the continued presence of the State, 
the logic of an achievable market solution should be rigorously 
questioned. 
• Given that early stage investments take a relatively long period of 
time to reach maturity and exit146, it is likely that the State should plan 
that its involvement with a specific seed fund should be over a 
minimum duration of approximately ten years unless the fund is 
‘bought out’ earlier. 
• The State’s primary role is to act as a catalyst whereby private agents 
are attracted to enter a new market and gain specialist experience and 
knowledge at a limited and acceptable level of costs. 
• The State should ensure that it leaves that market as soon as a stage is 
reached where its continued presence cannot be economically or 
socially justified. The State should be planning its exit prior to the 
moment that it becomes actually engaged in the investment activity 
which it is trying to stimulate. Exits should be engineered that provide 
an economic incentive for the private partners to the State to assume 
the roles of the State participant. The early removal of the State as an 
investor in a seed/early stage fund should be designed to offer a 
leverage advantage to the remaining private investors. 
• The State should see itself as an indirect investor through a ‘fund of 
funds’ mechanism. Other than in exceptional circumstances, the State 
should not see itself as investing directly in specific companies. This 
prohibition is particularly important where government employees 
have to make the investment selection choice. The State should avoid 
situations where government employees are mandated to act as 
investment professionals. The State should publicly communicate the 
nature and characteristics of the funds in which it would wish to 
invest. Given the scarcity of experienced managers and funds at the 
                                              
146   Bannock 1991 suggests that a realistic time frame from start-up to some form of exit is around 
seven years Bannock G. 1991. Venture Capital and the Equity Gap. National Westminster Bank: 
London. 
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seed/early stage, the State should be obliged to select all applicant 
funds through an open and public tendering process. 
• The main instrument employed to incentivize private investors and 
limited partners should be through the provision of State funds applied 
as a subordinated limited partner. These funds structures should 
enable the fund managers to exploit the advantage of leverage to the 
benefit of their limited partners. The leveraged structure should also 
benefit the fund managers through the ‘carry’ system. 
• There may be a case for leverage in excess of 1:1 private/State 
funding. However, this case should be made on a fund by fund basis. 
There remains a danger that the State is the biggest loser from poor 
investment decisions, limited partners do not need to strive to ensure 
the success of the managing partners seeing the State’s contribution as 
a buffer against their own losses. 
• The use of a guarantee in order to provide downside protection to 
limited partners or the fund manager should be applied sparingly and 
with discretion. Implicit in the provision of project guarantees or 
underwriting is some form of protection against failed investments. By 
providing a safety net, a guarantee structure can remove or lessen the 
incentive for managers to succeed and be rewarded by maximizing the 
capital growth of the portfolio of the fund. The inclusion of 
investment protection should be made on an assessment of individual 
circumstances. However, in the opinion of the evaluators and the 
expert respondents interviewed, the base case should be programs 
without a guarantee structure. 
• While the provision of seed or early stage capital implies a failure in 
supply markets, an efficient system needs the balancing of both supply 
and demand. Too little attention has been applied to improving the 
quality of entrepreneurs and managers. This omission is despite 
repeated protestations by venture capitalists that the dearth of 
experienced and high-quality management teams is one of the biggest 
constraints on the growth of the industry outside North America. Just 
how the various levels of managerial experience from pre-seed to pre 
IPO are to be made available is not the focus of this report. However, 
it is an issue of major importance as there is a shortage of skilled and 
experienced management capable of rapidly building young 
companies to international excellence. In Finland the taxation related 
to lack of incentives for high-growth entrepreneurship has been 
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claimed to be the biggest bottleneck that limits entrepreneurial activity 
and growth.147 148 149 
• Even a cursory appraisal of venture capital initiatives in Europe, 
Israel, North America, Australia and beyond has convinced these 
authors of the existence of numbers of skilled industry practitioners 
and policy makers. They share an interest and a commitment to issues 
centering on the financing of the innovation process and the nurturing 
of young new technology based firms being created from these 
processes. A deep level of skills also resides within some of the more 
established venture capital associations. It is hoped that future policy 
is crafted with the active involvement of such experts in order that 
high levels of extant skill and experience are not ignored but are made 
available to government.  
4.4 Enterprise and Competition Policy of the 
European Commission 
The nature and degree of government intervention in order to develop venture 
capital are partially regulated by the European Commission in the European 
Union. In its Enterprise Policy, The European Commission has for several years 
given a strong priority for developing the European venture capital markets.150 
Until recently, there has been confusion concerning what types of government 
intervention would be acceptable from the competition policy perspective. 
However, during the last two years, there has been significant and rapid 
development in the EC regulations concerning individual government 
intervention to support the development of national venture capital markets.  
                                              
147  Arenius P. and Autio E., 1999, Kansakuntien yrittäjyyspotentiaali − kymmenen maan välinen 
vertaileva tutkimus − Suomen osaraportti, Teknillinen korkeakoulu, Yritysstrategian ja kansain-
välisen liiketoiminnan laboratorio, Espoo. 
148  Arenius P. and Autio E., 2000, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor − 2000 Finnish Executive 
Report, Research Reports / Center for Technology Management 1−2000, Helsinki University of 
Technology, Espoo. 
149  Arenius P., Autio E., Kovalainen A., and Reynolds P. D., 2001, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2001 Finnish Executive Report, Center for Technology Management Research Reports 1−2001, 
Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
150  European Commission, 1998, Risk Capital Action Plan, The Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels. 
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In August 2001, the European Commission published a Communication “State 
Aid and Risk Capital”, which outlined certain conditions under which the 
European Commission would view national government intervention as 
positive.151 The new Communication is a response to the increased policy priority 
for finding ways to more effectively intervene and stimulate the development of 
the European venture capital markets. The objective of the new Communication 
is: “To authorize under certain conditions the granting of State aid in favor of 
risk capital”.152 Table 15 summarizes the new Communication. 
The new Communication is seen as a major development in adapting the 
competition policy to support the enterprise policy.153 154 The European 
Commission has used it as an example “showing how State aid rules may need to 
be adapted to new market situations”155 This policy clarification is also 
considered to be an important development in the implementation of the Risk 
Capital Action Plan and has already been applied in several new venture capital 
schemes of the Member States. 156 157 
The enterprise policy and the competition policy of the European 
Commission have become much more compatible during the last two 
years allowing effective instruments to resolve identified market 
failures. The new Communication “State Aid and Risk Capital” was 
created to enable State aid on certain conditions to effectively resolve 
market failures particularly in early stage venture capital. 
                                              
151  European Commission, 2001b, State aid and risk capital, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, (2001/C 235/03), C235/233−C235/211. 
152  European Commission 2001 State aid and risk capital − summary of legislation 
(http://europa.eu.int/ scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26081.htm) 
153  European Commission, 2002f, European Union competition policy − XXXIst Report on 
competition policy, European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, Brussels. 
154  European Commission, 2002e, European Competitiveness Report 2002, Commission Staff 
Working Paper SEC(2002) 528, The Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
155  European Commission, 2002f, European Union competition policy − XXXIst Report on 
competition policy, European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, Brussels. 
156  Liikanen E., 2002, Stimulating investment in European IT, Speech/02/541, European Investment 
Forum, Copenhagen, November 5, 2002. 
157  European Commission, 2002c, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Implementation of the Risk Capital Action Plan (RCAP), COM (2002) 
563(01), The Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
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Concerning the new Communication ‘State Aid and Risk Capital”, Maria 
Rehbinder, DG Competition, European Commission, stated: “State aid discipline 
must be able to respond to developments in the markets and changes in Member 
States’ policy priorities.”158 She pointed out that a new type of soft law was 
needed because the traditional approach to State aid control posed problems for 
risk capital measures, which are needed to encourage the development of 
European risk capital markets to reach levels comparable to those in the US. 
Regarding the application of the new Communication in establishing new policy 
measures to spur venture capital markets, she pointed out that the paper strongly 
underlines the need to establish the presence of a market failure as a criterion for 
authorizing aid. She stated that the criteria provided for assessing compatibility 
in the Communication are: 
• a "safe harbor" for transactions below certain levels (EURO 1 million 
in Article 87(1)(a) -regions; 750 000; 500 000 in other regions)159 
• above these levels there is a need to prove market failure; the aid must 
be proportionate to the market failure; and must minimize distortion; 
and  
• additional compatibility criteria are expressed as "positive" and 
"negative" elements to be taken into account. 
 
It is very important for national policy makers to carry out research 
on the venture capital market in order to identify and elaborate 
specific market failures. When an intervention is proposed, there is an 
obligation on the State authorities to be able to demonstrate the 
market failure in order to gain the European Commission’s agreement 
for State aid to be used to resolve the market failure. 
                                              
158  Rehbinder M., 2001, Recent Developments in Commission Policy and Practice, Paper presented at 
the EC State Aid Conference on 2 November 2001. 
159  The justification given is that for small transactions the argument that market failure exists through 
high transaction costs is more persuasive. 
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4.4.1 Examples of Commission-Accepted Funds 
The new Communication on State aid and risk capital was published in August 
2001. The first government sponsored venture capital program accepted based on 
this new Communication was the UK Regional Venture Capital Funds program. 
These funds have been designed to incentivize private investors to invest in 
market failure areas by boosting the return expectations through asymmetric 
profit sharing. The return for the government is capped at 6% level so that private 
investors share the exceeding returns. The cash flows in the funds have also been 
designed to boost the returns for the private investors in order to make the funds 
targeted to resolve market failure as attractive investments for fully commercial 
institutional investors.  
Concerning the application of the new Communication, the XXXIst Report on 
competition policy states that: ”The aim of the UK scheme is to address a lack of 
funding at regional level available to SMEs for equity investments. The 
Commission acknowledged market failure for this segment because the 
thresholds as laid down in the risk capital communication were not exceeded. 
The same line of reasoning was adopted in the French ‘Régime Cadre − Fonds de 
capital investissement’ case. When assessing these notifications, the Commission 
applied point VIII of the Communication and was able to conclude that the aid 
granted to the private investors and to the SMEs was compatible with State aid 
rules. As for the funds created under the measures, the Commission concluded 
that they are not enterprises receiving aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of 
the EC Treaty. Other cases where the Communication was applied in 2001 
included ‘Linea de apoyo a la capitalización de empresa de base tecnológica’ 
(Spain) (2), and a further UK scheme intended to fill the gap in the provision of 
risk capital in small amounts to SMEs in the coalfield areas of England.”160 
Examples of European Commission’s decisions concerning risk capital 
interventions of EU Member States can be found on the European Commission’s 
website.161 
Given that there are now clear guidelines and examples where these guidelines 
have been applied, it is likely to be easier and faster to get new government 
venture capital schemes accepted by the European Commission. Table 14 gives 
                                              
160  European Commission, 2002f, European Union competition policy − XXXIst Report on 
competition policy, European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, Brussels. 
161  European Commission, 2002h, State aid decisions − by aid instrument − equity capital, The 
Commission of European Communities, Accessed: 1.12.2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
competition/state_aid/register/ii/by_instrument_equity_capital.html>. 
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some examples of recent government-sponsored venture capital schemes in 
which there are incentives to attract private investors. 
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Table 14.   Examples of recent government-sponsored venture capital funds 
with incentives for private investors
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4.5 International Comparison of Government 
Interventions in Venture Capital 
Evaluations should necessarily go ‘back to basics’ and ask what is the purpose of 
the program in question? What assumptions are the key objectives based on? 
How credible does the program currently appear in the light of the assumptions 
made with partial information at the start of the program? However, in the real 
world of governmental action, it is common to reference the State’s actions to the 
comparable efforts of other governments seeking to address the same policy 
issues or concerns. Both approaches are valid and are highly complementary. 
Where available, the selection of appropriate country and policy comparisons is 
of enormous help if valid conclusions are to be drawn. Thus, the evaluators of FII 
have sought to identify programs in other countries which are either comparable 
to Finnish activities or, conversely, can be used to reference possible policy 
alternatives or developments. In making this selection, one constraint was 
imposed on the authors by MTI. It was requested that at least two other Nordic 
countries were included in any evaluation schema. 
With the exception of the Nordic requirement, the authors sought to find 
countries that could be defended as appropriate comparators. A two-stage 
approach was taken: 
First, the selected countries had to be defended on the basis of their relevance to 
Finland. In making this selection, a number of criteria were adopted. Candidate 
countries had to demonstrate: 
• A clear recognition by government of the importance of SMEs, and 
particularly NTBFs, in contemporary enterprise and innovation 
policies 
• A history of active NTBF policy development with findings that could 
be publicly accessed 
• An involvement by the State in the provision of venture capital based 
instruments in a community with an established venture capital/private 
equity industry 
• Evidence of contemporary success of policy instruments in sustaining 
or generating NTBF formation and growth 
• Direct similarities to Finland in areas of economic size, cultural 
affinity (i.e. Nordic comparisons) and sophistication of technological 
development. 
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Secondly, the countries selected also had to have a set of programs that allowed 
meaningful comparisons to be drawn. In order to do this, a template was 
constructed to look at key program characteristics including: 
• Policy focus 
• Policy objectives 
• Development of the national venture capital industry 
• Mode of operation of government agencies 
• Importance of technology-based new firms 
• Degree of State support 
• Type of State support 
• Channels (direct/indirect) for support 
• Conditions under which support given 
• Level of risk assumed by government 
• Other related support measures. 
Based on the above selection criteria and in discussion with the Finnish 
colleagues, the following countries were selected and approved by the evaluation 
sponsors as appropriate comparators: 
• United States of America 
• Israel 
• United Kingdom 
• Germany  
• Sweden 
• Denmark 
• Australia. 
The evaluators have had direct experience and contact with government and 
private agencies working in early-stage equity investment in all of the countries 
selected. 
In addition to the above-mentioned countries selected for closer analysis, there 
are several other countries in which the government has taken active measures to 
stimulate the venture capital markets using innovative instruments to incentivize 
private investors to resolve market failures. Some interesting countries in this 
respect are New Zealand, Korea, and Chile. Some of the government policy 
measures of these and other countries are described in this report when 
describing the features of various government venture capital programs. 
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Given the number of programs associated with venture capital that have existed 
over several years (ICFC, the precursor to 3i plc., was formed by the UK 
government in 1945 specifically to address ‘equity gap’ issues), it is not possible 
to do justice to this diversity of policy activity. Therefore, only a small number of 
programs will be cited for each of our target countries. The venture capital 
schemes which will be exampled in summary form have been chosen on the basis 
that their actions reflect i) the present and/or future interests of FII and the 
Finnish Government and/or ii) these schemes identified have relevance to 
different State approaches to the support of young firms. 
The country analyses are summarized in appendices in appendix 2. 
4.6 The Views of Non-Finnish Policy Makers 
Regarding the Optimal Modes of Government 
Intervention to Address Market Failures in Venture 
Capital 
In order to reference externally the activities of FII, a number of semi-structured 
telephone interviews were conducted with senior policy makers concerned with 
the supply of finance to new technology based firms within their national 
innovation systems. Senior government officials were contacted in Israel, 
Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Australia and the United Kingdom. In all cases, the 
respondents had direct experience of venture capital programs. Regarding the 
Israeli, Australian, German and one of the two UK interviewees, they had each 
been the most senior civil servant responsible for the design and implementation 
of a recent major governmental program in early stage venture capital. 
Discussions were also held with senior officials of DG Enterprise of the 
European Commission and the European Investment Fund. The EIF has a remit 
to co-invest in a number of venture capital funds set up by the European Union 
Member States and focused on equity gap and related market failure issues. The 
discussions produced a remarkable consensus of views which are summarized 
below: 
With one exception, no interviewee saw seed and very early stage funds being 
viable in the longer term in Europe without the direct support of the State. The 
single dissenting view was also made conditional on the fund also doing other 
non-seed investments. When asked to give the names of any independent, early 
stage funds currently operating successfully without State subsidy anywhere in 
the world, no examples were given. If seed investment were possible without 
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governmental financial support, it was thought that it could only be through the 
aegis of a large established venture capital fund which was prepared to make the 
occasional seed investment. Seed capital as an exclusive investment focus for a 
commercial venture capital fund was not seen as economically viable. 
Interviewees were particularly adamant that neither the State nor its agents 
should actively be involved in selecting high potential young firms in which to 
invest. This was seen as solely the responsibility of professional venture capital 
managers contracted by the State to manage its funds. The consensus view was 
that the State’s role should be indirect, namely either acting as a limited partner 
in a commercial fund or encouraging investment via a financing of fund of funds 
type operations. The State should only set the criteria under which it would be 
prepared to invest in a privately managed fund. Any fund meeting these criteria 
in a public tender should be able to attract government funds. 
Public funds addressed to early stage investments should seek to encourage 
private limited partners to participate as co-investors. The respondents were 
virtually uniform in their view that the State’s role is that of a catalyst.  That the 
fund is eventually taken over exclusively by private investors is the ideal 
consequence of the State’s pro-active intervention. This was only likely to 
happen if the State could leverage the returns of the private investors (limited 
partners). This objective was attempted via subordinating the State’s claims to 
any investment surplus. Without the critical presence of private investors, the 
State would be locked into a market-based activity with little opportunity for an 
exit. No catalytic role would be possible. 
The idea that successful funds might be purchased (the Israeli respondent used 
the term ‘soft privatization’) at a pre-determined date (e.g. five years from its 
inception) as with the original Yozma funds in Israel generally attracted wide 
support. It was viewed as an interesting means by which the State could exit a 
fund while signaling its success to private investors. Respondents saw this as an 
ideal outcome but one that might not always be feasible given the present 
difficult economic situation for early stage investors. Such a buy-out option also 
emphasized the catalytic and temporary role of the State. 
Interviewees expressed some greater variance of opinion as to whether or not the 
State should offer private investors guarantees limiting their downside risk in 
investing in early stage deals. Overall, the majority of expert respondents did not 
see this as an appropriate action given the moral hazard problem underwriting 
fund losses created. Private investors should be incentivized by the opportunity 
of making large profits not by being protected from the negative consequences of 
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their investment actions best summarized the general view. Those funds that had 
had direct experience of a guarantee scheme were among the most vociferous 
opponents of such a facility. Recent German experience of such schemes in the 
BTU program has been highly problematic. 
Whether or not the State should seek to make a return on its investments above 
the State’s cost of capital generated the widest range of responses. Several 
respondents liked the idea that the State was also seen to gain from attractive 
investments. It was felt that if the State had no commercial interest in the 
economic outcome of the high potential enterprises in which it also invested, it 
would lose the respect of the other private co-investors in a fund. However, one 
opposing view to this was that the State was not there to make profits but to 
catalyze the required private sector activity. There should be no reason for the 
State not to leave as soon as it was shown that attractive investments could be 
made in early stage investments. Respondents were more in agreement that, 
whatever the State’s reward, it should be relatively modest. The real return to 
government is the creation of a successful private channel of finance to young, 
high potential companies. 
Whatever else the State did, it should insist that its sponsored funds were 
managed by the best professional and profit-motivated managers that the funds 
could attract. Thus, such managers needed to be properly remunerated and 
incentivized as in the private sector. It was also recognized that over time several 
of the best managers were very likely to gravitate to larger funds and move out of 
the early-stage areas of interest to policy makers. 
Transposing the consensus views of these foreign policy experts to the current 
Finnish situation resulted in an analysis strongly in line with that of the two FII 
evaluators. An indirect fund of funds operation allows the State to define the 
‘terms of engagement’ but does not have public servants attempting to act as 
professional investment managers. The State seeks to make the investment 
environment sufficiently attractive for professional managers so that they are 
prepared to invest in an area of importance to public policy. The State does not 
seek to extend its reach or that of its employees beyond areas where it has a 
direct competence. 
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Figure 30.   Attitudes of non-Finnish policy experts to government venture 
capital 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In summarizing the best practices from contemporary research findings and 
international comparisons of extant schemes, we present the following outline 
scheme for a government intervention to resolve a market failure in early-stage 
venture capital. The purpose of such a scheme is for the State to act as a catalyst 
in order to encourage private sector venture capitalists and limited partner 
investors to supply risk capital for the earliest stages (seed and start-up capital) of 
new firm financing. It is in these most speculative investment areas involving 
relatively small amounts of capital that market failure most commonly occurs.  
The key principles of the approach are to i) catalyze private institutional 
investors to provide capital and ii) attract experienced and competent private 
venture capitalists to make the firm level investment decisions. The role of public 
policy is to incentivize the private actors by creating a vehicle which rewards the 
investors with competitive return and risk expectations broadly comparable to 
other (later stages) sectors of the venture capital market which do not experience 
market failures. A key feature of any effective policy intervention is the 
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alignment of incentives to support effective investment selection and value added 
for the selected target portfolio firms. In order to achieve this outcome, it is 
critical that the State orchestrates wide interest in any sponsored scheme in order 
to attract the best possible management companies to bid for the management of 
the proposed investment vehicles. Such a bidding process should be open up to 
all competent parties irrespective of nationality. In the following paragraphs, the 
key features of this approach are described in more detail. 
1. Identification of the market failure. A market failure needs to be clearly 
identified and its implications quantified. This is important in order to both 
assess and justify the cost of government intervention. The assessment of 
the market failure is also important for planning the scale of the required 
intervention and for ensuring supportive relationships with the European 
Commission. 
2. Vehicles for resolving the market failure are designed. An important part of 
the process is to involve expert members of the venture capital industry 
from the beginning of the design of any policy initiative. The national 
venture capital association is a natural stakeholder to be included in the 
planning process. Further, industry representatives are able to contribute a 
level of experience and technical detail not generally available to 
government officials. 
3. The creation of targeted venture capital funds as the mode of policy 
intervention. The operating mode is to create an agreed number of venture 
capital funds in which a government agency is one of the founding limited 
partners. The government does not invest directly into any single portfolio 
company nor does it have any role in the investment decisions of the 
managing partner of the fund. Because the funds are designed to resolve an 
identified market failure, they have a number of parameters that are 
different when compared to a normal (i.e. private) venture capital fund: 
• Because the purpose of the vehicles is to help resolve a market failure, 
the funds should employ legal covenants, which constrain the scale 
and scope of investments that can be made in order to address the 
identified market failure. For instance, in the case of early stage 
investments, the maximum investment per company should be set as 
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relatively low level168. The idea is to ensure that the investments are 
targeted at the market failure as effectively as possible. 
• The government agency acting as a limited partner invests a significant 
amount of money to help establish the funds rapidly. The level of 
government support will depend on particular circumstances. 
However, funds of under €30 million should not be encouraged given 
the negative effects of fixed costs on small fund efficiency. It is not 
likely to be less than 25% of the total fund and should not exceed 50% 
of the total funds raised in order to meet the European Commission 
guidelines. The level of initial financing provided by the government 
should clearly signal its commitment to the scheme. Financial 
institutions are required to provide the rest of the funding. 
• In order to make this activity attractive for competent and experienced 
private investors, the government agency acting as a limited partner 
needs to engineer the return expectations so that the fund will offer an 
IRR for private investors and the management company which is 
competitive in comparison to other (non-market failure) activities of 
the asset class, e.g. later stage investments. 
• The key feature is a buy-out option for the private limited 
partners to purchase in full the stake of the government agency 
in the fund in the event of the fund becoming commercially 
successful. It is proposed that this transaction is made at a 
nominal price plus a predetermined rate of interest within an 
agreed period of time (around 5−7 years). The buy-out option 
should be limited to a certain period of time in order to attract 
the private investors to exercise it and thereby allow the 
government to exit from the program. The pricing structure and 
the conditions for the buy-out would be agreed with the limited 
partners at the time of creating the fund. 
                                              
168  This would be in line with the recent EC regulation in which the limit is set to 500 000 euros. 
Similarly, the UK Regional Venture Capital Funds are set at a maximum first investment per 
company of £250,000 (€397000) 
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• Such a buy-out option has several positive effects:  
i. The buy-out option helps make the IRR expectations of the 
fund materially more competitive with the other investment 
alternatives of competent private investors 
ii. The buy-out option creates a natural exit for the 
government in the event of the success of the fund. (The 
State’s IRR expectation after 5−7 years of its contribution 
to the fund should reflect169 the long-term bank rate.). 
Through this mechanism, the government can demonstrate 
the success of the program while accomplishing its earlier 
exit. Even more importantly, the government can put its 
money to work again  much earlier than if it had to wait for 
the cash flows from the exits of individual ventures and the 
final termination of the fund. 
iii. The buy-out option (in comparison to a ‘capped return’ for 
the public investor) helps the general partner to signal 
already after a relatively short period of time that it has 
invested successfully. This is valuable when managers seek 
to raise the next fund. Normally, fund success cannot be 
shown much before a substantial proportion of portfolio 
companies have been successfully exited. In this buy-out 
alternative, the decision of the limited partners to buy-out 
the government investor after the predetermined period of 
e.g. 5−7 years gives a strong advanced signal of the likely 
success of the fund. 
iv. The buy-out option creates a natural exit for the 
government in the event of the success of the fund. (The 
State’s IRR expectation after 5−7 years of its contribution 
to the fund should exceed the long-term bank rate.) 
Through this mechanism, the government can demonstrate 
the success of the program while accomplishing its earlier 
exit. Even more importantly, the government can put the 
                                              
169   There is a debate on whether or not the government’s funding should share in the profits generated 
by the fund. The view of the evaluators is that any profit share should be modest and only reflect 
the government’s cost of capital. The purpose is to incentivize the private market to act. Any profit 
assumed by government reduces this incentive. 
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money to work again in the highest priority market failure 
areas much earlier than if it had to wait for the cash flows 
from the exits of individual ventures and the final 
termination of the fund. 
v. With a strong managerial incentive created by the buy-out 
option to make the fund successful, it is much more likely 
for the government to get a small positive return from the 
investment (e.g. bank rate or an appropriate interest rate) 
compared to investments pari passu with private investors. 
In this latter case, private investors are not fully rewarded 
for their skill in selecting good deals or their efforts to add 
value to the ventures. This is likely to impact directly and 
negatively on the interest of the managing partners and 
their willingness to be involved in such schemes. 
• An additional means by which the IRR of private investors and 
general partners can be made competitive with alternative 
investment opportunities is the timing of the cash flows. By 
organizing the cash flows so that the government agency invests 
first but receives its share of the investments returns after the 
private investors have been recompensed reduces the time that 
the capital of the private investors is tied in the fund. Preferential 
and accelerated payment schedules properly increase the IRR for 
the private investors at the expense of the State. 
• This proposed scheme would not utilize downside guarantees for 
the private investors. The idea is to make their IRR expectations 
sufficiently attractive by exclusively concentrating on improving 
the upside potential. This is important for ensuring that the 
managerial incentives are fully aligned with the goal of making 
the fund successful. By accepting normal downside risk 
combined with a higher than normal upside potential creates an 
incentive system whereby a competent investor receives returns 
solely as a result of the skills and effort applied to adding value 
to the new firm ventures. With downside protection schemes, a 
moral hazard problem is generated because investors are 
protected rather than fully incentivized. 
4. A ‘beauty parade’ type of bidding process is arranged to select the best 
possible management teams to manage the new vehicles. The establishment 
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of the funds and the bidding process are advertised as widely as possible to 
attract the attention of potential management companies. The bidding 
process should not be restricted to venture capital management teams from 
any one country. The potential management companies are requested to 
submit bids in a standardized format including their proposed investment 
strategy for the fund, organizational commitments and competencies (the 
identities and track record of committed full-time partners and other staff), 
and a plan detailing the management’s own capital commitment and their 
plans to raise the rest of the capital. The idea is that the management 
companies are selected exclusively on their demonstrable capability to 
invest successfully and add value to the fund’s portfolio companies. The 
bidding process is primarily about the setting the conditions necessary in 
order to attract and secure the best teams to manage these fund vehicles. 
New management companies and existing management companies are 
evaluated using the same selection criteria. Established management 
companies may find it attractive to expand their activities towards earlier 
stages by managing these early stage vehicles in addition to their existing 
funds. 
The outlined approach has been briefly introduced and discussed in various 
interviews with industry and government practitioners. It is not presented as a 
fully determined proposal but as a general framework to be amended in the light 
of Finnish circumstances. However, the logic and structure of the model have 
received a lot of support in discussions with several representatives of the 
Finnish venture capital industry and government agencies as a potential solution 
for catalyzing investments in early-stage venture capital funds. While there are 
many other important issues involved in helping the venture capital market to 
develop (for example, taxation, regulation, education etc.170 171 172 173), the above 
                                              
170  Reynolds P. D., Bygrave W. D., Autio E., Cox L. W., and Hay M., 2002a, Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002 Executive Report, Babson College, Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation & London Business School. 
171  European Commission, 2002a, Better Environment for Enterprises, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Com (2002) 610(01), The Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels. 
172  HM Treasury and Small Business Service, 2002, Enterprise Britain: a modern approach to 
meeting the enterprise challenge., Stationery Office, London. 
173  Arenius P., Autio E., Kovalainen A., and Reynolds P. D., 2001, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2001 Finnish Executive Report, Center for Technology Management Research Reports 1−2001, 
Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
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synthesis represents the evaluators’ view as to current best practice regarding 
government’s efforts to catalyze the supply of venture capital.174 175 
                                              
174  Also in line with EC and OECD recommendations e.g. OECD, 1997, Government Venture Capital 
for Technology-Based Firms, OCDE/GD(97)201, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris. 
175  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Finnish Venture Capital Market 
While the Finnish venture capital market experienced rapid growth during the 
latter part of the 1990s, the size of the venture capital market in relation to 
Finland’s GDP is still very small. Finland’s below European average share of 
GDP represented by venture capital financing is alarming particularly given 
Finland’s position as a technologically advanced nation competitively placed in 
the new knowledge economy. 
The size of the Finnish venture capital market (measured as a 
percentage of GDP) is very small by international comparisons 
particularly given Finland status as a high technology economy.  
In a deeper analysis of the Finnish venture capital market, it can be noted that the 
existing availability of expansion-stage venture capital is sufficient for the 
amount of good quality deals coming to venture capital investors. The problem, 
however, is that the volume of high-quality expansion stage deals in Finland is 
unacceptably low reflecting an under-developed venture capital market. The 
scarcity of early stage (seed stage and start-up-stage) financing is likely to be an 
important contributory factor to the lack of high-quality, expansion stage deals. 
Partly because of the lack of competitive early-stage financing, many potential 
entrepreneurs do not consider starting a new company as an attractive career 
alternative. Given the lack of sufficient and appropriate financing, many of the 
entrepreneurs with the highest potential find that they are better off choosing 
another alternative rather than starting a new venture. There was almost 
unanimous agreement among the respondents of our survey and interviews that 
there is an important market failure in seed-stage venture capital in Finland. 83% 
of our survey respondents considered that government should increase its 
involvement in seed stage financing. 
In developing the supply of venture capital to the Finnish economy, 
there is a strong case for State intervention in order to encourage the 
supply of early stage (seed and start-up) venture capital provided by 
the private sector. 
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5.2 The Raison d’Être of FII 
The raison d’être of FII is to resolve market failures in the supply of equity 
finance to SMEs with a particular emphasis on market failure in the supply of 
early-stage venture capital. In addition to the primary goal of addressing market 
failures, the current remit of FII also requires that the organization is profitable. 
Although the profitability goal of FII acts as a governance mechanism preventing 
government funds from being wasted in commercially non-viable investments, 
the current interpretation of the profitability requirement also effectively limits 
the capability of FII to resolve market failures. At periods in the economic cycle 
when specific investment sectors (early-stage venture capital) or industries 
(biotechnology and life sciences) become commercially difficult for professional 
investors, this is when the State has a critical supply-side role. However, given 
the imposition of this profitability performance hurdle, FII faces identical 
economic constraints at the same time as private investors. Therefore, instead of 
acting as a ‘countervailing force’ and effectively helping to resolve market 
failures, FII also has to adhere to the short-run dictates of the market. Because of 
this behavior, many interviewers have questioned whether FII is an effective 
policy vehicle for the government. As an agent of government, the importance 
and relevance of FII is that it can act differently from a purely private-sector 
investor. If it cannot or does not wish to act in such a fashion, there are no 
compelling arguments for the Finnish government to invest the tax payers’ 
money merely to create another private venture capital business. FII exists either 
a) to do something that the private-sector cannot do, and/or b) to incentivize 
private sector players do something they would not otherwise do without the 
State’s encouragement or incentives. 
In FII’s case, the profitability goal and its current interpretation have recently 
decreased the effectiveness of FII as a policy tool. The principle of co-investing 
with private investors on equal terms means, in effect, that the capability of FII to 
resolve market failures through filling the gaps itself, or by incentivizing the 
private sector to fill the gaps, is very limited. According to FII’s current 
operating logic (i.e. investing pari passu with private investors), this State 
agency can only invest in areas which are attractive enough for private investors 
also to invest on equal terms. The only flexibility FII has to catalyze private 
investors is to commit its own resources first and provide a part of the funding to 
supplement the funding from private investors. This does not seem a very 
creative means of resolving important market failures. It severely constrains the 
flexibility and ability of FII to respond to such adverse situations. If the primary 
objective of FII is to help resolve market failures, FII activity in this role should 
result in a proportionally larger share of FII investments going to areas or 
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investment stages where market failures are more common or disruptive. If 
measured by its involvement in such critical investment stages over time, FII’s 
effectiveness has recently decreased. 
The effectiveness of FII in resolving market failures is fundamentally 
weakened by two constraints on its operations. First, the imposition by 
government of a minimum annual profitability requirement virtually 
removes the ability of FII to undertake significant investments in the 
earliest and most risky investment stages. Secondly, FII’s operating 
principle of investing pari passu with private investors further 
undermines the purpose and effectiveness of FII. 
5.3 Performance Measurement 
Policy Performance 
In the monitoring of the performance of FII as a policy vehicle for the 
government, it is important to develop measures that unambiguously show 
whether or not the activity is effective in resolving the identified problems. At 
the moment, the performance measurements employed to assess FII are 
insufficient. The main policy measures of the fund of funds investments are the 
allocation of FII’s capital in three sectors “regional, venture capital, and private 
equity”. This categorization leaves many problems: 
• The classification is not accurate enough regarding investment stages. 
The market failure is strongest in seed investments. There is probably 
more expansion stage capital available in Finland than can be 
profitably invested at the present time. This is because of the lack of 
high-quality deal flow, which, in turn, is partially a result of the severe 
market failure in earlier stage investments.  
• The current classification does not recognize an important group of 
investments, which are both early stage and regional. Geographical 
location and stage of investment are two separate dimensions. 
• The classification focuses on a categorization of funds in order to 
allocate FII investments. This does not take full account of what 
specific investments are actually made by the funds in these 
categories. It is a universal phenomenon that investment fund 
managers tend to move to later stage investments as soon as they have 
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a chance to do so. This is because as an investment category later 
stage investments are more profitable, less risky, they require less 
work by the fund managers per invested euro, and they offer a shorter 
time to exit. The last factor is particularly important for new fund 
management teams because they normally need to create a track 
record as soon as possible in order to be able to raise the next new 
funds. As a consequence, venture capital funds that are labelled as 
early stage may in effect move to later stage investments very quickly 
if given the opportunity. The current focus on fund labels does not 
guide FII to ensure that the investments made by the government 
really help resolve market failures. 
From the perspective of a government agency acting as a limited partner with an 
explicit remit to promote early stage investments in Finland, FII should take an 
active role ensuring that the policy measures are effective. If the purpose of FII is 
to promote early stage (i.e. seed and start-up stage) investments, it should help 
create funds that really do focus on those areas. Since the reason for a market 
failure is that private investors do not see the segment as attractive enough 
compared to other segments, a government agency with the remit to help resolve 
market failures should proactively help create vehicles which target those market 
failures. When setting up vehicles to address the identified market failures, it is 
important to create appropriate legal covenants in order to confine the size and 
scope of the investments made to the targeted area in order to satisfy the policy 
goals. However, in order to attract private purely commercially oriented investors 
to invest in areas of market failure, the government agency will necessarily have 
to compensate the private investors for the restrictions on their freedom to invest 
in more attractive areas. Thus, creation of more effective policy tools requires a 
proactive approach, which understands the interests and likely actions of each 
party to the investment activity. The required elements of an effective program 
include restrictions of the investments to the identified market failure area, 
compensation for private investors accepting these restrictions in order to attract 
private investors to invest their money, and effective governance and monitoring 
on behalf of FII. Fund categorization is not a sufficiently precise level of 
monitoring. 
The performance of FII in fulfilling the State’s policy goals should be 
measured more precisely. In addition to fund categorization, FII 
should measure the actual investment allocation made by the funds in 
which it invests. 
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Financial Performance 
Currently, the financial performance of FII is measured with reference to the 
organization’s annual profit. The current financial objective given to FII by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry is to generate a return in excess of the current 
inflation rate. While this profit benchmark is low, it does not take into account a) 
the dynamics in the cash flows in venture capital investing, and b) the potential 
needed to create significant incentives for private investors in order to effectively 
resolve market failures during periods of challenging market conditions. 
With regard to the dynamics of venture capital, two points are relevant, First, 
venture capital investing is highly cyclical and success in venture capital 
investments follow closely more general economic cycles. In times of market 
downturn as witnessed in the venture capital industry post Spring 2000, 
investment decreases rapidly. The remaining investors can attempt to ‘sit it out’ 
nurturing their present portfolios or they may retreat to later stage investments. If 
a public investor is under a strong pressure to make profits each year, it will 
encounter great difficulties in reconciling this goal with also continuing to invest 
in a market downturn. Such a crude profitability goal will effectively prevent FII 
from fulfilling parallel policy goals. 
Second, another highly specific and universal characteristic of venture capital 
fund investing is represented by the J-curve. Essentially, the fund in its early 
years will bear significant costs as investments are made and managerial charges 
are incurred. Even in a successful closed end fund of ten years’ duration, the 
limited partners are not likely to see their original investment sums returned until 
midway through the fund’s life. Capital gains on these investments - even if 
successful - are also likely to be delayed for some years. Thus, the first few years 
are characterized by increasing and then decreasing cumulative negative cash 
flows prior to entering into positive flows (i.e. the J-curve) as the fund exits from 
successful portfolio investments. This pattern is indirect contradiction to an 
annual profit target. 
If the financial performance of FII continues to be a key objective 
imposed on the organization, it should be measured over a sufficiently 
long period of time in order to allow FII the opportunity to meet both 
its financial and policy goals. This means that FII has to be given the 
managerial freedom to take risks and to invest counter-cyclically. 
However, it is the view of the evaluators that simultaneous profit and 
policy goals in this area of activity cannot practicably be reconciled. 
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5.4 Organization and Rewards 
The current organization of FII is a small team of a CEO, three investment 
directors and three other employees operating from one location in central 
Helsinki. This small team is well suited to a fund of funds operations. FII is 
viewed by industry colleagues as very competent in the core activities of a fund 
of funds operation, namely financial appraisal and monitoring. However, it is 
also clearly recognized that the team has insufficient resources for the execution 
of direct investments on a continuing basis. FII should not be encouraged to 
expand its organisation or extend its present responsibilities. The fund of funds 
operations should remain as the central activity of FII. There is little argument to 
support increased long-term activity in direct investments. It is an area outside 
the core remit of FII and does not fit well with FII’s existing experience and 
management resources. Any demand for FII to become involved in direct 
investment should be exceptional. If a case can be made, FII should use relevant 
external experts in carrying out such operations. The need for direct intervention 
should only be undertaken in concert with other players of the Finnish innovation 
system when specialist technological or sector skills are required. 
The optimal compensation scheme differs considerably between a fund of funds 
and a direct investments operation. Effective fund of funds operation is small, 
centralized and consists to a large part of financial and accounting specialists 
backed up with good database management. In contrast, direct investing requires 
a strong local presence and more emphasis on business development and other 
forms of value adding at the investee firm level. The optimal compensation 
schemes for a fund of funds operation can be identified when examining how 
pension funds, insurance companies and other financial institutions manage their 
venture capital and private equity allocations. The organizations, competencies 
and compensation characteristics familiar to the private equity directors of a 
limited partnership differ markedly from those of a general partner in a venture 
capital fund. General partners should be rewarded for their effectiveness in 
project level decision-making and in providing the value-added to their portfolio 
companies. In FII’s case, their main role and the competencies they require 
resemble closely those of a limited partner, not a general partner. The current 
organization is not appropriately designed to nor are the reward systems 
appropriate for a direct investment organization. 
FII should continue to focus on its effective (and respected) fund of 
funds operating model. Management should not start expanding the 
organization in order to increase its long-term operations in direct 
investing. If direct investments are ever deemed justified by its 
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stakeholders, FII’s role should be to work in concert with relevant 
expertise from organizations. 
5.5 Early Stage Investments 
Our survey, interviews, and other evidence have given a virtually unanimous 
picture of a serious and persistent lack of seed-stage equity capital in Finland. 
There is also a similar consensus that seed-stage venture capital is not a fully 
commercial activity able to be sustained as a profitable activity in its own right. 
International evidence over a long time shows that seed stage investments are 
very rarely commercially attractive particularly when compared to later stage or 
management buy-out investments. Nevertheless, access to small tranches of risk 
capital is a crucial part of the support environment that allows the new growth-
oriented ventures to emerge. 
Lack of seed stage financing also has a negative effect on the deal flow for later 
stage venture capital investors. In line with international evidence, our 
interviewees and survey respondents strongly agreed that the public sector should 
be active in this segment. 83% of the respondents saw a need for the government 
to increase its involvement in the supply of seed capital. This view was based on 
the understanding that, in the absence of public intervention, no private or 
commercial agency is going to address the problem. 
Government intervention should be clear and organized to best ensure that 
increased involvement will stimulate the growth of those new ventures with the 
highest commercial potential. Therefore, the division of roles between private 
and public players should be such that government proactively stimulates the 
commercial interest in undertaking the activity, but private-sector firms alone 
subsequently make the selection and financing decisions at the level of portfolio 
firms. This transparent division of responsibilities, risks and rewards between 
public and private players is seen as fundamental. The fund of funds operating 
model is ideal for achieving these goals. 
The current model of FII does not work effectively in catalyzing seed stage 
investments. Because FII invests on same terms as other private investors, it is 
not effectively able to catalyze activity in seed stage. Despite the involvement of 
FII, private investors presently do not find seed investment sufficiently attractive. 
Therefore, the key change needed in the operations of FII is to develop better 
instruments, which will allow private investors to make returns broadly 
comparable to their other investment opportunities. Such instruments, which 
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commonly improve the return expectations of private investors through 
asymmetric profit sharing between the public and private investors, have been 
engineered and used in many other countries to tackle these challenges. 
According to the information gathered in the evaluation, the management of FII 
has not appeared particularly enthusiastic in finding ways to solve the difficult 
problems in the supply of early stage financing. In order to identify and to put 
into practice credible working solutions, a much greater level of commitment and 
determination is needed. Accordingly, FII should take a more proactive role in 
stimulating the supply of seed-stage venture capital. The skills and experience of 
FII’s management represent an impressive resource to help achieve this goal. 
Early-stage market failure cannot be solved passively. In the absence of 
government action, the sub-optimal supply of seed capital finance will not 
change. 
FII should take a more proactive role in stimulating the supply of 
seed-stage venture capital. Early stage market failure cannot be 
solved passively without the active involvement of the State as a co-
investor and risk taker. 
5.6 Regional Investments 
Currently, FII, Finnvera, and Sitra all have ownership stakes in the existing 
regional venture capital funds. Overlapping roles and the lack of clear 
responsibility have created ample confusion. There is a clear need to clarify these 
agencies’ roles and to consolidate the ownership of regional funds. 
FII has been generally considered as having done a good job in setting up 
‘limited partnership type’ regional venture capital funds. Investments in regional 
venture capital funds is the activity where FII received the best feedback in our 
survey of the stakeholders. 
In managing the regional funds, there are benefits from having a single 
government body acting as a fund of funds investor. Central coordination helps 
in transferring knowledge and in professionalizing the management of the funds. 
It is also easier to develop performance measurements appropriate to a policy 
perspective when this task is the responsibility of one government agency. In 
managing the existing limited partnership funds, FII is acknowledged as having 
done a good job. Thus, it could be seen as the natural candidate to continue this 
role. 
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However, there is more than one type of regional fund. Regional policy has a 
history, which is complex and has involved the influence and interests of many 
agencies of the government. While it is not the objective of the present evaluators 
to comment on regional policy per se, we do believe that there is a clear need to 
rationalize and make the current enterprise support arrangements simpler to their 
users in regional areas of Finland. 
Regional investments should be consolidated and managed by fewer 
players in order to clarify roles, and to reduce the existing overlap in 
activities of several government agencies. One agency taking primary 
responsibility for regional funds could help develop the effective 
coordination of regional enterprise financing activities. 
5.7 Direct Investments 
Although the fund of funds operating mode has been stated as the most desirable 
form of activity for FII, the legislation gives an opportunity for FII to also make 
direct investments. FII has used this opportunity and has been planning to 
increase its annual allocation to direct investments. While direct investments in 
some cases might be justified, these circumstances are the exception. Both theory 
and practice would strongly suggest that the State’s involvement in making 
commercial decisions should be undertaken with considerable reservation. There 
appears little support from other parties in the Finnish innovation system for FII 
to expand its direct investment operations. 
While there are always some cases where intervention is justified, direct venture 
capital investments as a mode of government intervention have been generally 
seen as ineffective and expensive. The poor alignment of incentives, 
vulnerability to political pressures and lack of trained investment staff make 
direct investment by public agents of questionable value. Internationally, it has 
lead to a track record of losses in such operations where government assumes it 
can act as with comparable experience and efficiency to private agents seeking to 
maximize their own profits. In the case of FII, an odd contradiction is that while 
FII has successfully introduced the limited partnership structure in regional funds 
− by arguing the benefits of such a term structure over an evergreen fund 
structure − FII itself has recently tried to evolve closer towards the evergreen 
model. This is one effect of increasing the allocation of direct investments from 
FII’s own balance sheet. 
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Of the various alternative rationales for direct investments, our research found 
stakeholders giving most support for direct intervention by FII in strategically 
important, emerging technology areas. The prime example is the current situation 
facing the Finnish biotechnology/life sciences sector. However, such intervention 
should not be viewed as FII’s opportunity to develop a biotechnology team and 
become a new biotechnology investor. Instead, the role for FII would be to act in 
collaboration with the other players of the Finnish innovation system. A priority 
role at present is to help rationalize and consolidate a number of young Finnish 
life science companies that are too small to survive independently but still 
represent potentially interesting and valuable technology and intellectual 
property. This would require the refinancing and aggregation of existing 
enterprises in order to create viable companies capable of acquiring international 
financing on competitive terms in the future. In practice, this would mean FII 
treating biotech as a special project, which it would plan and co-ordinate with 
existing life science investors. This would require the delegation of technical 
appraisals and other industry specific knowledge to external specialists. It would 
not require FII to develop its own in-house specialists for ‘one-off’ interventions. 
FII would not undertake such investments in the absence of other commercial 
investors. However, it should also be noted that no rigorous argument has yet 
been presented for the above proposal. Such an independent analysis should be a 
precondition of any State action. 
A key issue in identifying such ‘strategically important’ targets is to operate in 
close collaboration with other players of the innovation system. The meaning of 
strategic importance should be unambiguously clear in order to justify FII’s 
attention and the employment of scarce State resources. It is confusing and 
ineffective from the perspective of the Finnish innovation system if FII operates 
independently without aligning its involvement in strategically important 
operations with other players of the innovation system. A strategically important 
intervention would, by definition, need the broad consensus of the relevant 
technical specialist agencies. For instance, Tekes and Sitra carry out research on 
science and engineering priorities and have an international technological and 
geographical perspective. Leveraging these organization competencies would be 
a necessity in order to determine with any credibility the strategically important 
areas where large-scale direct involvement is justified. Regardless of FII’s role, 
such allocations should be based on a decision at the highest levels of Finnish 
technology and innovation policy after a rigorous analysis of the purported 
problem. It should not automatically be assumed that FII should intervene 
without such an analysis. 
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In addition to direct intervention in sectors such as biotech, an alternative way to 
operate would be establishing a ‘special situations’ fund managed by private 
venture capitalists to target the identified market failure. The fund(s) should be 
set up with strict rules and limitations in order to ensure that funds remain 
targeted to the identified market failure. These constraints are likely to skew the 
risk and return characteristics making it unattractive for the private investors. 
Accordingly, private investors participating in such funds could be compensated 
by asymmetric profit-sharing between the public and private limited partners. In 
this model, the decision-making on a project by project basis would be delegated 
to private investors with suitable commercial incentives, experience, and contact 
networks to add value to the target firms. The ideal outcome would be highly 
targeted intervention resulting in a real increase in value to the firms so supported 
via the use of private-sector skills and experience. 
Should FII continue to be involved in direct investment activity, it 
should limit direct investments to technology areas with a recognized 
national policy importance. This requires consensus decision-making 
regarding strategic target industries and technologies. It also implies 
FII’s involvement in significant operations planned in coordination 
with other major players in the Finnish innovation system. FII should 
not recruit its own staff for such exceptional activities. An alternative 
preferred to direct investments is to create a focused fund managed by 
professional private investors. 
5.8 Other objectives 
One valuable role of FII has been its support in helping channel European Union 
funding to Finnish venture capital funds. Given the limited supply of domestic 
risk capital, the immature venture capital market, and the challenges for Finnish 
firms in internationalizing, an important part of the development of the venture 
capital market for FII in the future could be supporting the Finnish venture 
capital funds in attracting capital from foreign investors. 
5.9 Roles and Collaboration 
In collecting the material necessary to evaluate FII, it has become evident that 
opportunities exist to improve the level and quality of the collaboration between 
players in the Finnish innovation system. The operations of different State 
agencies have been driven more by the specific histories and interests of 
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individual agencies rather than a desire to coordinate the related objectives and 
goals of the Finnish innovation system. Some problems in the innovation system 
may be a consequence of the differing ownership structures, i.e. FII, Finnvera 
and Tekes are jointly under the control of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
while Sitra is under the authority of the Finnish Parliament. Further, no single 
ministerial portfolio or other key individual has pre-eminent responsibility for 
driving and developing the innovation system as a whole. The evaluators believe 
that the Finnish Innovation System needs such a champion rather than the current 
structure of diverse and, to an extent, competing responsibilities. 
Recently, an informal forum, “the group of six” has created to improve the 
collaboration and coordination among the State agencies involved in the Finnish 
innovation system (Sitra, Tekes, Finnvera, T&E Centres, Finpro, and FII). 
Recently, also the Foundation for Finnish Inventions joined the forum. This 
informal forum has so far had a couple of meetings at senior executive level. 
While this is a significant and positive development, it is not likely to be 
sufficient. Further, effective enterprise policy requires coordinated actions not 
only between several government special financing agencies but also in more 
fundamental functions such as taxation, regulation, and education given their 
importance as preconditions for entrepreneurial activity. Without sufficient 
measures taken to improve the incentives and other preconditions for high-
growth entrepreneurship, government supply of venture capital can have only a 
limited impact on growth-oriented entrepreneurship. Effective enterprise policy 
requires a clearly identifiable and responsible champion at the highest level of 
the government capable of influencing and driving the development of the 
environment for entrepreneurship in all key areas. 
Improved coordination between FII and other government agencies 
involved in the Finnish innovation system is urgently needed. The 
emergent informal forum is a valuable but not yet sufficient 
development. Currently, there is no single individual or ministerial 
brief responsible for driving the Finnish innovation system as a whole. 
There is a need for more centralized authority and direction in 
overseeing and coordinating the activities of various agencies and 
other vital areas such as taxation to improve the conditions for 
growth-oriented entrepreneurship. The present innovation system is 
still too much driven by its history and casually evolved structures 
rather than Finland’s future needs. 
In our evaluation, a picture emerged that FII is seen by its peers as more distant 
when compared to other State agencies in the Finnish innovation system. 
  
133
Whereas Sitra and Tekes have previously been more independent, they have 
recently developed a close working relationship. Tekes was seen as having the 
most clearly defined role in the innovation system. With FII, Sitra and Finnvera, 
there was more confusion, e.g. their overlapping roles in regional investments. 
Overall, the most unclear division of work was seen to be between FII and Sitra 
because both have a more general role in the development of the Finnish venture 
capital market. In identifying complementary roles for these organizations in the 
area of developing venture capital, a generally agreed view was that Sitra could 
be more focused on direct investments in the early stage area, whereas FII should 
operate as a fund of funds. Sitra already has investment teams operating in the 
area, has an experienced workforce, conducts research in the area, and 
collaborates effectively with Tekes in direct investments. FII, on the other hand, 
has good relationships with venture capital funds, institutional investors, the 
European Investment Fund, and has developed an organization best suited to a 
fund of funds operation. Conversely, it does not have the experience, 
organization and depth of managerial knowledge needed for effective operations 
in direct investing. 
The main problem of FII as a collaborator with other government agencies was 
seen by survey respondents as its habit of acting in isolation from others, its risk 
adversity, and the organization’s prioritization of profitability over key policy 
goals (e.g. early stage financing). The activities of FII were seen as being driven 
largely by personal priorities rather than based on needs identified in the 
innovation system. Such a critical response may be because respondents, 
including key collaborators, had a substantial lack of understanding of the role of 
FII. One further reason may be the variety of activities FII is pursuing without 
publicly presenting a clear view as to its priorities. There was a concern that FII 
is a product of conflicting political interests. Accordingly, management struggles 
to reconcile and manage the disparate set of goals imposed by various 
stakeholders involved in the creation and continued support of the organization. 
The effectiveness of FII as a policy tool for resolving market failures in venture 
capital has decreased at the same time as the need for such tools has increased. 
As a consequence, there is an evident need to improve the capability of FII to 
seriously and committedly focus on the identified market failures in early stage 
financing. If legislation, organizational structure, or other factors do not make it 
possible for FII to effectively address the identified market failures, the raison 
d’être of FII is seriously at question. If FII cannot be mandated with this 
important role, there may be a need to release resources and reorganize them in 
other ways which can more effectively target key market failures. The remit to 
resolve market failures in the supply of venture capital is, and remains, the 
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primary reason why FII was created as an important agent of government 
intervention. 
If FII is not able to establish and pursue a clear and effective role of 
resolving market failures in seed and start-up stage venture capital 
because of incompatible objectives, inappropriate organizational 
structure or for any other reasons, the continued existence of FII 
should rightly be questioned. There may be a need to reallocate 
resources between various government agencies in order to ensure 
that these market failure problems are addressed effectively. 
Reorganizations including the merger of existing agencies should not 
be ruled out of the options to be considered. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Glossary of Terms176 
Term Definition 
Added value  A private equity management team’s exceptional experience, know-how or 
valuable business contacts which constitute a vital input for the growth of investee 
companies. 
Angel financing  Capital contributed by independently wealthy private investors. See business angel.
Asset class  A category of investment, which is defined by the main characteristics of risk, 
liquidity and return. 
Business angel  A private investor who provides both finance and business expertise to an investee 
company. 
Buyout  A transaction in which a business, business unit or company is acquired from the 
current shareholders (the vendor). See management buyout (MBO), management 
buyin (MBI), institutional buyout (IBO), leveraged buyout (LBO). 
Buyout Fund  Funds whose strategy is to acquire other businesses; this may also include 
mezzanine debt funds which provide (generally subordinated) debt to facilitate 
financing buyouts, frequently alongside a right to some of the equity upside. 
Capital under 
management  
This is the total amount of funds available to fund managers for future investments 
plus the amount of funds already invested (at cost) and not yet divested. 
Carried interest  A bonus entitlement accruing to an investment fund’s management company or 
individual members of the fund management team. Carried interest (typically up to 
20% of the profits of the fund) becomes payable once the investors have achieved 
repayment of their original investment in the fund plus a defined hurdle rate. 
‘Classic’ Venture 
Capital 
An American term used to describe investment in seed, early stage and 
development funds but excluding private equity investments such as management 
buy-outs (often termed ‘merchant’ capital) 
Collateral  Assets pledged to a lender until a loan is repaid. If the borrower does not pay back 
the money owed, the lender has the legal right to seize the collateral and sell it to 
pay off the loan. 
Covenants  An agreement by a company to perform or to abstain from certain activities during 
a certain time period. Covenants usually remain in force for the full duration of the 
time a private equity investor holds a stated amount of securities and may 
terminate on the occurrence of a certain event such as a public offering. 
Affirmative covenants define acts which a company must perform and may include 
payment of taxes, insurance, maintenance of corporate existence, etc. Negative 
covenants define acts which the company must not perform and can include the 
prohibition of mergers, sale or purchase of assets, issuing of securities, etc. 
                                              
176  http://www.evca.com/html/PE_industry/glossary.asp?action=search&letter=no 
  
147
Deal flow  The number of investment opportunities available to a private equity house. 
Development capital  See expansion capital. 
Due diligence  For private equity professionals, due diligence can apply either narrowly to the 
process of verifying the data presented in a business plan/sales memorandum, or 
broadly to complete the investigation and analytical process that precedes a 
commitment to invest. The purpose is to determine the attractiveness, risks and 
issues regarding a transaction with a potential investee company. Due diligence 
should enable fund managers to realise an effective decision process and optimise 
the deal terms. 
Early stage  Seed and start-up stages of a business. See seed, start-up. Compare later stage. 
Early Stage Fund  Venture capital funds focused on investing in companies in the early part of their 
lives. 
Expansion capital  Also called development capital. Financing provided for the growth and expansion 
of a company, which may or may not break even or trade profitably. Capital may 
be used to: finance increased production capacity; market or product development; 
provide additional working capital. 
Fund  A private equity investment fund is a vehicle for enabling pooled investment by a 
number of investors in equity and equity-related securities of companies (investee 
companies). These are generally private companies whose shares are not quoted on 
any stock exchange. The fund can take the form either of a company or of an 
unincorporated arrangement such as a limited partnership. See limited partnership.
Fund of funds  A fund that takes equity positions in other funds. A fund of fund that primarily 
invests in new funds is a Primary or Primaries fund of funds. One that focuses on 
investing in existing funds is referred to as a Secondary fund of funds. 
Fundraising  The process in which venture capitalists themselves raise money to create an 
investment fund. These funds are raised from private, corporate or institutional 
investors, who make commitments to the fund which will be invested by the 
general partner. limited partner, commitment. See general partner, 
General partner  A partner in a private equity management company who has unlimited personal 
liability for the debts and obligations of the limited partnership and the right to 
participate in its management. 
Initial investment  First venture-backed investment made in an investee company. Compare follow-up 
investment. 
Institutional investor  An investor, such as an investment company, mutual fund, insurance company, 
pension fund, or endowment fund, which generally has substantial assets and 
experience in investments. In many countries, institutional investors are not 
protected as fully by securities laws because it is assumed that they are more 
knowledgeable and better able to protect themselves. 
IRR Internal Rate of 
Return  
The IRR is the interim net return earned by investors (Limited Partners), from the 
fund from inception to a stated date. The IRR is calculated as an annualised 
effective compounded rate of return using monthly cash flows to and from 
investors, together with the Residual Value as a terminal cash flow to investors. 
The IRR is therefore net, i.e. after deduction of all fees and carried interest. In 
cases of captive or semi-captive investment vehicles without fees or carried 
interest, the IRR is adjusted to created a synthetic net return using assumed fees 
and carried interest. 
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J-curve  The curve generated by plotting the returns generated by a private equity fund 
against time (from inception to termination). The common practice of paying the 
management fee and start-up costs out of the first drawdowns does not produce an 
equivalent book value. As a result, a private equity fund will initially show a 
negative return. When the first realisations are made, the fund returns start to rise 
quite steeply. After about three to five years the interim IRR will give a reasonable 
indication of the definitive IRR. This period is generally shorter for buyout funds 
than for early stage and expansion funds. 
Later stage  Expansion, replacement capital and buyout stages of investment. 
Limited partner  An investor in a limited partnership (i.e. private equity fund). Compare general 
partner. Compare early stage. 
Limited partnership  The legal structure used by most venture and private equity funds. The partnership 
is usually a fixed-life investment vehicle, and consists of a general partner (the 
management firm, which has unlimited liability) and limited partners (the 
investors, who have limited liability and are not involved with the day-to-day 
operations). The general partner receives a management fee and a percentage of the 
profits. The limited partners receive income, capital gains, and tax benefits. The 
general partner (management firm) manages the partnership using policy laid down 
in a Partnership Agreement. The agreement also covers terms, fees, structures and 
other items agreed between the limited partners and the general partner. 
Management buyout 
(MBO)  
A buyout in which the target’s management team acquires an existing product line 
or business from the vendor with the support of private equity investors. 
Pari passu Participate on equal terms, making investments on a pari passu basis with other 
investors (EIF) 
Portfolio company  
(or investee company) 
The company or entity into which a private equity fund invests directly. 
Private equity  Private equity provides equity capital to enterprises not quoted on a stock market. 
Private equity can be used to develop new products and technologies, to expand 
working capital, to make acquisitions, or to strengthen a company’s balance sheet. 
It can also resolve ownership and management issues. A succession in family-
owned companies, or the buyout and buyin of a business by experienced managers 
may be achieved using private equity funding. Venture capital is, strictly speaking, 
a subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for the launch, 
early development, or expansion of a business. See venture capital, venture 
capitalist. 
Public offering  An offering of stock to the general investing public. The definition of a public 
offering varies from country to country, but typically implies that the offering is 
being made to more than a very restricted number of private investors; that road 
shows promoting the offering will be open to more than a very restricted audience; 
or that the offering is being publicised. For a public offering, registration of 
prospectus material with a national competent authority is generally compulsory. 
See IPO. 
Rescue (or 
turnaround)  
Financing made available to an existing business which has experienced trading 
difficulties, with a view to re-establishing prosperity. 
Seed stage  Financing provided to research, assess and develop an initial concept before a 
business has reached the start-up phase. 
See early stage. 
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Start-up  Financing provided to companies for product development and initial marketing. 
Companies may be in the process of being set up or may have been in business for 
a short time, but have not sold their product commercially. 
See early stage. 
Track record  A private equity management house’s experience, history and past performance. 
Turnaround  See rescue. 
Venture capital  Professional monies co-invested with the entrepreneur to fund an early stage (seed 
start-up) or expansion venture. Offsetting the high risk the investor takes is the 
promise of high return on the investment. 
See private equity, venture capitalist. 
Venture capitalist  The manager of private equity fund who has responsibility for the management of 
the fund’s investment in a particular portfolio company. In the hands-on approach 
(the general model for private equity investment), the venture capitalist brings in 
not only moneys as equity capital (i.e. without security/charge on assets), but also 
extremely valuable domain knowledge, business contacts, brand-equity, strategic 
advice, etc. 
 
  
150
Appendix 2 
 
Summary of the European Commission’s 
Communication on State Aid and Risk Capital 
 
Table 15 summarizes the recent Communication of the European Commission on 
State aid and risk capital. 
Table 15.   European Commission Communication on State aid and risk capital 
2001177 178 
 
State aid and risk capital 
1) OBJECTIVE 
To authorise under certain conditions the granting of State aid in favor of risk capital. 
2) INSTRUMENT 
Commission notice - State aid and risk capital (Text with EEA relevance) [Official Journal C 235 
of 21.08.2001]. 
3) SUMMARY 
Definition of risk capital 
1. The Commission defined (in SEC(1998) 552 final of 31 March 1998)) risk capital as equity 
financing provided to companies in their start-up and development phases. 
Context 
2. On a capital market sometimes short of financial resources, European companies, and in particular 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the high-technology sector, face an equity gap. 
Indeed, the provision of equity finance presents numerous challenges both to the investor, who needs 
to make a careful analysis, and to the enterprise, which must agree to share control with an outside 
investor. In order to ensure that European enterprises do not become overdependent on debt finance, 
the European Union has developed a general policy in favor of promoting risk capital. In March 2000 
the Lisbon European Council set the date of 2003 for implementation of the risk capital action plan 
(RCAP ).  
3. However, from the viewpoint of competition, risk capital financing proved problematic in relation to 
the Commission's general policy on State aid, particularly as regards the essentially commercial nature 
of such financing on the fact that the beneficiary is often in the private sector. 
                                              
177  European Commission 2001 State aid and risk capital − summary of legislation (http://europa. 
eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26081.htm) 
178  European Commission, 2001b, State aid and risk capital, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, (2001/C 235/03), C235/233−C235/211. 
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4. In this notice the Commission recognises the important role that public authorities still have to play 
but takes the view that risk capital measures must be restricted to addressing certain "market failures" 
in the knowledge that public capital for enterprises is not the same as State aid. It has already published 
a number of instruments setting out the criteria for determining whether individual measures are 
covered by the definition of State aid and could thus apply to risk capital measures. These instruments 
include the 1984 notice on government capital injections, the 1998 notice on the application of the 
State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation and the notice on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees. The present notice 
supplements this legislative framework by clarifying certain aspects of the approach taken to risk 
capital aid. 
Scope 
5. On the one hand, the notice recognises that there are three types of aid beneficiary, viz. the investors, 
the funds through which the finance is channelled and the companies invested in . The Commission 
has, however, pointed out that this type of financing is not always considered to be compatible with the 
EC Treaty (see Article 87(3)), which allows the granting of State aid under certain conditions. The 
specific nature of risk capital aid stems from its commercial purpose. On the other hand, since certain 
measures to support risk capital do not have any distortive effect on competition, the Commission has 
acknowledged following a thorough analysis that State aid for risk capital is admissible where it can be 
shown that there is a market failure. 
Main assessment criterion: market failure 
6. A market failure can be defined as a situation in which the economic efficiency of supply and 
demand is not achieved owing to imperfections in the market mechanism. The causes of such market 
imperfections are often to be found in imperfect information and high transaction costs, which penalise 
mainly SMEs and new firms.  
7. With a view to authorising risk capital financing, the notice is based on Article 87(3) and considers 
that such financing must not exceed 500 000, 750 000 in regions eligible for aid under Article 87(3)(c) 
or 1 million in regions eligible for aid under Article 87(3)(a). The Commission must, however, 
ascertain whether the aid is proportionate to the market failure and must ensure that the distortive effect 
on the market is minimal. It is prepared to accept different forms of financing (investment funds, grants 
to cover administrative and management costs, guarantees to investors or venture capital funds, etc.). 
Criteria for assessing the compatibility of the measures 
8. The Commission looks, among other things, at the size and stage of development of the enterprises 
concerned, the existence of safeguards against distortions of competition, etc. 
9. These criteria may positively influence the Commission's assessment but they are not sufficient to 
permit the granting of aid. The weight given to these criteria may depend on the form of the aid and the 
aid measure itself. The Commission will take account of the regional nature of the measure and will 
ascertain whether the measure is proportionate. 
Notification procedure 
10. Any aid scheme not satisfying the conditions of this notice or of the de minimis rule must be 
notified using a standard form. 
11. The notice will remain in force for five years provided that no new decision is taken. 
4) IMPLEMENTING MEASURES  
5) FOLLOW-UP WORK 
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Appendix 3 
 
Country Summaries 
 
The following chapters summarize briefly the government venture capital 
programs in the selected countries (United States, Israel, German, United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Australia). Figure 31 presents the development of the 
investments in R&D and venture capital in these countries between 1996 and 
2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31.   The shares of R&D expenditures and VC investments as a 
percentage of GDP in selected countries in 1996 and 2001179 
                                              
179  Sources: OECD, EVCA, 3i/PwC, Worldbank, Tekes 
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United States of America 
The USA is the largest venture capital market in the world. In the peak year of 
2000, National Venture Capital Association members raised $104.6 billion and 
invested $102.3 billion. In 2001 with the advent of the severe market corrections, 
fund raising and disbursements fell to $40.6 billion and $37.7 billion 
respectively, the lowest figures since 1998. The USA is also arguably the most 
studied VC market in the world. While the USA is a society, which extols 
individual choice, the “free market” and “small government”, it is noteworthy 
how much legislative and fiscal support the VC industry has received since its 
genesis after World War II.180. As the size and importance of the venture capital 
industry has expanded, a host of agencies have become involved either directly 
or indirectly with promoting venture capital. In a summary report of this nature, 
it is impossible to do justice to the diversity of country programs. Therefore, only 
a small number of programs will be cited for each of our target countries. In the 
case of the United States, importance of the Small Business Investment 
Companies (SBIC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
programs will be specifically noted. 
Of particular importance in the history of the US venture capital industry is the 
role that the federally-funded Small Business Administration (SBA) has played 
in the industry’s evolution, particularly through the Small Business Investment 
Company (SBIC) program which started in 1958. These investment companies 
allowed a generation of investment managers to ‘cut their teeth’ via the 
management of government-supported investment programs designed to assist 
entrepreneurs and small businesses’ men and women. SBICs worked on the 
margins of the capital markets investing in enterprises that would be of no 
interest to large merchant banks nor the small number of established VC and 
MBO funds. This was one of the first major programs to use government-
mediated finance (i.e. sourced at cheaper rates than for other non-governmental 
users of the capital markets) in order to leverage the investment returns to 
‘limited partner’ contributors to small, privately owned and managed investment 
firms (SBICs). The program can offer leverage up to 300% of the fund’s own 
capital in areas where there is a special socio-economic case for additional public 
support. The SBA also sponsored the Small Business Development Centers 
Program – a university-related technology transfer program started in 1976. 
Given the contemporary importance given by several governments in developed 
                                              
180  See e.g. Bygrave W. D. and Timmons J. A., 1992, Venture Capital at the Crossroads, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA., Lerner J., 1999, The government as venture capitalist: The 
long-run impact of the SBIR program, Journal of Business, 72, 285-318.,  
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economies to venture capital support to young firms and the encouragement of 
the commercialization of university research, one cannot fail to be impressed at 
the foresight of US legislators and policy makers. 
The SBA also co-ordinates the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program which was set up in 1982. SBIR provides awards (grants) for small 
technology-based firms. It is a highly competitive program that encourages small 
business to exploit their technological potential. Pump-priming awards from the 
SBIR provide the incentive and support to inexperienced technical entrepreneurs 
to test the potential of their innovations at a comparative level of safety. The 
rational of the SBIR program is that by including qualified small businesses in 
the nation's R&D arena, high-tech innovation is stimulated. Through the SBIR 
program, the United States signals its support of the entrepreneurial spirit while 
simultaneously contributing to its specific research and development needs.  
Critically, SBIR targets the entrepreneurial sector specifically because of its 
innovative potential. A percentage of federal R&D funds are reserved for SMEs. 
SBIR funds the critical start-up and development stages through to the early 
commercialization of the technology, product, or service. The SBIR program 
embraces two levels of small business support: 
• Phase I is the start-up phase. Awards of up to $100,000 for 
approximately six months support exploration of the technical merit or 
feasibility of an idea or technology.  
• Phase II awards of up to $750,000, for as many as 2 years, expand 
Phase I results. During this time, the R&D work is performed and the 
developer evaluates its commercialization potential. Only Phase I 
award winners are considered for Phase II.  
• Phase III is the period during which Phase II innovation moves from 
the laboratory into the marketplace. No SBIR funds support this 
phase. The small business must find funding in the private sector or 
other non-SBIR federal agency funding. 
SBIR is managed by the SBA which co-ordinates the participation of the eleven 
major federal agencies (for example, the departments of Defense and 
Agriculture) involved in the scheme.  
Given that the US venture capital industry’s average investment in a new 
enterprise in 2001 was of the order of $10 million, tiny seed investments were 
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also outside the scope of many industry players. The comments below are only 
surprising in their indication of how small the size of investment US VCs were 
prepared to consider in 1998. 
“The garage start-up is dead. We want to be able to invest $4 million in a 
start-up” 
John Doerr, Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield and Byers, Silicon Valley Ca., 1998 
“…don’t ask for pocket change. Don’t come to Battery Ventures wanting $1 
million. We only do $3 million to $12 million deals.” 
Morgan Jones, Battery Ventures, Boston MA, 1998 
The organizations involved in public venture capital in US operate on both a 
federal and a State level181. SBA has a portfolio of 219,000 loans worth of $45 
billion182. 
On the regional level there are at least 43 State venture firms in at least 30 States. 
These funds often invest in technology-based firms. The State-level equivalent 
for the SBIR program is the State SBIRs, run since 1982 in at least 6 States. 
                                              
181  Lerner J., 1999, The government as venture capitalist: The long-run impact of the SBIR program, 
Journal of Business, 72, 285−318. 
182  History of SBA 1957−2000. 
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Israel183 184 185 186 187 188 189 
After the United States, the most frequently cited country regarding genuinely 
early-stage venture capital has been Israel. This relatively tiny nation of around 
six million persons became in the 1990s one of the world’s leading powerhouses 
of high-tech entrepreneurial activity. Israel had a higher level of venture capital 
as a share of GDP in the period 1998−2001 than any OECD country. On average 
for these years, Israel ranked ahead of the United Kingdom, Sweden and the 
United States in terms of venture capital raised and invested relative to its size. 
Growing rapidly in the 1990s, venture capital investments reached over 2% of 
GDP in 2000, but then declined with the downturn in technology markets.190 
After the US, there are more Israeli originated firms that have undertaken an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) on NASDAQ than from any other country, with the 
exception of Canada.  
Several factors help explain Israel's success in fuelling high-technology start-ups 
through venture funding: a risk-taking culture, wide-ranging technological know-
how partly associated with military-related developments, and a large supply of 
skilled human resources and intellectual capital based on both an excellent 
educational infrastructure and the international migration of Jewish scientists to 
Israel from particularly the former USSR. In addition, Israel has benefited from 
large inflows of venture capital from abroad especially from the United States. 
When analyzing the Israeli experience holistically, the unique political and 
economic history of the country has to feature largely in any analysis. However, 
from a policy perspective, the question becomes - how unique and exclusive to 
                                              
183  http://ifise.unipv.it/index.html 
184  http://www.israelventure.com/ 
185  http://www.yozma.com/ 
186  http://www.ivc-online.com/ 
187  http://www.israelventure.com/IVA-PPTn.ppt 
188  Trajtenberg M., 2001, Government support for commercial R&D: Lessons from the Israeli 
experience, Paper presented at the NBER conference on Innovation Policy and the Economy, 
Washington, DC. 
189  Trajtenberg M., 2000, R&D policy in Israel: An overview and reassessment, NBER Working 
Paper Series #7930. 
190  OECD, 2002, Venture Capital Country Note: Israel, DSTI/IND(2002)16, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
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Israel’s contemporary experience are their policy programs in the field of venture 
capital and the support of NTBFs? 
Two particular programs are of interest in relation to early stage support. These 
are i) the Yozma program which was set up in 1993 to develop the Israeli venture 
capital industry and ii) the present Technology Incubator program. Both 
programs came from the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS), which was set up in 
1970 with a direct remit to increase the R&D expenditure of Israel. At the start of 
the 1990s, Israel did not have a domestic VC industry. What funds had reached 
Israel were largely from investors in the US (and, to a lesser extent, Europe) with 
a strong commitment to supporting Israel and the Jewish nation. The objective of 
the OCS was to create de novo a VC industry to act as a source for capital for the 
emerging hi-tech start-up companies. 
Yozma (1993−97) has become one of the most well known government-initiated 
VC programs internationally. It reputation rests on three related outcomes. 
Firstly, this program was pivotal in creating an indigenous Israeli venture capital 
industry. Secondly, this latter goal was demonstrably achieved within five years. 
Finally, the government was able to withdraw from an active involvement in the 
market place by selling, at a profit, its shares of eight of the ten Yozma funds 
back to the Israeli and foreign private investors. These ambitious goals were 
designed into the original specification of the Yozma program by creating 
attractive incentives for the private investors to act according to the policy goals 
of Israel.  
Professor Dan Kaufmann (2001) of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies sees 
the Israeli industry as having gone through three distinct phases as it evolved to a 
level of commercial maturity by the end of the 1990s: 
Phase 1 (1993−1996): Creation, Emergence and Learning of Israeli VC 
Industry  
• Industry dominated by Yozma funds 
• Very low start-up company valuations 
• Small funds (~$20M) 
• Small amount invested in each start-up and small numbers of 
investments 
• Large share of co-investment with other Israeli VCs 
• Little seed investments and no specialization in areas 
• Foreign partners had an important operational role 
• Cumulative learning 
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• Very little understanding of the market and the VC business - very 
small added value by venture capitalists 
• Goal of venture capitalists to make fast exit through M&A (in low 
valuations − $10M−$70M). 
 
Phase 2 (1996−1998) − Growth  
• First round of private venture capitalist funds not related to Yozma 
were raised 
• Still low valuation in private investment, compared to US start-ups 
• Medium-sized funds predominate (~$100M) 
• Increase in the amount invested in each start-up and fewer portfolio 
companies 
• Increase in seed investments and beginning of specialization in 
investment areas 
• Foreign partners had less important, non-operational roles. 
 
Phase 3 (1999−2000) − Maturity  
• Many venture capitalist companies and large variety of VC company 
types 
• Normal valuation in private placements, compared to US start-ups 
• Most venture capitalists specialized in certain areas 
• Increase in seed investments 
• Increase in venture capitalists added value capabilities 
• Increase in co-investment with US venture capitalists 
• Goal of venture capitalists to create successful independent companies 
or very high valuations at exits 
• Israeli start-up companies becoming less dependent on Israeli venture 
capitalist’s added value. 
 
Yozma and the government’s finance were initially directed towards new funds 
primarily created by experienced non-Israeli investors bringing their finance and 
skills to Israel. Yozma provided up to 40% of the capital in each of the new funds 
but limited itself to no more than $8 million per fund, with private partners 
contributing $12 million. Thus, the overseas investors in the new funds have to 
find 60% of the funds under management. The incentive for private investors was 
the option to buy Yozma out of their fund after five years at the pre-arranged 
option price of the investment value + LIBOR+1% in addition to 7% of the 
future profits. Yozma invested in 10 small new funds and 15 start-ups directly. 
The target funds have grown from the original $200 million to $2.9 billion under 
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management. The Israeli Government exited Yozma in 1997, and this first fund 
was followed by Yozma II in 1998. The public funding of the venture capital 
sector has reduced to nearly zero from the 50% (including Yozma) of the early 
1990s.191 
Today there are about 100 Israeli VC funds with about $5 billion under 
management, and VC investments are being made at a rate of about $2.5 billion 
annually (in a country with a GDP of about $100 billion and a population of 6 
million). Kaufmann concludes that the success of the Yozma program was 
conditional on the potential value represented in the technology of young 
entrepreneurial firms in Israel. The attraction of these companies stemming from 
an increasing spend in civilian R&D over the 1980s coupled with a highly trained 
population was readily recognized by overseas VC firms. Thus, Israel offered 
investors many good investment opportunities. The government’s assistance to 
entrepreneurs was strongly focused on leveraging Israel’s technology and 
innovation excellence beyond its domestic shores. In essence, the Yozma 
program was about setting up the right conditions for the commercialization of 
new technologies by ensuring linkages to sources of finance and new (and larger) 
markets beyond Israel. 
After Yozma, the Israeli government has concentrated public policy on its 
incubator program, set up in the early 1990s. There are 24 technologically 
focused and geographically spread incubators. In Israel, the incubators assist seed 
companies in the areas of management, business development, marketing, setting 
up strategic alliances and raising VC investments. Initially the infrastructure 
needs of these technology incubators were supported up to 100% by the Israeli 
government, but today the VC funds are playing a more prominent role. In effect, 
the government has encouraged the privatization of these incubators. This is not 
dissimilar to the actions taken to privatize Yozma over time. It reflects a strong 
Israeli belief that after successfully setting initial conditions for industry 
development, the State should withdraw from an activity better undertaken by 
profit-focused, private businesses.  
In 2002, the Israeli government announced a seed capital program largely based 
on the earlier Yozma model, i.e. the initial investors have the option to buy out 
the State from the funds at some future date when risks and uncertainties are 
more defined. It will be of considerable interest to many observers whether or not 
                                              
191  OECD, 2002, Venture Capital Country Note: Israel, DSTI/IND(2002)16, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
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the earlier successes of the Yozma program can be replicated in a smaller scale, 
and in an investment activity which is known as being notoriously difficult at 
securing attractive returns. 
Germany192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 
The BTU-program (Beteiligungskapital für kleine Technologieunternehmen) was 
set up in 1995 to address the gaps in venture capital financing for small 
technology-based start-ups202. The BTU offers two types of support, equity co-
financing for start-ups and loan refinancing for venture capital funds203. The 
scheme is a successor to the earlier TBJU scheme. Its main purpose has been to 
encourage the investment of venture capitalists into high-potential young firms 
which do not have the collateral for normal, debt-based bank instruments. 
                                              
192  Becker R. and Hellmann T., 2000, The Genesis of Venture Capital: Lessons from the German 
Experience. 
193  Fiedler M.-O. and Hellmann T., 2001, Against all odds: the late but rapid development of the 
German venture capital industry, The Journal of Private Equity, 4, 31−45. 
194  http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/hellmann/pdfs/happyvc01all.pdf 
195  http://www.bvk-ev.de/stats2001.php/aid/68 
196  Haar B., 2001, Venture Capital Funding for Biotech Pharmaceutical Companies in an Integrated 
Financial Services Market: Regulatory Diversity within the EC, European Business Organization 
Law Review (EBOR), 2, 585−602. 
197  Mayer C., 2002, Financing the New Economy: financial institutions and corporate governance, 
Information Economics and Policy, 14, 311−326. 
198  Gilson R. J., 2002, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, Paper presented at the Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. 
199  Tykvova T., 2000, Venture Capital in Germany and Its Impact on Innovation, Center for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) - Department of International Finance and Financial Management. 
200  Adelberger K. E., 1999, A Developmental German State? Explaining Growth in German 
Biotechnology and Venture Capital, BRIE Working Paper 134, The Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy (BRIE), University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
201  Walz U. and Bascha A., 2001, Financing Practices in the German Venture Capital Industry: An 
Empirical Assessment. 
202  In Germany SMEs had relied traditionally on strong long relationships with their banks.  Equity 
markets were relatively under-developed in Germany throughout the majority of the 1990s. 
203  European Trend Chart on Innovation, Country Report: Germany, Jan-June 2001. 
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Providing a mixture of equity leverage and down-side protection via a 50% 
guarantee, the scheme expanded until 2000. In the three years up until this date, 
the federal government provided over 2 billion euros to the BTU scheme. 
One consequence of a scheme with, in effect, two banks (i.e. tbg and KfW 
competing to provide two variations of a State support scheme, was that early-
stage investments in Germany grew over the period to 2001 from a negligible 
figure to the largest venture capital commitment to early-stage technology in the 
European Union. There has been considerable discussion that the schemes were 
too generous. Certainly, the federal government has had to accept a major 
liability in the light of the “dot.com” implosion where large amounts of BTU 
guarantees were called in by the participating VC firms. Equally of concern to 
policy makers has been their assertion that German high-tech young companies 
are on occasion of a lower quality than their (particularly) UK counterparts, 
which have been raised in tougher soil. Certainly, the scheme appears to have 
engendered a ‘moral hazard’ dilemma. Given the guarantee for the VC firms, a 
number of companies have been forced into liquidation as it was more profitable 
for the investors to claim a 50% guarantee rather than receive a lesser amount 
from a buyer which would keep the guaranteed company afloat. 
The Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg, operating under DtA, Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank) provides equity financing for young technology-based firms. 
tbg invests only with a lead investor that invests at least an equivalent share (1:1 
leverage). The lead investor has an active role while tbg remains passive. In 
return for the lead investor's commitment, tbg may compensate partially any 
potential loss sustained. The refinancing of loans and coverage for risks is 
provided by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). “It offers low-interest loans 
to refinance venture capital providers who pass on this funding as venture capital 
to young technology-based firms. KfW partially releases the venture capital 
providers from their liability for the refinancing loan.”204 
DtA is the business start-up and SME promotion agency of the German Federal 
Government, an all-around service and special purpose bank for SME 
entrepreneurs in Germany. Of its two subsidiaries, tbg concentrates on young 
high-tech start-ups, while gbb focuses on equity assistance below the high-tech 
threshold especially for start-ups in the new Federal States.205 
                                              
204  European Trend Chart on Innovation, Country Report: Germany, Jan-June 2001. p. 33 
205  Deutsche Ausgleichsbank www.dta.de  
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The German government has reigned in the BTU schemes since 2001 given 
recent and substantial losses incurred via the guarantee shceme. A new scheme in 
2001 was launched to assist the provision of seed and pre-seed finance, the BTU-
Early stage Scheme. 
Sweden206 207 208 209 210  
Swedish policy towards innovation and industrial RTD policy went through a 
major change starting in 1999 when the three ministries of Industry, Employment 
and Communications were amalgamated. This was a visible indication of the 
Swedish Government’s commitment to creating a more efficient co-ordination 
between the different policy areas crucial to innovation. This resulted in the 
formation of VINNOVA (the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems) in 2000. 
The main objectives of VINNOVA are: 
• Financing RTD 
• Fostering co-operation between academic and industrial institutions 
• Promoting the diffusion of information and knowledge, especially to 
SMEs 
• Stimulating Sweden’ role within the EU’s RTD framework programs  
• Evaluating and developing the Technology Foresight process 
• Developing the role of research institutes in innovation systems. 
 
At the same time as RTD policy was being amended, the business and industry 
development side was also under government scrutiny. NUTEK, the Agency for 
Business Development, was revamped and assumed control of regional 
enterprise support through the incorporation of the ALMI group of 40 
local/regional bodies advising SMEs. 
                                              
206  http://naring.regeringen.se/propositioner_mm/ 
207  Kuusisto J. and Arnold E., 2002, Government innovation support for commercialisation of 
research, new R&D performers and R&D networks, Technology Review 121/2002, Tekes. 
208  http://www.vencap.se/article_view_e.asp?ArticleID=18 
209  http://www.industrifonden.se/english.html 
210  Hyytinen A. and Pajarinen M., 2001, Financial Systems and Venture Capital in Nordic Countries: 
A comparative Study, Etla Discussion Papers No. 774, The Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy, Helsinki. 
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A key part of the Swedish re-alignment was the creation of a new Regional 
Development Policy based on the regional policy bill “A Policy for Growth and 
Vitality in All Regions”. Regional growth agreements have been created, which 
will develop into regional growth programs in 2004 combining an analysis based 
on a set of priorities for the financing, implementation and evaluation of a series 
of regional growth initiatives. Also for 2002, VINNOVA intends to launch a 
program provisionally entitled “Regional Growth by the Development of 
Dynamic Innovation Systems”. The programs seek to achieve effective 
cooperation within each region between companies, the R&D system and the 
political system (the triple helix) in order to increase the international 
competitiveness of the regions in focused areas. 
The Swedish public funding system is organized through three central agencies:  
• Industrifonden (Swedish Industrial Development Fund) 
• NUTEK (Swedish Business Development Agency) 
• ALMI Business Partners AB. 
 
Industrifonden, founded in 1979, is a Swedish governmental foundation whose 
objective is to promote industrial growth in Sweden. As it is publicly financed 
and provides venture capital finance, it is the closest equivalent to FII in Finland. 
Industrifonden has received capital contributions from the government, totaling 
SEK 1.6 billion (175 million euros). Profitable investments have increased its 
current capitalization to SEK 4 billion (440 million euros).  
Industrifonden provides both debt and equity capital to SMEs with less than 250 
employees or with a turnover less than SEK 400 million. The minimum size 
required for a project is SEK 4 million (0.44 million euros), and Industrifonden 
can provide up to 50% of the capital needed. However, Industrifonden requires 
that there is another external investor present in the investment. The targeted 
firms are mostly technology-based firms that require financing for R&D or 
marketing efforts. Thus, they are mainly in the start-up or early growth phases. 
Industrifonden is a minority shareholder in 73 firms, and has loans to 136 firms. 
Also, it is a co-owner in seven regional venture capital funds. In 2001, 
Industrifonden made a result of SEK 510 million. The amount of capital 
committed was SEK 2042 million, and it has 305 investments in its portfolio.  
Industrifonden co-operates with the Swedish Business Development Agency, 
NUTEK. 
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NUTEK is the central Swedish public authority for industrial policy issues. Its 
role has been revised and expanded since 2000. Particularly, it has taken on a 
greater involvement in the execution of regional policy initiatives. NUTEK is 
engaged in four main areas of activity: financing, entrepreneurship programs, 
company development and regional business development. The activities 
between NUTEK and Industrifonden are coordinated so that NUTEK handles the 
applications and makes recommendations to Industrifonden. It is this latter 
organization that undertakes the subsequent analysis and makes the investment 
decision. The arrangement is to make the roles more cleare to co-ordinate 
financing, and increase the level of financing directed to SMEs. 
NUTEK in turn is connected with ALMI Business partners, a company with a 
regional network of 21 offices. Regional ALMI Business Partner offices are 
owned by State and local councils. ALMI provides both information and support 
and loans and guarantees for small, local firms. ALMI operates a fund worth of 
SEK 4 billion. 
Denmark211 212 213 
In Denmark, the administering agency for public financing to SMEs, research 
institutes, high-potential businesses and venture capital funds is directed through 
a single firm, Business Development Finance (“VaekstFonden”). Constituted in 
the legal form of a private venture capital fund, it makes investments directly in 
firms seeking financing, commitments to venture capital funds, and manages a 
loan guarantee scheme. Started in 1992, the fund has been implementing a new 
strategy since early 2001. Instead of exclusively underwriting loans, BDF has 
become an active early-stage investor. Using equity, convertible loans, and loans, 
the fund makes investments on commercial terms in firms that have difficulties 
raising capital.  
In 2001, the Growth Fund made investments to 69 firms, totaling to DKK 334 
million (45 million euros). It also made capital commitments to VC funds worth 
                                              
211  The European Charter for Small Enterprises, Implementation report, Denmark 2002. 
212  Danish Venture Capital Association http://www.dvca.dk/ 
213  Harding R., 2002b, Plugging the knowledge gap - an international comparison of the role for 
policy in the venture capital market, Venture Capital, 4, 59−76, Harding R., 2002a, A Gap 
Analysis of the Danish Venture Capital Market, Danish Growth Fund. 
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of DKK 100 million (13 million euros). The expected numbers for 2002 are 
DKK 250 million (34 million euros) for direct investments and DKK 250−400 
million (34−54 million euros) for venture capital fund commitments. The capital 
base on the fund is currently DKK 2 400 million (323 million euros). 
The fund manages a range of instruments from a guarantee scheme for venture 
capital companies (“Udviklingsselskaber”) and also a loan guarantee scheme, 
(“VækstKaution”). The former scheme, which started in 1992, is concerned with 
reducing venture capital firms’ risk in investing in innovative young firms that 
have had difficulties with raising private finance. 50% of the funds at risk are 
guaranteed by the State for the venture capital firm for an eight-year period after 
which the guarantee reduces and eventually terminates in year 12. The sixteen 
development companies administering the scheme for the Danish State have 
made guarantees of over €134 million and have invested in over 140 companies. 
United Kingdom214 215 
The UK enjoys the biggest venture capital and private equity industry in Europe. 
In 2001, some £12.2 million was raised (a record year) and £6.2 billion was 
invested in a record 1,597 companies. The UK is second only to the USA in size 
and history. It has embarked since the present government’s 1998 White Paper 
on Competitiveness on a range of policy initiatives designed to encourage and 
exploit the knowledge economy as represented by NTBF firms. Given the size 
and sophistication of the UK’s venture capital community, the government has 
until recently not felt the need to support or subsidize this investment activity. 
The biggest SME schemes were the Small Firm’s Loan Guarantee Scheme and 
the more technology-oriented SMART merit awards for NTBFs. However, 
neither of these schemes was designed to aggressively build the recipient 
company over a relatively short period. However, the increasing scale of the 
industry and its diffidence towards early-stage investment have increasingly 
obliged the government to be an active player in the early-stage venture capital 
market. 
One of the two most important new schemes has been the Regional Venture 
Capital Funds. These funds are directly designed to address ‘equity gap’ issues 
                                              
214  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica.htm 
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and the maximum funding per firm is 790,000 euros, i.e. two tranches of 
£250,000. Supporting, in a competitive bidding process, one fund in each of 
England’s nine regions, the UK government has allocated £80 million (127 
million euros) as the State’s contribution of the total investment funds. This sum 
represents 25% maximum in each fund with the European Investment Fund 
putting in a further 25% of the total fund. The private partners must contribute a 
minimum of 50% of the total funds raised. However, while the SBS money is 
subsidized, EIF’s returns are pari passu with any other commercial investor in 
the fund. The State also takes a more minor guarantee role by requiring that the 
private funds be repaid first before the State is repaid. Similarly, the limited 
partners are allowed to receive a 10% IRR before the State starts receiving any 
surplus back. The State’s distribution of rewards is capped at 5%. Thus the 
State’s returns are subordinated to the other limited partners while ensuring that 
the State invests first and is returned its principle funds (and any interest) after all 
LPs. This subordination is calculated to cap the State’s returns at 5% while 
ensuring private limited partners a 27% return if the fund reaches a net IRR of 
20% per annum. 
The Regional VC Funds form part of the wider Enterprise Fund. A second 
element of the government’s program is the UK High Technology Fund. This is 
managed by Westport UK Ltd. A professional fund of funds. This fund manager 
was given a target of £105 million to be raised from private sector investors 
alongside £20 million of government investment. This target was exceeded, as 
Westport was successful in raising £106.1 million from private sector investors. 
The Enterprise Fund was established on a ‘fund of funds’ basis, investing in 
existing high-technology based venture capital funds instead of directly in high-
technology firms. Westport attracted not only institutions new to investing in the 
high technology sector but also those who had never previously invested in 
venture capital. The fund is already making investments in those venture capital 
firms that are specialist in investing in early-stage, technology-focused 
companies. Investments in sectors being supported by the Fund include software, 
pharmaceuticals, communications, Internet technologies and biosciences. It is, as 
yet, too early to make any observations on the commercial success of this 
government-supported fund. 
The UK government is exceptional in Europe in having embraced a significant 
number of new financing initiatives, which include venture capital as a 
component part216. Notably these include the University Challenge Fund (a seed 
                                              
216  HM Treasury and Small Business Service, 2002, Enterprise Britain: a modern approach to 
meeting the enterprise challenge, Stationery Office, London. 
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fund initiative for British universities) and the socially targeted Phoenix Fund, 
which has a community development remit. These initiatives should have also 
been in the context of a change in policy towards the provision of advice in small 
firms. The Small Business Service set up the Small Business Investment 
Taskforce to look critically and informedly at the full range of the government’s 
support to small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those involving new 
technologies. 
Australia 
Given its geographic isolation coupled with the need of a modern economy to 
invest in the commercialization of new ideas, Australia has encouraged a range 
of enterprise-based schemes since the early 1980s. In 1996, (in part at the 
author’s instigation) the Commonwealth Government started to place 
considerable importance on encouraging the supply of venture capital to young 
Australian companies. The government also invested in demand-side activities 
particularly through its “investor ready” program for young companies seeking 
external funding. 
The venture capital activities of the government have been arranged under 
AusIndustry, the Commonwealth government’s business unit financing 
innovation and R&D. Operating under Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources, AusIndustry was established in 1995.217, 218 It manages an annual 
budget of A$1.7 billion, and channels its support in the form of grants, loans and 
tax concessions. AusIndustry provides a number a programs focused on small-
businesses, specific industries, R&D and venture capital. The programs are 
organized through private sector investors who make the specific investment 
decisions on behalf of the State.  
COMET is program for commercialization of emerging technologies. Launched 
in November 2000, funding of $30 million over three years has been allocated 
for the COMET program. Funds are aimed for early-growth companies, 
individuals and spin-off companies focused on the commercialization of 
innovative products. Competitive, merit-based grants are delivered by private 
                                              
217  AusIndustry website www.ausindustry.com.au  
218  Ferris W. D., 2001, Australia chooses - Venture capital and a future Australia, Australian Journal 
of Management, 26. 
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sector consultants. This scheme closely reflects the US SBIR and the UK’s 
SMART Award Schemes. 
The Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) promotes the commercialization of R&D. 
The small, high-tech companies at the seed, start-up or early expansion stages. 
Nine government-licensed private sector fund managers with funds ranging from 
$30 million to $50 million have been created with a remit to invest their funds in 
new technology-based companies. The total capital of the program, $358 million, 
is provided by both the Commonwealth and private sector investors, in a 
proportion of 2:1 government/private monies.  
AUSTEP Pre-seed fund is directed at universities and public-sector research 
agencies to address the gap between promising scientific discoveries and 
commercialization. Funds are managed by four private investors, with total funds 
of $100 million, of which $72.7 million is provided by the government. This 
program was set up in 2001. This highly leveraged fund has been designed to 
create sufficient incentives to attract private investors (via a capped return for the 
government).219 220 
The IIF and the Pre-Seed Fund were modeled closely on both American and 
European experience in that they contain both a leveraged financing and a 
guarantee element in the programs. The urgency of schemes that encourage the 
supply of venture capital finance have been made more cogent by the fact that the 
Australian Commonwealth has not had legislation that would have allowed for 
the formation of a tax transparent Limited Liability Partnership. This has made 
the Australian environment very unattractive to overseas investors. This fact is 
reflected in the relatively low value of venture capital as a percentage of GDP in 
Australia at approximately 0.1 percent of GDP in 2000.  
However, on 14 November 2002, the Federal Government tabled two bills which 
remove an Australian taxation impediment faced by international investors 
wishing to invest in Australian companies. The bills – Taxation Laws 
Amendment (Venture Capital) Bill 2002 and Venture Capital Bill 2002 – which 
apply retrospectively from 1 July 2002, were designed to put Australia's venture 
                                              
219  AUSTEP Strategic Partnering, 2001, Competitive Pre-Seed Fund for Universities and Public 
Sector Research Agencies: AUSTEP Submission on Threshold Issues, AUSTEP Strategic 
Partnering. 
220  UWA, 2001, Australia's Pre-Seed Fund, Media statement 16.8.2001, The University of Western 
Australia, Accessed: 25.11.2002, <http://www.uwa.edu.au/media/statements/2001/08/australias_ 
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capital industry on an equal footing with international best practice. The 
requirement to pay tax on gains derived from Australian investments has been a 
major disincentive for many international investors (which are frequently exempt 
from tax in their own countries, e.g. UK pension funds), from investing in 
Australia. It has significantly reduced the global funds available for financing 
start-up and expanding companies, particularly in Australian biotech and 
information technology industries.221 
                                              
221  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002, Venture Capital reform: Increased venture capital funds to flow 
into Australian companies, Press release 15.11.2002, PriceWaterhouseCoopers Australia, 
Accessed: 15.11.2002, <http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/service.nsf/docid/9A312FC0 
BD088407CA256C750000BDE2>. 
  
170
Appendix 4 
 
Stakeholder Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
171
 
 
  
172
Appendix 5 
 
Short Biographies of the Two Evaluators 
 
Dr. Gordon Murray 
Gordon Murray is an Associate Professor of Entrepreneurial Management at the 
Department of Entrepreneurship, London Business School, England (www. 
london.edu). He has worked for both international corporations and in 
government service before becoming an academic in his early 40s. Since 1990, 
he has researched, lectured and consulted internationally in the two related areas 
of New Technology-based Young Firms and the development of the International 
Venture Capital Industry. Dr. Murray is also deeply interested in both the 
commercial and policy implications of venture capital. He has conducted policy-
focused research for the UK, German and other European governments, the 
Australian Commonwealth and the European Commission, in addition to 
undertaking consulting commissions for several corporations, the British and 
European Venture Capital Associations, banks and other financial service 
providers. Particular long-term interests include how national venture capital 
industries have evolved over time; performance issues; and in trans-Atlantic and 
pan-European comparisons of venture capital support for, especially, start-ups 
and other early stage, technology investments. The strategic logic of corporate 
venture capital is a contemporary research interest with colleagues at Helsinki 
University of Technology. 
Dr. Murray is a senior advisor on policy-related issues concerning the financing 
and growth of New Technology Based Firms to the UK government’s 
Department of Trade & Industry and is a member of the recently created (2000) 
Small Business Investment Task Force. He is a member of the SBIT panel 
allocating £80 million of government capital to regional ‘seed’ venture capital 
funds. He has also regularly advised the European Commission on the financing 
of high-growth young firms and has recently become an invited member of the 
Professional Chamber of the Enterprise Policy Group set up in 2001 by 
Commissioner Liikanen (DG Enterprise). He is the only academic member of the 
High-Tech Committee of the British Venture Capital Association. Dr. Murray is 
also a member of the advisory board of a UK/US venture capital firm − Granville 
Baird Capital Partners. Dr. Murray will take up a Chair in Management at the 
University of Exeter in the UK (www.exeter.ac.uk) in January 2003. 
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Dr. Markku Maula 
Dr. Markku Maula is Senior Researcher at the Institute of Strategy and 
International Business of Helsinki University of Technology. He has worked at 
the Institute in various roles since 1997. Dr. Markku Maula graduated as Doctor 
of Science in Engineering (with distinction) in 2001.  
In his research, Dr. Maula has focused on venture capital, corporate venturing, 
and entrepreneurial management with his dissertation focusing on corporate 
venture capital. Dr. Maula has received several international awards for 
outstanding scholarship. He is only the second scholar in Europe to win the 
Heizer Award from the Academy of Management for the best doctoral 
dissertation in the field of new enterprise development. A research study on 
corporate venture capital by Markku (co-authored with Professor Gordon Murray 
of London Business School) was awarded the McKinsey & Company Best 
Conference Paper Prize Honorable Mention at the prestigious Strategic 
Management Society conference in 2000. 
In addition to his research and teaching roles, Dr. Maula has gained experience of 
a venture capital firm and a communications network manufacturer. Dr. Maula 
also acts as an advisor in areas related to business strategy, corporate finance, and 
innovation and enterprise policy. 
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